Of Tort Reform and Millionaire Muggers: Should an Obscure Equitable Doctrine Be Revived to Dent the Litigation Crisis? by Prentice, Robert A.
San Diego Law Review
Volume 32 | Issue 1 Article 3
2-1-1995
Of Tort Reform and Millionaire Muggers: Should
an Obscure Equitable Doctrine Be Revived to Dent
the Litigation Crisis?
Robert A. Prentice
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr
Part of the Torts Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Digital USD. It has been accepted for inclusion in San Diego Law
Review by an authorized editor of Digital USD. For more information, please contact digital@sandiego.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert A. Prentice, Of Tort Reform and Millionaire Muggers: Should an Obscure Equitable Doctrine Be Revived to Dent the Litigation
Crisis?, 32 San Diego L. Rev. 53 (1995).
Available at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr/vol32/iss1/3
Of Tort Reform and Millionaire 
Muggers: Should An Obscure Equitable 
Doctrine Be Revived To 
Dent the Litigation Crisis? 
ROBERT A. PRENTICE* 
"No polluted hand shall touch the pure fountains of justice." 
-Chief Justice Wilmot. 1 
"No court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon 
an immoral or an illegal act." 
-Lord Mansfield.2 
"Bernard McCummings, a New York City mugger, became a millionaire last 
week when the U.S. Supreme Court lot stand a ruling that a police officer 
used excessive force by shooting him in the back as he fled a crime scene 
in 1984. McCummings, paralyzed from the chest down from the shooting, 
had been awarded $4.3 million in damages by a New York Court."3 
* Smith Centennial Professor of Business Law, Graduate School of Business, 
University of Texas at Austin. 
I. 14 Collins v. Blantern, [1767] 2 Wilson 341, 350, 95 Eng. Rep. 847, 852 
(K.B.). 
2. Holman v. Johnson, [1775] I Cowp. 342, 343, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121 
(K.B.). This dictum is often cited as the origin of the ex turpi causa doctrine. Plaintiff 
sued to recover the purchase price of tea pursuant to a sale made in Scotland. The court 
held that because the contract was perfectly legal in Scotland, defendant could not raise 
as a defense the fact that the seller may have known that defendant buyer intended to 
smuggle the tea into England. 
3. Paul Clegg, A Mugger Millionaire, SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 5, 1993, at A25. 
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In a world of anecdote-driven tort reform movements, few 
stories other than the infamous cup of very hot McDonald 'S
coffee have more power to outrage than that of Bernard 
McCummings, the "millionaire mugger" who was awarded $4.3 
million by a jury after he was shot by a police officer allegedly 
using excessive force. A seldom-invoked equitable doctrine-----ex 
turpi causa non oritur actio ("no cause of action can arise out of 
an immoral act") has been invoked more liberally in other 
western common-law nations than in the United States and could 
be revived by U.S. courts and legislatures to bar recovery in 
cases like that of McCummings and, potentially, in a much 
broader range of cases as well. However , this Article demon-
strates that when the initial outrage of newspaper editorial 
writers is replaced by reasoned analysis, it becomes clear that 
the ex turpi causa doctrine should, other than in very exceptional 
circumstances, not bar recovery by even the most unsympathetic 
tort plaintiffs. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Many believe that the United States faces a litigation crisis of 
unparalleled dimensions. The crisis supposedly consists of the filing of 
far too many lawsuits, particularly tort actions. Fonner Vice-President Dan Quayle, for example, noted in his capacity as chairman of the 
President's Council on Competitiveness that eighteen million new civil 
cases were filed in the United States in 1989 alone. 4 The ill effects 
caused by such filings supposedly include loss of jobs, burdens to the 
U.S. economy, suppression of product innovation, and general injury to 
U.S. competitiveness in the global economy.5 
Suggestions for remedying the crisis have come from many quarters 
and have taken several shapes and forms.. Most states have passed tort 
reform legislation and at the time of this writing the Republicans' 
"Contract with America" is proposing more federal changes, yet no 
proponent of the "litigation crisis" theory would suggest that these 
reforms constitute anything more than a starting point for necessary 
4. Talbot "Sandy" D' Alemberte, Restarting Engine of Law Reform, AB.A. J., 
Oct. 1991, at 8. 
5. See generally WALTER K. OLSON, THE LmGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT 
HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT (1991); PETER W. HUBER, THE 
LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988). 
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Americans have often looked abroad for helpful reform ideas, 
especially because other nations are generally perceived as having less 
litigation than the United States. 7 Most prominently, many suggest that 
America borrow the "English rule" regarding attorneys' fees, so that a 
losing plaintiff will have to pay the attorneys' fees of a prevailing 
defendant. Such a rule, which prevails in most of the rest of the western 
world, supposedly will discourage the filing of frivolous lawsuits.8 
This Article also looks abroad to other western common-law 
jurisdictions that, suffering their own increases in tort litigation, use the 
ex turpi causa non oritur actio doctrine (which means, essentially, that 
no lawsuit may be brought by a person who has committed an illegal or 
immoral act) much more often than U.S. courts. The doctrine is used to 
dismiss tort litigation brought by a particularly troublesome type of 
plaintiff-a person, such as Bernard McCummings (the "millionaire 
mugger" referred to above), who is himself ( or herself) guilty of 
wrongdoing in a legal or moral sense.9 Indeed, the ex turpi causa 
6. The author has elsewhere expressed the opinion that over-litigiousness is not 
one of America's more pressing problems. Robert A. Prentice & Mark E. Roszkowski, 
"Tort Reform" and the Liability "Revolution": Defending Strict Liability in Tort for 
Defective Products, 27 GoNz. L. REV. 251, 254-71 (1992) (suggesting that claims of a 
"liability crisis" are overblown). Nonetheless, the author, too, would be pleased if fewer 
frivolous lawsuits were filed. Although aware that our current rules for tort litigation 
are not perfect, the author has defended strict products liability, one of the most 
controversial areas of tort law. Id. at 272-300. However, the author has also suggested 
helpful modifications to the current tort law system. See Robert A. Prentice, Reforming 
Punitive Damages: The Judicial Bargaining Concept, 7 REV. Lmo. 113 (1988) 
(expressing doubt as to existence of a punitive damages "crisis," but suggesting that 
judges use ''judicial remittitur" of punitive damage awards in appropriate circumstances 
to induce defendants to remove dangerous products from the market). 
7. On the other hand, there is evidence that despite the widespread perception to 
the contrary, U.S. citizens are no more litigious than citizens of other western 
industrialized nations. Bob Gibbins, Propositions.Built on Myth, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 7, 
1991, at 17, 17-18. 
8. See Edward A. Snyder, An English Reform for American Law, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 9, 1991, at AS (strongly supporting U.S. adoption of the English rule); Herbert M. 
Kritzer, The English Rule, AB.A. J., Nov. 1992, at 54 (questioning the efficacy of the 
English rule). 
9. Proponents of tort reform are almost as fond of citing examples of tort 
recoveries by criminals or drunk drivers as they are of citing excesses by "greedy" 
plaintiffs' attorneys. E.g., Capping the Courts, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 1985, at 30 
(editorial) (citing such examples). Of course, many of these tales are simply legal 
versions of "the urban legend." See generally Fred Strasser, Have 'Anecdotes,' Not 
Facts, Fueled Tort Crisis?, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 24, 1986, at 15. 
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defense has enjoyed a positive revival in recent years in Anglo-
Australian jurisdictions.10 Yet, the words ex turpi causa almost never 
appear in modem American court opinions.11 Furthermore, the doctrine 
has received virtually no attention in American legal literature, 12 and 
the only American decision which could be deemed a "landmark" in the 
area was decided in 1845.13 
This Article seeks (a) to explain the essence of the ex turpi causa 
doctrine,14 (b) to examine how it is applied in various forms in selected 
western common law jurisdictions (Australia, England, Canada, New 
Zealand, and the United States), 15 ( c) to evaluate the various specific 
approaches to application of the ex turpi causa defense which have 
evolved in these nations, 16 and ( d) to give an overall appraisal of the 
The Bernard McCummings case, however, is not apocryphaL See McCummings v. 
New York City Transit Auth., 613 N.E.2d 559 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 548 
(1993). It also led to howls of protest. See, e.g., Eric Breindl, Who Says Crime Doesn't 
Pay?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 1993, at Al7; Mugging the System, ATLANTA J. & CONST., 
Dec. 3, 1993, at Al 7; The Mugger and His Millions, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1993, at B2; 
Richard Cohen, A Mugging of Taxpayers, PLAIN DEALER {CLEVELAND), Dec. 5, 1993, 
at 3D; Steve Lopez, A Mugger Shouldn't Profit from Beating, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, 
Dec. 4, 1993, at 29A; Tom Knott, Thuggery Just Isn't What It Used To Be, WASH. 
TIMES, Dec. 2, 1993, at C2; Marcia Chambers, Sua Sponte, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 20, 1993, 
at 13 (listing the case as an example of the "foibles of the legal community" in 1993). 
10. See, e.g., LEWIS N. KLAR. TORT LAW 326 {1991) {citing ex turpi causa's 
"apparent rebirth in Canadian tort law"); R.F.V. HEUSTON & R.A. BUCKLEY, SALMOND 
AND HEUSTON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 327 {19th ed. 1987) {ex turpi causa defense has 
enjoyed an "apparent rebirth in Canadian tort law"); ALLEN M. LINDEN, CANADIAN 
TORT LAW 439 (1977) ("There has been a rebirth of an old, harsh doctrine of the 
common law-ex turpi causa non oritur actio, or what might be called the illegality 
defence."); C. R. Symmons, Ex Turpi Causa in English Tort Law, 44 Moo. L. REV. 585, 
588 (1981) (ex turpi causa seems "in receat years to have attained greater prominence 
in tort cases"). 
11. A quick LEXIS search will confirm the accuracy of this statement. When the 
phrase does appear, it is almost always in a footnote or a passing reference, with no 
attempt to explain or justify the doctrine. 
12. The last full-scale discussion of the matter was apparently in Harold S. Davis; 
The Plaintiff's Illegal Act as a Defense in Actions of Tort, 18 HARV. L. REV. 505 (1905). 
The issue has received passing attention in a few more recent articles (E.g., Paula C. 
Murray & Brenda J .. Winslett, The Constitutional Right to Privacy and Emerging Tort 
Liability for Deceit in Interpersonal Relationships, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 779, 817-22; 
Robert A. Prentice & Paula C. Murray, Liability for Transmission of Herpes: Using 
Traditional Tort Principles to Encourage Honesty in Sexual Relationships, 11 J .. 
CONTEMP. L. 67, 93-101 (1984); Louis A. Alexander, Liability in Tort for the Sexual 
Transmission of Disease: Genital Herpes and the Law, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 101, 135-
37 (1984); Marc Gary, Comment, Tort Liability of Participants in Consensual Crimes, 
65 GEO. L.J. 1619, 1629-34 (1977). 
13. Bosworth v. Swansey, 51 Mass. (10 Met.) 363 (1845). 
14. See infra notes 20-75 and accompanying text. 
15. See infra notes 76-177 and accompanying text. 
16. See infra notes 178-255 and accompanying text. 
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doctrine to determine whether it should be revitalized by the courts17 
(or adopted by the legislatures) in the United States18 as a means of 
solving the so-called tort litigation crisis. 
Whether application of the ex turpi causa defense in tort cases is an 
appropriate doctrinal transplantation (from contract law) raises many 
interesting questions that are basic to the very theoretical underpinnings 
of tort jurisprudence.19 
II. EX TuRPI CAUSA NON ORJTUR ACTI0: BACKGROUND AND 
ORIGINS 
A. A Legal Maxim Defined 
As noted earlier, ex turpi causa non oritur actio means: ''No cause of 
action can arise out of an immoral ( or illegal) inducement ( or consider-
ation). "20 
B. Roots in Contract Law 
1. Introduction 
The ex turpi causa doctrine originated in contract law;21 indeed, ex 
turpi contractu non oritur actio22 is the most familiar application of the 
doctrine. It is a fundamental concept of contract law that illegal 
bargains will not be enforced by the courts. 23 
17. Ex turpi causa non oritur actio is a court-developed legal maxim developed 
for contract cases and occasionally applied in tort cases. Courts invented the doctrine. 
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 330 (1982). They have slowly discarded it in tort 
cases in the United States. Theoretically, they have the power to revive it. 
18. See infra notes 256-364 and accompanying text. 
19. The ex turpi causa defense raises many intricate and fascinating philosophical 
and legal questions, but suffers from the problem raised by Justice Manning when he 
complained that "a nice point of law has been brought to the surface of an unedifying 
contest between unmeritorious suitors." Godbolt v. Fittock, 1963 N.S.W. St. R. 617,624 
(Austl.) (paraphrasing Psaltis v. Schultz, 76 C.L.R. 547, 557 (1948) (Austl.) (Dixon, J.)). 
20. BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 447 (3d ed. 1969). 
21. Godbolt, 1963 N.S.W. St. R. at 627 (Manning, J.) (The ex turpi causa doctrine 
"had its origin no later than the eighteenth century and was directed primarily to 
contracts."). 
22. Literally, "[f]rom an immoral (or illegal) contract no action can arise." 
BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 20, at 447. 
23. 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON, CONTRACTS§ 1630 (2d ed. 1937). 
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The famous English "Highwayman's case," Everet v. Williams,24 
illustrates this limitation on the principle of freedom of contract. In 
Everet, one partner sued another, alleging that the defendant had kept 
more than his share of the partnership's proceeds. The complaint was 
rather vague in describing the nature of the business, alleging that the 
parties "proceeded jointly in [dealing for commodities] with good 
success on Hounslow Heath, where they dealt with a gentleman for a 
gold watch;" that in Finchley plaintiff and defendant "dealt with several 
gentlemen for divers watches, rings, swords, canes, hats, cloaks, horses, 
bridles, saddles, and other things;" that a gentleman from Blackheath 
had items defendant thought "might be had for little or no money in case 
they could prevail on the said gentleman to part with the said things."25 
It is told that when it dawned on the court that the partners were 
highwaymen, the solicitors for both parties were jailed, and the parties 
themselves were executed, vividly making the point that courts will not 
enforce illegal bargains. 
2. Scope of the Doctrine 
The Restatement of the Law of Contracts specifies that a contract is 
"illegal . . . if either its formation or performance is criminal, tortious, 
or otherwise opposed to public policy."26 Thus, this is a broad concept, 
especially so because it gives courts discretion to go beyond criminal 
acts in order to refuse to give effect to bargains deemed inconsistent 
with that "unruly horse"27 of public policy. Public policy has been 
used to invalidate contracts on grounds of immorality, unconscionability, 
economic policy, unprofessional conduct, injury to public institutions, 
24. The case is partially reproduced and discussed in The Highwayman's Case 
(Everet v. Williams), 9 LAW. Q. REV. 197 (Sir Frederick Pollock ed., 1893). 
25. Id. 
26. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS§ 512 (1932). This statement of 
the law has been refined in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 178 (1981). 
27. Richardson v. Mellish, 2 Bing. 229, 252, 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303 (1824) 
(Burrough, J.). This unruly horse also evolved over time as standards of morality and 
business ethics changed. As noted in Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224 (1892): 
It is impossible to define with accuracy what is meant by that public policy for 
an interference and violation of which a contract may be declared invalid. It 
may be understood in general that contracts which are detrimental to the 
interests of the public as understood at the time fall within the ban. The 
standard of such policy is not absolutely invariable or fixed, since contracts 
which at one stage of our civilization may seem to conflict with public 
interests, at a more advanced stage are treated as legal and binding. 
Id. at 233-34. 
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and many other grounds.28 Courts have, on public policy grounds, 
refused to enforce numerous types of agreements,29 including: contracts 
inducing the commission of a tort,30 contracts in restraint of trade (such 
as overly broad covenants-not-to-compete31), gambling or lottery 
contracts,32 contracts adversely affecting the administration of justice 
(such as champerty and maintenance contracts33), contracts tending to 
corrupt or to cause a neglect of duty (such as contingent fees for 
lobbyists34 or unfair exculpatory clauses35), and contracts impeding the 
marriage relationship. 36 
3. Rationale of the Doctrine 
Although the common law gives great weight to the freedom of men 
and women to privately order their own affairs, the illegality defense 
embodies the legal system's recognition that in some instances the 
freedom to contract is outweighed by broader societal interests.37 
Assume that A hires B to murder C. Although it is clear that the courts 
28. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS§ 22-1 
(2d ed. 1977). 
29. See generally 14 WALTER H. E. JAEGER & SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE 
ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS§ 1628 (3d ed. 1972); LAURENCE P. SIMPSON, HANDBOOK 
OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 430-62 (2d ed. 1965); GROVER C. GRISMORE & JOHN E. 
MURRAY, JR., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 488-503 (rev. ed. 1965). 
30. E.g., Sayres v. Decker Auto. Co., 145 N.E. 744 (N.Y. 1924) (holding an 
agreement to defraud an insurance company unenforceable)
31. E.g., Bryceland v. Northey, 772 P.2d 36 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (finding a 
covenant too broad temporally to be enforceable). 
32. E.g., McFadden v. Bain, 91 P.2d 292 (Or. 1939) (deciding that where a prize 
wall awarded on the basis of mere chance, illicit lottery was involved). 
33. E.g., Fordson Coal Co. v. Garrard, 125 S.W.2d 977, 981 (Ky. 1939) (deciding 
that champerty and maintenance contracts are those contracts that have "the tendency or 
purpose to stir up and foment litigation, multiply contentions, or unsettle the peace and 
quiet of a community, or set one neighbor against another" and were therefore void). 
34. E.g., Gesellschaft v. Brown, 78 F.2d 410, 412 (D.C. Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 
296 U.S. 663 (1935) (finding a contingent fee for passage of a bill was void as "a direct 
and strong incentive to the exertion of not merely personal, but sinister, influence upon 
the legislature"). 
35. E.g., DeVito v. New York University College of Dentistry, 544 N.Y.S.2d 109 
(Sup. Ct. 1989) (holding a release of liability for willful or gross negligence was 
unenforceable). 
36. E.g., McCoy v. Flynn, 151 N.W. 465 (Iowa 1915) (deciding that a promise to 
pay a woman $5,000 if she remained unmarried for three years was unenforceable). 
37. See Peat Marwick v. Haass, 775 S.W.2d 698, 710 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (''The 
right of competent parties to make their own bargain is not unlimited."). 
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should not enforce the agreement at the behest of either party, many 
cases are not so clear and therefore involve a delicate weighing of public 
policy factors. 
Factors favoring enforcement may include the justified expectations of 
the parties, any forfeiture that might result from a refusal to enforce, and 
excusable ignorance of the law by one of the parties.38 Factors 
weighing against enforcement include the importance of the public 
policy involved, the seriousness and deliberateness of the parties' 
misconduct, and the directness of connection between that misconduct 
and the agreement. 39 Thus, as a. general rule, a plaintiff who has 
performed a promise and who would face a burdensome forfeiture if the 
contract were not performed may recover if the illicit act is merely 
ma/um prohibitum.40 However, this general rule is filled with excep-
tions, and the distinction between acts that are ma/um prohibitum 
("wrong because prohibited") and those that are ma/um in se ("wrong in 
themselves") has been harshly criticized.41 
Among the oft-spoken reasons for the American courts' refusal to 
enforce illegal or immoral contracts are: (a) to deter illegal or other 
undesirable conduct,42 (b) to avoid sullying the machinery of justice,43 
and (c) to regulate contractual morality.44 Similar reasons are given in 
38. FARNSWORTH, supra note 17, at 328. 
39. Id. 
40. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 28, at 788 (quoting John E. Rosasco 
Creameries, Inc. v. Cohen, 11 N.E.2d 908, 909 (N.Y. 1937)). . 
41. Gibbs v. Consol. Gas Co., 130 U.S. 396, 411-12 (1889) (the distinction 
between these two concepts "has long since been exploded"). See generally ARTHUR 
L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 1169, (1952). 
42. See McMullen v. Hoffinan, 174 U.S. 639,670 (1899). The McMullen Court 
stated:· . 
The more plainly parties understand that when they enter into contracts of this 
nature they place themselves outside the protection of the law, so far as that 
protection consists in aiding them to enforce such contracts, the less inclined 
will they be to enter into them. In that way the public secures the benefit of 
a rigid adherence to the law. 
Id.; see also Sirlcin v. Fourteenth St. Store, 108 N.Y.S. 830, 834 (N.Y. App. Div. 1908) 
("I think nothing will be more effective in stopping the growth and spread of this 
corrupting and now criminal custom [of commercial bribery] than a decision that the 
courts will refuse their aid to a guilty vendor or vendee .... "). See generally Juliet 
P. Kostritsky, Illegal Contracts and Efficient Deterrence: A Study in Modern Contract 
Theory, 74 IOWA L. REV. 115 (1988) (arguing that the illegality doctrine is based on 
courts' application of an efficient deterrence approach). 
43. Manning v. Noa, 76 N.W.2d 75, 77(Mich. 1956) ("Our doors are open to both 
the virtuous and the villainous. We do not, however, lend our aid to the furtherance of 
an unlawful project, nor do we decide, as between two scoundrels, who cheated whom 
the more."). 
44. Kostritsky, supra note 42, at 119. 
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other common-law jurisdictions.45 
4. Effect of Contractual Illegality 
Generally speaking, courts refuse to lend the judicial process to aid 
either party to an illegal bargain. Courts often state that illegal contracts 
are void ab initio, (void from their inception) but it seems more accurate 
to conclude that courts simply leave· the parties to an illegal bargain 
where they find them,46 refusing to allow judicial machinery to be used 
to provide remedies to one who has participated in· an illegal transac-
tion, 47 ' ' 
There are, of course, exceptional situations where the courts will lend 
a hand in cases involving illegal contracts, including (a) where plaintiff 
is in the category of persons meant to be protected by the violated 
statute,48 (b) where plaintiff is less at fault than defendant,49 and (c) 
where a "severable" contract allows the court to enforce the legal 
45. See e.g., Euro-diam Ltd. v. Bathurst, [1988] 2 W.L.R. 51 7 (Eng. C.A.); 
Bowmakers Ltd. v. Barnet Instruments Ltd., [1945] 1 K.B. 65 (Eng.); Beresford v. Royal 
Ins. Co. Ltd., [1938] A.C. 586 (Eng.). See generally Y. L. Tan, Stolen Diamonds and 
Ex Turpi Causa, 104 LAW Q. REV. 523 (E.M.B. Reynolds ed., 1988). 
46. This, of course, often means that one wrongdoer unjustly profits at the expense 
of another. For example, if A has lost an illegal bet to B and paid on that bet, a court 
will not assist A in retrieving her money. This result stems not from any solicitude for 
B, but simply from a reluctance to aid A. FARNSWORTHsupra note 17, at 326-27. 
· 47. GRISMORE & MURRAY, supra note 29, at 509. · Grismore &.Murray believe 
that the essence of the courts' approach is embodied in the following statement from 
Lord Mansfield: 
The principle of public policy is this; ei dolo malo non oritur actio. No Court 
will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or· 
an illegal act. If, from the plaintiff's own stating or otherwise, the cause of 
action appears to arise ex turpi causa or the transgression of a positive law of 
this country, there the-Court says he has no right to be assisted. It is upon that 
ground the Court goes; not for the sake of the defendant, but because they will 
not lend their aid to such a plaintiff. So if the plaintiff and defendant were to 
change sides, and the defendant was to bring his action against the plaintiff, 
the latter would then have the advantage of it; for where both are equally in 
· fault, potior est conditio defendentis. · 
Holman v. Johnson, [1775] 1 Cowp. 342, 343, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121 (K.B. 1775). 
48. E.g., Kneeland v. Emerton, 183 N.E. 155 (Mass. 1932) (Deciding that the 
purchaser of illegal bonds which defendant failed to register under blue-sky law was not 
denied remedy of enforcement of the bonds).· · 
49. E.g., Stewart v. Wright, 147 F. 321 (C.C. Mo. 1906), cert. denied, 203 U.S. 
590 (1906) (granting amateur gambler hoodwinked by infamous Buckfoot Gang relief). 
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portions of a contract that are independent of the illicit provisions. 50 
C. Ex Turpi Causa: Transplanted to the Tort Context 
1. Overview 
Although there is little or no historical evidence that the ex turpi causa 
non oritur actio defense was originally intended for application beyond 
the contractual context, it has been asserted, with varying degrees of 
success, as a defense in tort cases in the United States and, more 
frequently, · in other western common-law jurisdictions. This is so 
despite the warnings of many that a contract doctrine should not lightly 
be transplanted to the field of tort law.51 
In the United Kingdom, Lord Diplock noted in 1964: 
[E]x turpi causa non oritur actio is concerned not specifically with the 
lawfulness of contracts but generally with the enforcement of rights by the 
courts, whether or not such rights arise under contract. All that the rule means 
is that the courts will not enforce a right which would otherwise be enforceable 
if the right arises out of an act committed by the person asserting the right ( or 
by someone who is regarded in law as his successor) which is regarded by the 
court as sufficiently anti-social to justify the court's refusing to enforce that 
right. 52 
In transplanting the ex turpi causa defense from contract law into the 
body of tort law, courts have given the same basic justifications for the 
doctrine53 and have provided for many of the same limitations. 54 
50. E.g., Panasonic Co. v. Zinn, 903 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1990) (deciding that an 
illegal provision of contract that was not an essential feature of the agreement could be 
severed and the valid portion of the contract enforced). 
51. E.g., G.H.L. Fridman, The Wrongdoing Plaintiff, 18 MCGILL L.J. 275, 295 
(1972) ("Slavish emulation of the contract principles in an altogether different situation". 
could lead to a confusion of the real issue before a court faced with the tort problem."). 
52. Hardy v. Motor Insurers' Bureau, [1964] 2 ALL E.R. 742, 750 (emphasis 
added). 
53. See infra notes 256-325 and accompanying text. 
54. For example, in tort law the ex turpi causa defense does not bar recovery by 
a wrongful plaintiff who was a member of the class protected by a criminal statute. 
E.g., Galvin v. Jennings, 289 F.2d 15 (3d Cir. 1961) (state alcoholic beverage regulation 
intended to protect minors and drunks, so plaintiff was permitted to recover for personal 
injuries resulting from illegal sale by defendant); Hudson v. Craft, 33 Cal. 2d 654, 201 
P.2d 1 (1949) (state ,law intended to protect amateur boxers, so combatants allowed to 
recover for injuries resulting from illegal boxing match). 
Also, as in contract cases, courts in tort cases often provide compensatory relief to a 
plaintiff who was significantly less at fault (not in pari delicto ) than the defendant. 
E.g., De Vall v. Strunk, 96 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) (plaintiff female seduced 
into sexual intercourse by defendant's false promise to marry entitled to recover on 
battery claim for sexually transmitted disease); Panther v. McKnight, 125 Okla. 134,256 
P. 916 (1926) (plaintiff who relied on defendant's false assurance that they were legally 
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Courts in the common law system do not hold wrongdoing plaintiffs 
to be caput lupinum.55 Forfeiture and taint of blood are no longer 
general consequences of criminal activity,56 yet few courts would aid 
a burglar who tripped on a defective stair in his suit against the 
homeowner who failed to post a warning. Before examining the current 
state of the ex turpi causa defense in tort suits brought in western 
common-law jurisdictions, it might be helpful to examine some factual 
scenarios to illustrate how a revitalization of the ex turpi causa defense 
in the tort arena would reduce the amount of tort litigation ( and ultimate 
liability of tort defendants) in the United States: 
* Consider McCummings v. New York City Transit Authority,51 in 
which a mugger who was shot by transit police as he sought to escape 
apprehension was awarded a $4.3 million judgment against the City 
of New York. In England and other countries, many courts would 
apply the ex turpi causa defense to deny recovery in such cases. 58 
* Consider Ashmore v. Cleanweld Prods., Inc.,59 in which plaintiff 
was injured while making an illegal pipe bomb that exploded 
premanturely. The court held that his lawsuit against the manufacturer 
of one of the components of the pipe bomb could proceed despite the 
illegal nature of his activities.60 A vigorous application of the ex 
turpi causa defense would likely lead to an outright dismissal of such 
married also entitled to recover for transmission of venereal disease). 
55. "Caput lupinum" means a "wolfs head" or outlaw. BALLENTINE'S LAW 
DICTIONARY, supra note 20, at 174. See Henwood v. Municipal Tramways Trust, [1938] 
60 C.L.R. 438, 446 (Latham, C.J.) ("[T]here is no general principle of English law that 
a person who is engaged in some unlawful act is disabled from complaining of injury 
done to him by other persons, either deliberately or accidentally. He does not become 
caput lupinum."); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 484 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) ("The door of a court is not barred because the plaintiff has committed a 
crime. The confinned criminal is as much entitled to redress as his most virtuous fellow 
citizen; no record of crime, however long, makes one an outlaw,"); Rodney v. Rapid 
Transit Co., 267 N.Y.S. 86, 87 (Sup. Ct. 1933) (allowing recovery for false imprison-
ment by illegal alien and noting "even the meanest outcast is entitled to protection 
against unlawful restraint of his person"). 
56. M.P. Furmston, The Analysis of Illegal Contracts, 16 U. TORONTO L.J. 267, 
274 (1965). 
57. 613 N.E.2d 559 (N.Y.}, cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 548 (1993). 
58. E.g., Murphy v. Culhane, [1977] Q.B. 94, 98 (Eng. C.A.) (dicta). 
59. 672 P.2d 1230 (Or. 1983) . 
60. Id. at 1231. 
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a suit based on plaintiff's illegal acts.61 
* Consider Gonzalez v. Garcia,62 in which plaintiff passenger and 
defendant driver went on a drinking expedition. Plaintiff knew that 
defendant was extremely drunk, yet voluntarily rode in the car with 
him and was injured when an accident occurred. Plaintiff recovered 
a judgment against defendant, and it was held that the trial court 
properly refused to instruct the jury regarding the assumption of risk 
defense. In other countries, the ex turpi causa defense has been held 
to completely·bar recovery in similar cases.63 
* Consider Long v. Adams,64 in which plaintiff contracted herpes 
from defendant during sexual intercourse. Despite the fact that the 
parties were not married and the intercourse was therefore illicit, 
plaintiff was allowed to recover on a battery theory. · Recognition of 
the ex turpi causa defense might well totally bar recovery in such 
circumstances because of plaintiff's immoral and possibly illegal 
acts.65 
* Consider Chomatopoulos v. Roma DeNotte Social Club,66 in which 
plaintiff was stabbed eight times while intervening in a fight that 
occurred at an illegal gambling establishment. Plaintiff sued the 
operator of the establishment for negligence and was held entitled to 
recover. In similar cases in other countries, the ex turpi causa defense 
has' been used to hold that no duty of care arises to protect a voluntary 
frequenter of such illicit establishments.67 · 
* Consider Laird v. Illinois Cen. R.R. Co.,68 in which a FELA69 
plaintiff was allowed to recover fifty percent of his damages caused 
by a concurrence of his employer's negligence and his own violation 
of a safety regulation meant for his own protection. In other countries 
the ex turpi ·causa defense has sometimes been invoked to totally bar 
61. E.g., Barker v. Kallash, 468 N.E.2d 39 (N.Y. 1984) (dismissing suit by plaintiff 
injured while making illegal pipe bomb). 
62. 75 Cal. App. 3d 874, 142 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1977). 
63. E.g., Miller v. Decker, [1955] 4 D.L.R. 92 (B.C.C.A.) (Smith, J.A.) (denying 
recovery on ex turpi causa grounds to drunken passenger who sued drunken driver). 
64. 333 S.E.2d 852 (Ga. 1985). 
65. E.g., Hegarty v. Shine, 14 Cox Crim. Cas. 145 (Ir. C.A. 1858) (denying 
recovery on ex turpi causa grounds to woman who was infected with venereal disease 
while having illicit intercourse with defendant). 
66. 515 A.2d 296 (N.J. County Ct. 1985). 
67. E.g., Danluk v. Birkner, [1946] 3 D.L.R. 172 (Ont. C.A.) (plaintiff injured 
when he stepped out of door with no stairway during police raid on defendant's 
gambling establishment not owed duty by operator of gambling establishment). · 
68. 566 N.E.2d 944 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). 
69. Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976). 
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* Consider Klanseck v. Anderson Sales & Serv., Inc.,11 in which 
plaintiff was injured while driving his brand new motorcycle. Plaintiff 
had failed to obtain a statutorily mandated license to drive motorcy-
cles. This failure was held to constitute evidence of comparative 
negligence on plaintiff's part; he recovered only forty percent.of his 
damages from defendant seller. Before the ex turpi causa defense .fell 
into virtual disuse in this country, it had been used to completely bar 
recovery to a wrongdoer such as the plaintiff in this case. 2 
* Consider. Llorence v. State Dep't of Transp.,13 in which plaintiff 
was allowed to recover for injuries sustained in a traffic. accident 
though his speeding was a fifty percent cause of the accident. 
Stringently applied, the ex turpi causa defense might well bar any 
recovery whatsoever for injuries sustained in an accident occurring 
while plaintiff was violating the legal speed limit.74 
. Other examples could be given, but the point should be clear: If U.S. 
courts revived the ex tuturpi causa defense as it once existed in the United 
States and as it currently exists in some other western common law 
nations, the face of tort litigation in the United States could be 
profoundly changed. Not only could mugger Bernard McCummings be 
denied recovery, but a wide range of less severe illegal or immoral 
conduct could also disqualify plaintiffs from recovery of tort damages. 
Resurrection of this defense in the United States by borrowing theoreti-
cal approaches developed abroad could substantially reduce the number 
of successful tort suits. 
Would this be a salutary development? This is the essential question 
explored in this Article. Editorialists addressing the Bernard 
McCummings case surely would support revival of the doctrine,75 but 
a truly satisfactory answer to the question requires an examination of the 
70. E.g., Hillen v. I.C.I. (Alkali), Ltd., [1934] 1 K.B. 455 (Eng. C.A.) (stevedores 
who breached safety regulation not allowed to recover for injuries sustained when hatch 
coverings collapsed). 
71. 393 N.W.2d 356 (Mich. 1986). 
72. E.g., Hanson v. Culton, 269 Mass. 471, 169 N.E. 272 (Mass. 1929) (out-of-
state plaintiff who had not registered his car in Massachusetts was barred from 
recovering from negligent defendant). 
73. 558 So. 2d 320 (La. Ct. App. 1990), appeal denied, 565 So. 2d 442 (La. 1990). 
74. E.g., Tuttle v. City of Lawrence, 119 Mass. 276 (1876); Heland v. City of 
Lowell, 85 Mass. (3 Allen) 407 (1862). · · 
75. See supra note 59. 
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ex turpi causa defense in its various forms and applications. The 
following part illustrates how courts in selected western common-law 
jurisdictions have struggled to develop a principled application of the ex 
turpi causa defense in tort cases. 
III. APPLICATION OF THE EX TURPI CAUSA DEFENSE TO TORT CASES 
IN WESTERN COMMON-LAW JURISDICTIONS 
A. Australia 
No jurisdiction has a more developed jurisprudence in this area than 
Australia. Over time, Australian courts have explicated three separate 
approaches to applying the ex turpi causa doctrine in tort cases. The 
first has been applied in cases involving a wrongdoing plaintiff; the 
second two have been applied primarily in cases where injuries were 
· sustained during joint criminal ventures involving both plaintiff and 
defendant. 
1. Legislative Intent 
The facts in Henwood v. Municipal Tramways Trust76 were simple 
enough. Decedent was riding defendant's tram when he became 
nauseated. He leaned out over a rail on the offside of the train and 
vomited. While so engaged, decedent's head struck in succession two 
steel standards which were in the middle of the street, just seventeen 
inches from the side of the train. The key issue was whether decedent's 
parents were barred from a negligence recovery against defendant by 
decedent's violation of section 7 4 of the Municipal Tramways Trust Act 
of 1906 which provided: "No passenger shall project or lean his head or 
other portion of his body or lii:nbs out of any window in any 
tram ... 77
Judges McTieman and Dixon reviewed American cases,78 determin-
ing that "the directness of the connection between the illegality and the 
injury seems to have emerged as the discrimen more generally adopted" 
in allowing or disallowing recovery.79 They, however, rejected this 
causation approach in favor of one keyed to legislative intent: 
76: . 60 C.L.R. 438 (1938) (Aust!.). 
77. Id. at 439. In the United States, the case likely would have turned not on the 
ex turpi causa issue, but upon an assumption of risk defense. The tram car carried eight 
conspicuous notices: "Danger. Do not lean over the rail." 
78. Among the U.S. cases discussed were Bosworth v. Swansey, 51 Mass. (10 
Met.) 363 (1845) and Lyons v. Desotelle, 124 Mass. 387 (1878). Id. at 459. 
79. Id. For a discussion of this proximate cause approach see infra part 111.E.1. 
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We do not think that, in the absence of English authority requiring us to do so, 
we ought to adopt as part of the law of torts a general principle that, if the 
damage suffered by the plaintiff has been directly brought about by an act of 
his which is unlawful, he can never complain of a wrongful or negligent act or 
omission on the part of the defendant from which the damage otherwise flows 
as a reasonable and probable consequence. It appears to us that in every case 
the question must be whether it is part of the purpose of the law against which 
the plaintiff has offended to disentitle a person doing the prohibited act from 
complaining of the other party N neglect or default, without which his own act 
would not have resulted in injury. 
[T]he general principle remains that a private right of action is not created 
by a penal statutory provision unless the statute so intends. In the same way, 
we think that, unless the statute so intends, no penal provision should receive 
an operation which deprives a person offending against it of a private right of 
action which in the absence of such a statutory provision would accrue to 
him. 80
In Henwood, Judges Dixon and McTieman concluded that depriving 
a person such as decedent ( or his heirs) of a cause of action because of 
the violation was "[p]robably the last thing intended by the framers."81 
2. Public Policy 
A second Australian approach to application of the ex turpi causa 
defense in tort cases was enunciated in Godbolt v. Fittock, 82 which 
involved a simple wreck of a truck driven· by defendant in which 
plaintiff was a passenger. The complicating factor was that the parties' 
journey involved the theft and contemplated sale of cattle. When the 
accident occurred at 2:20 a.m., the plaintiff and defendant had already 
stolen six cattle from three farms and were on their way to market. 
Judge Sugerman's opinion denied recovery on the basis of the ex turpi 
causa defense, rejecting what he perceived as the American causation 
approach. Sugerman enunciated instead a rationale based on public 
policy considerations: 
The directness of the connection between the criminal purpose and the journey 
in whose course the injury occurred, rather than a causal association of the 
injury with the specifically criminal character of the joint venture, is, in my 
opinion, the true criterion in these cases of mutual criminality. The latter causal 
association is lacking in the present case. But the former is clearly present, the 
80. Id. at 460-61 (emphasis added). 
81. Id. at 461. 
82. 1963 N.S.W. St. R. 617 (Austl.). 
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accident having occurred in the course of one continuous journey which 
included in uninterrupted sequence the stealing of the calves and their 
transportation to market. The question is not one of causation as between the 
specifically criminal ingredient in the circumstances and the injury but one 
of public policy, operating in this disabling sense .... by way of avoiding the 
encouragement to crime which would follow if the law lent its aid to the 
resolution of disputes of the present kind between its practitioners and bent its 
powers to ensuring that one should receive compensation from another for 
injuries sustained by negligent acts and omissions in the course of activities 
directly connected with the execution of a joint criminal purpose. 83 
Unlike Henwood, Godbolt involved a joint criminal undertaking 
between plaintiff and defendant. This factor might well justify a 
different approach to the ex turpi causa defense, although why it is less 
suitable for application of the legislative intent approach is not clear and 
was not addressed by the court. Nor did the judges state whether they 
would apply the public policy approach to a case not involving joint 
wrongdoers. The judges also did not explain which public policy 
factors, other than "avoiding the encouragement to crime," were to be 
considered in applying the defense.84 
This approach, stressing that the courts should not be available to aid 
wrongdoers when to do so would violate . vague concepts of public 
policy, has gained acceptance in England, Canada, and in some U.S. 
jurisdictions, as we shall see presently. 85 
3. The Duty Rule (Parts One and Two) 
I 
The High Court of Australia rendered a very important ex turpi causa 
decision in 1969 in Smith v. Jenkins, 86 wherein plaintiff was injured in 
a wreck while occupying a car driven·by defendant. Plaintiff, defendant, 
and two companions had acquired the keys to the car by exerting some 
force upon the car's rightful owner.in a public lavatory. 
Thus, like Godbolt, and unlike Henwood, Smith involved a joint 
criminal undertaking between plaintiff and defendant. The court reached 
the same result as in Godbolt, and for the same public policy reasons, 
but through an entirely different route. The most influential opinion in 
83. Id. at 624 ( emphasis added). 
84. Although I have characterized the case as applying a public policy approach, 
it might also be framed as applying a direct connection (as opposed to a causal 
connection) test As the quotation above indicates, Judge Sugennan required as a 
prerequisite to application of the ex turpi causa defense not that the injury be caused by 
the criminal nature of the joint venture, but simply that there be some direct connection 
between the criminal purpose of the venture and the injury. Id. 
85. See infra notes 122-24 and accompanying text (Canada), notes 109-20 and 
accompanying text (England), and notes 169-72 and accompanying text (United States). 
86. 119 C.L.R. 397 (1969) (Austl.). 
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the case was penned by Judge Windeyer. Rejecting the ex turpi causa 
defense as applicable solely to contract cases, 7 Judge Windeyer 
reached the same result as if he had applied the defense by holding that 
defendant owed no duty to plaintiff in light of the illicit joint enter-
prise. 88 He stated: "If a special relationship be in some cases a 
prerequisite of a duty of care, it seems to me that in other cases a special 
relationship [such as that shared by co-conspirators in a criminal venture] 
can exclude a duty of care."89 · · 
Judge Owen agreed, stating: "[T]he law does not recognize the 
relationship between two criminals who are jointly engaged in carrying 
out a criminal venture as being one which_ gives rise to a duty of care 
owed by the one to the other in the execution of the crime." 0 Judge 
Kitto also agreed, resting his reasoning on the "legal inseverability, for 
the purposes of responsibility, of the acts which several persons 
knowingly contribute to the joint commission of a wrong."91 
The judges in Smith specifically held that they were not applying the 
ex turpi causa defense in order to disqualify plaintiff from recovering. 
Yet, plaintiff was not allowed to recover because no duty could be owed 
by defendant. Why? Because plaintiff was involved in the same type 
of activity that would have led to invocation of the ex turpi causa 
defense in Godbolt. And for what reasons did the court hold that one 
criminal in a joint enterprise owes .no duty to the other criminal? The 
same reasons that other courts have used to invoke the ex turpi causa 
defense: 
If two or more persons participate in the commission of a crime, each takes the · 
risk of the negligence of the other or others in the actual performance of.the 
criminal act. That formulation can be regarded as founded on the negation of 
duty, or on some extension of the rule volenti non fit injuria, or simply on the 
refusal of the courts to aid wrongdoers. How it be analysed and explained 
matters not.92 
Thus, while their Honours specifically refused to extend the ex turpi 
causa doctrine to a tort case involving joint wrongdoers, their result, 
87. Id. at 413-14. 
88. Obviously, Smith, like Goldbolt and unlike Henwood, involved a joint 
criminal enterprise between plaintiff and defendant. 
89. Smith, 119 C.L.R. at 418. 
90. Id. at 425. 
91. Id. at 404. 
92. Id. at 422 (Windeyer, J.) (emphasis added). 
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reasoning, and rationale were virtually identical to an application of that 
doctrine. Realistically, the judges in Smith were holding that plaintiff's 
illegal acts nullified the existence of a duty on the part of defendant 
which would have existed absent plaintiff's illegal conduct. Indeed, 
using the ex turpi causa defense, the Court of Appeal in New South 
Wales reached that very result using very similar reasoning in a similar 
case at about the same time that Smith was decided.93 And subsequent 
courts have concluded that there is no substantive difference between the 
Godbolt and the Smith approaches.94 In short, the duty approach is 
merely a somewhat disguised application of the ex turpi causa de-
fense.95 It shall be treated as such in this Article. 
The approach of Smith constitutes "Part One" of the "duty rule." An 
important amendment to the duty approach ( constituting "Part Two") 
occurred in Jackson v. Harrison,96 a case which purported to truly 
differentiate the duty approach from the public policy approach.97 In 
Jackson, plaintiff was injured while riding in a car driven by defendant, 
whom plaintiff knew did not possess a valid driver's license. Although 
plaintiff and defendant were jointly participating in an offense under 
Australia's Motor Vehicles Act, the court managed to distinguish the 
case from Smith, despite a strong dissent.98 
93. Bondarenko v. Sommers, 87 N.S.W.W.N. (pt. 2) 295 (1968) (plaintiff was 
injured by defendant in a drag race involving a car they had both stolen). 
94. E.g., Tallow v. Tailfeathers, 44 D.L.R.3d 55, 66 (Alta. 1973) (Clement, J.A.) 
("I think there is no difference in substance between this expression [by Judge Sugerman 
in Godbolt] and the conclusion reached by Judge Kitto in Smith v. Jenkins .... "). 
95. W.J. Ford, Tort and Illegality: The Ex Turpi Causa Defence in Negligence Law 
(Part One), 11 MELB. U. L. REV. 32, 40 (1977) ("By subsuming the unlawfulness into 
the question of duty a court is able to avoid defining the nature and limits of the 
illegality defence, rather less conspicuously than in a decision explicitly based upon the 
maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio."); see also Jane Swanton, Plaintiff a Wrongdoer: 
Joint Complicity in an Illegal Enterprise as a. Defence to Negligence, 9 SYDNEY L. 
REV. 304, 310 (1981) (viewing Smith as an ex turpi causa case). 
96. 138 C.L.R. 438 (1978) (Austl.). 
97. Jackson seems to be an attempt to narrow slightly the scope of the ex turpi 
causa defense in Australia after it was given a broad reach in Smith. Swanton, supra 
note 95, at 325. 
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98. In dissent, Chief Justice Barwick noted: 
It seems to me that where there is a joint venture to do an act punishable by 
fine or imprisonment, no narrow or pedantic view should be taken of the 
nature and scope of the arrangement between the parties when applying the 
principle of Smith v. Jenkins and that the consequence to one of the partici-
pants of any act done in furtherance of the arrangement or in obtaining the 
benefit of having carried it out should not give rise to a cause of action. The 
relationship of those participants should not be regarded as giving rise to 
relevant rights or duties. The public policy which the denial of a cause of 
action in such circumstances is designed to serve is not satisfied if the 
miscreant is not denied rights against his co-participant in the commission of 
the offence in respect of acts related to that commission. 
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The majority in Jackson clearly amended the Smith rule that no duty 
exists between joint criminal venturers. The new approach denies a duty 
exists in cases of clear joint criminal enterprise of such a nature that no 
standard of care could be determined (such as in a :flight from a pursuing 
police car), but recognizes the existence of a duty in a case where a 
standard of care could be determined (such as where both passenger and 
driver know that the driver does not have a license). Judge Mason 
stated: 
If a joint participant in an illegal enterprise is to be denied relief against a co-
participant for injury sustained in that enterprise, the denial of relief should be 
related not to the illegal character of the activity but rather to the character and 
incidents of the enterprise and to the hazards which are necessarily inherent in 
its execution. A more secure foundation for denying relief, though more limited 
in its application---and for that reason fairer in its operation---is to say that the 
plaintiff must fail when the character of the enterprise in which the parties are 
engaged is such that it is impossible for the court to determine the standard of 
care which is appropriate to be observed. The detonation of an explosive 
device is a case of this kind. But the driving of a motor vehicle by an 
unlicensed and disqualified driver, so long as it does not entail an agreement to 
drive the car recklessly on the highway (see Bondarenko v. Sommers (1968) 69 
S.R. (N.S.W.) 269), stands in a somewhat different position. In this case the 
evidence indicates that the participants contemplated that the vehicle would be 
driven carefully---an accident or untoward event might, as in fact it did, lead 
to discovery of their breach of the law. It is not suggested that either party 
lacked the experience or ability to drive carefully--that they were unlicensed 
was due to their having been disqualified as a result of earlier traffic offences 
.... A plaintiff will fail when the joint illegal enterprise in which he and the 
defendant are engaged is such that the court cannot determine the particular 
standard of care to be observed.· It matters not whether this in itself provides 
a complete answer to the plaintiff's claim or whether it leads in theory to the 
conclusion that the defendant owes no duty of care to the .plaintiff because no 
standard of care can be determined in the particular case. 9 
The High Court in Australia recently married the duty and standard of 
care approaches in Gala v. Preston;100 a suit arising out of injuries 
sustained in a joy-riding incident. The High Court encapsulated the 
rationale for the ex turpi causa defense as follows: "In the special and 
exceptional circumstances that prevailed, the participants could not have 
had any reasonable,basis for expecting that a driver of the vehicle would 
drive it according to ordinary standards of competence and care."101 
138 C.L.R. at 445. 
99. Id. at 455-56 (emphasis added). 
100. 172 C.L.R. 243 (1991) (Austl.). 
101. Id. at 254. 
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It now appears that the Henwood legislative intent approach to the ex 
turpi causa defense will be used in Australia where a plaintiff has 
violated a safety regulation meant to protect him or her, but the Smith 
duty rule, as amended in Jackson, will be applied where plaintiff and 
defendant were joint venturers in crime.102 
B. England 
For years the ex turpi causa defense had little presence in English tort 
cases.103 Since at least the 1981 case of Ashton v. Turner,104 howev-
er, the illegality defense has bloomed in the tort context in England. 105 
Ashton adopted the "no duty'' approach pioneered in Australia. 106 
Several recent English107 and Scottish108 cases have followed this 
approach. 
However, another popular approach-a public policy approach keyed 
to the "public conscience"--has recently appeared as well. The most 
102. See id aat 243 (passenger in stolen car who participated in theft and excessive 
drinking owed no duty by negligent joint venturer/driver); Matthews v. McCullock 
[1973] 3 N.S.W.L.R. 331, 337 (plaintiff, who was disqualified from holding a license 
to ride a motorcycle, was not barred from recovering in negligence from defendant driver 
who rear-ended plaintiff at a stop light). 
103. Until the 1980s, there was little reason to dispute Lord Asquith's observation 
in National Coal Bd. v. England, 1954 App. Cas. 403, 428 (appeal taken from Eng.), that 
cases where a tort action had been defeated by the ex turpi causa defense were 
"exceedingly rare." 
104. [1981] 1 Q.B., 137 (denying recovery to plaintiff passenger in negligence suit 
against defendant driver where injury occurred during escape from the scene of a crime 
jointly committed by plaintiff and defendant). 
105. In giving life to ex turpi causa as a tort defense in England, Judge Ewbank, 
in Ashton, cited three earlier cases which can only with difficulty be read as supporting 
the existence ofthe defense in tort cases: National Coal Bd. v. England, 1954 App. Cas. 
403 (appeal taken from Eng.); Hardy v. Motor Insurers Bureau, [1964] 2 Q.B. 745; 
Murphy v. Culhane, [1977] I Q.B. 94. See generally Charles Debattista, Ex Turpi 
Causa Returns to the English Law of Torts: Taking Advantage of a Wrong Way Out, 
ANGLO-AM. L. REV., Apr.-June 1984, at 15. 
Another case to which Ewbank could have referred, but did not, is Johnson v. Croggan 
& Co., [1954] 1 W.L.R. 195 (Q.B.), in which, without much explanation, an employee 
who violated a safety regulation in choosing to use an inadequate ladder which collapsed 
and injured him, was held barred from recovery on ex turpi causa grounds. But see 
Cakebread v. Hopping Bros. (Whetstone) Ltd., [1947] 1 K.B. 641 (Eng. C.A.) (rejecting 
ex turpi causa defense on similar facts). 
106. Ashton, [1981] 1 Q.B. at 146. 
107. E.g., Sullivan v. Sullivan, 79 W.N. 615 (1962) (plaintiff passenger's suit 
against defendant driver would be dismissed for lack of duty owed, among other 
grounds, if evidence shows at trial that the parties were at the time of the accident 
engaged in a joint burglary and were transporting gelignite and detonators). 
108. E.g., .Weir v. Wyper, 1992 S.L.T. 579, 1992 S.C.L.R. 483 (Outer House); 
McLean v. Harper, 1992 S.L.T. 1007 (Outer House) (Notes); Ashcroft's Curator Bonis 
v. Stewart, 1988 S.L.T. 163 (Outer House); Sloan v. Triplett, 1985 S.L.T. 294 (Outer 
House); Lindsay v. Poole, 1984 S.L.T. 269 (Outer House). 
72 
[VOL. 32: 53, 1995] Litigation "Crisis" 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
prominent recent case in England is Pitts v. Hunt, 109 which involved 
a familiar scenario. Plaintiff passenger and decedent driver (whose 
estate was first defendant) were both drunk and aboard decedent's 
motorcycle (which plaintiff knew he was not licensed to drive). They 
were weaving recklessly down the road shouting ''yippee" and similar 
remarks when they were clipped by a car driven by the second 
defendant. 
The court of appeal held the plaintiff's recovery to be barred by the 
ex turpi causa doctrine, but the judges' reasoning did little to clarify the 
law of England in this area. Lord Justices Dillon and Balcombe110 
seemed to prefer the "duty" approach of Jackson, even though there was 
poor factual basis for applying that test. 111 Lord Justice Beldam 
appeared to accept the "conscience test"112 earlier explicated in 
England in such cases as Saunders v. Edwards,113 Kirkham v. Chief 
Constable of Manchester, 114 and Thackwell v. Barclays Bank. 115 
The "conscience test" asks two questions: (a) Has there been illegality 
of which the court should take notice? and (b) Given all the facts, would 
it be an affront to the public conscience if by affording plaintiff relief 
the court indirectly assisted or encouraged the plaintiff in his criminal 
act?116 
109. [1990] 3 W.L.R. 542 (Eng. C.A.). 
110. Id. at 558 (Balcombe, L.J.), 567 (Dillon, L.J.). 
111. It is arguably difficult to formulate a standard of care applicable when a 
safecracker is mixing a dynamite charge or a-getaway car is speeding away from a bank 
with the police in hot pursuit. But this case simply involved driving a motorcycle; 
formulation of a standard of care should not have been at all difficult. Kevin Williams, 
Defences for Drunken Drivers: Public Policy on the Roads and in the Air, 54 Moo. L. 
REV. 745, 750 (1991). 
112. Pitts, [1990] 3 W.L.R. at 554. 
113. [1987] 1 W.L.R. 1116, [1987] 2 All E.R. 651 (Eng. C.A.) (plaintiff, who in 
purchasing leasehold obtained defendant's agreement to falsely apportion value of 
chattels and value of flat in order to minimize stamp duty, was not barred on public con-
science grounds from recovering for deceit from defendants who fraudulently 
misrepresented that the leasehold included an adjoining terrace); see also Shelley v. 
Paddock, [1980] 1 Q.B. 348 (Eng. C.A.) (similar result on similar facts). 
114. [1990] 2 W.L.R. 987 (Eng. C.A. 1989) (decedent's act of suicide held not to 
bar his family's negligence suit against jailers on ex turpi causa grounds because suicide 
was no longer a crime and no longer shocked the public conscience). 
115. [1986] 1 All E.R. 676,687 (Q.B.) (Hutchison, J.) (plaintiff who was knowingly 
involved in a forged check scheme could not recover from bank for negligently cashing 
the check). · 
116. In Saunders v. Edwards, Lord Justice-Nicholls adopted this formulation, but 
stated that he would add to the end of the second element the words "or encouraging 
73 
The existence of two separate approaches in ex turpi causa tort cases 
in England leaves substantial room for confusion. 11 However, often 
the two rationales lead to similar results. 118 As noted by Lord Hunter 
in the Scottish case, Winnik v. Dick, 119 which barred a suit by a 
passenger against the driver of a car when both had been drinking 
together all day: 
It was submitted that the pursuer's claim was defeated by application of the 
brocard ex turpi ·causa non oritur actio, either because in law one joint 
participant would not in such circumstances owe a duty of care to the other 
joint participant or because on grounds of public policy, the court would not 
countenance nor adjudicate on a claim by one such joint participant against 
another. I see no reason why a Scottish court should not, on the basis of one 
or other or both of these principles, arrive in appropriate circumstances at a 
result the same as that reached in several cases in other jurisdictions [(i.e., 
dismissal of the suit)] to which we were referred. 120 
C. Canada 
Canadian cases have wandered down several paths in an attempt to 
determine the proper role of. the ex turpi causa defense.121 Perhaps 
their very indecisiveness and confusion helped the Supreme Court of 
Canada decide, in 1993, to reject the defense almost completely in tort 
cases. Before we address that landmark decision, however, let us 
quickly discuss the history of this defense in Canada, a defense that was 
enjoying a revival until the ax fell in 1993. 
others in similar criminal acts." Saunders, [1987] 1 W.L.R. at 1132. 
117. The inherent vagueness of the variety of tests available means that "in 
troublesome cases there may well be disagreements concerning (a) the proper application 
of the [ ex turpi causa] doctrine; (b) the quality of turpitude required; ( c) the degree of 
connection necessary between it and the plaintiff's damage; and (d) the purposes to be 
served by denying the plaintiff a remedy." Williams, supra note 111, at 749. 
118. For example, in Pitts, Lord Justice Beldam refused to allow plaintiff to 
recover, reasoning that the public conscience was so offended by those who would drink 
and drive that no court should lend its assistance to a plaintiff injured while jointly 
engaged in such activity. Pitts v. Hunt, [1990] 3 W.L.R. 542 (Eng. C.A.). Reaching the 
same result, Justices Balcombe and Dillon refused recovery because, following Jackson, 
they were unable to determine a standard of care owed by defendant driver to plaintiff 
passenger in such a joint drunken endeavor. Id. at 559 (Balcombe, L.J.), 569 (Dillon, 
L.J.). 
119. 1983 Sess. Cas. 48 (Inner House). 
120. Id. at 189 (emphasis added) (citing cases such as Smith v. Jenkins, 119 C.L.R. 
397 (1969) (Aust!.), and Ashton v. Turner, [1981] 1 Q.B. 137). 
121. Indeed, some Canadian courts have dismissed cases on the basis of the doctrine 
without any attempt to develop a theoretical foundation for doing so. E.g., Johnson v. 
Royal Can. Legion Grandview Branch No. 179, [1988] 5 W.W.R. 267,271 (B.C.C.A.) 
(plaintiff's claim for injuries sustained in a fight dismissed on ex turpi causa grounds 
because plaintiff's act of fighting in a public place violated statute). 
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Several earlier Canadian cases had used a public policy approach in 
invoking the ex turpi causa defense to defeat tort claims. A leading 
Canadian public policy case, Tallow v. Tai/feathers, 122 was decided by 
the Alberta Supreme Court. After drinking all night and stealing a car, 
plaintiffs were seriously injured when defendant lost control of the car. 
Thus, like Australia's Godbolt and Smith, the case involved a joint 
criminal enterprise. 
The Tallow court adopted Godbolt '.s' public policy approach to 
determine when ex turpi causa should bar recovery by tort plaintiffs. 
Judge Clement concluded that there were two prerequisites to successful 
invocation of the defense by defendants: (a) the plaintiff's act had to be 
one that could be characterized as having "such a quality of turpitude 
that it must be regarded as anti-social," and (b) the plaintiff's claim had 
to "arise out of the commission of that act" (requiring a direct, but not 
a causal, connection).123 
Cases from several other Canadian provinces had also adopted a public 
policy approach.124 
2. Duty 
Other Canadian decisions had adopted a "duty" approach, reminiscent 
of Australia's Smith and Jackson decisions.125 indeed, some courts 
122. 44 D.L.R.3d 55 (Alta. 1973). 
123. Id. at 61. 
124. E.g., Caleval v. Miller, 26 Sask. R. 209 (Q.B. 1983) (plaintiff injured while 
assaulting victim in car when victim attempted to drive away barred· from recovery in 
order to avoid offending the ''public conscience"); Mack v. Enns, 30 B.C.L.R. 337, 345 
(1984) (plaintiff gang member who kicked car of rival gang in attempt to provoke a fight 
was barred from recovery against driver of second rival gang car who accidentally ran 
over plaintiff in the melee; purpose of the defense stated to be "to defend the integrity 
of the legal system" by avoiding results ''manifestly unacceptable to fair-minded, or 
right-thinking, people"); Danluk v. Birkner, [1946] 3 D.L.R. 172, 178 (Ont. C.A.) (in a 
case also based in part on duty concept, court denied recovery to gambler who stepped 
out of second-story door with no attached staircase while escaping a police raid; public 
policy prevents such a plaintiff from invoking assistance of courts). 
125. Phillips v. Vespini, No. 287, 1988 Ont. C.A. LEXIS 158 (plaintiff passenger 
could not recover from defendant driver for injuries arising out of accident occurring 
during pursuit by police; court followed Smith by denying that it was applying ex turpi 
causa defense, yet reached identical result as if doctrine had been applied); Joubert v. 
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had gone so far as to hold that the ex turpi causa defense in Canada was 
available only in cases of joint criminal enterprise.126 
3. Direct Connection 
Several more recent Canadian cases involving joint criminal enterpris-
es barred recovery on ex turpi causa grounds based on a "direct 
connection" rather than a "causal connection" approach.127 On the 
other hand, many courts rejected the defense where there was not at least 
some general causal link between the illegality and the plaintiff's 
injury. 128 These cases are difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile. 
Even in the heyday of the ex turpi causa defense in Canada there were 
courts holding that the defense had been effectively eviscerated by 
legislation eliminating the all-or-nothing contributory negligence 
Toronto Gen. Trusts Corp., [1955] 3 D.L.R. 685 (Man. C.A.) (intoxicated passenger 
could not recover for injuries sustained due to carelessness of intoxicated driver where 
the two were jointly engaged in the criminal venture of drunken driving); Tomlinson v. 
Harrison, 24 D.L.R.3d 26 (Ont. High Ct. 1971) (same); Rondos v. Wawrin, 68 D.L.R.2d 
658 (Man. C.A. 1968) (same); Miller v. Decker, [1955] 4 D.L.R. 92 (B.C.C.A.) (same); 
Danluk v. Birkner, [1946] 3 D.L.R. 172, 177 (Ont. C.A.) (in a case that also contained 
some elements of the public policy approach, ex turpi causa defense was held to bar 
recovery by plaintiff who sustained injuries when he ran out a second-story door with 
no attached staircase during a police raid of an illegal gambling establishment; plaintiff 
was neither invitee nor a licensee and was therefore owed no duty by defendant). But 
see Foster v. Morton, 4 D.L.R.2d 269 (N.S. 1956) (recovery allowed by decedent 
passenger's estate against defendant drunken driver). 
126. E.g., Betts v. Sanderson Estate, 53 D.L.R.4th 675 (1988) (Can.) (plaintiff's 
driving while intoxicated alongside intoxicated defendant did not amount to joint 
criminal enterprise which would bar all recovery by plaintiff under ex turpi causa 
defense); Funk v. Clapp, 35 B.C.L.R.2d 222 (C.A. 1986) (family of prisoner who 
committed suicide in cell not barred by immorality of the act of suicide from pursuing 
negligence claim against jailers); Teece v. Honeybourn, 54 D.L.R.3d 549, 5 W.W.R. 592 
(B.C. 1974) (plaintiff car thief attempting to resist arrest not barred from recovery 
against police officer who carelessly shot plaintiff). 
127. E.g., Tomlinson v. Harrison, 24 D.L.R.3d 26 (Ont. High Ct. 1971) (denying 
plaintiff passenger recovery from defendant driver for injuries sustained in accident 
occurring during police chase after plaintiff and defendant got drunk and stole the car); 
Rondos v. Wawrin, 68 D.L.R.2d 658, 64 W.W.R. 690 (Man. C.A. 1968) (denying 
recovery to plaintiff who knew he was riding in a car stolen by defendant driver for 
injuries sustained in accident occurring during police chase); see also Mongovius v. 
Marchand, 44 C.C.L.T. 18 (B.C. 1988) (dismissing drunken passenger's suit against 
drunken driver on ex turpi causa grounds because of the "demonstrable causal link 
between the plaintiffs participation in the illegality and the injuries"). 
128. E.g., Pugliese v. Taxiarchis, 1989 Ont. C.J. LEXIS 96 (Ont.) (noting that 
illegal drug pickups and sales had largely ended when defendant driver caused accident 
injuring plaintiff passenger); Bond v. Loutit, 2 W.W.R. 154 (Man. Q.B. 1979) (holding 
that illegal taking of vehicle had nothing to do with the negligent way in which 
defendant later drove it, injuring plaintiff). 
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defense. 129 This fact, coupled with the inconsistent reasoning and 
results of Canadian ex turpi causa cases-only some of which could be 
explained by province-to-province variations-created a most unsatisfac-
tory situation. 130 Lower courts called for the Canadian Supreme Court 
to bring clarity to the issue.131 The Supreme Court's ultimate conclu-
sion surprised many. 
4. Canadian Supreme Court Decisions 
The Canadian Supreme Court first addressed the illegality defense in 
tort cases in Canada Cement LaFarge Ltd. v. British Columbia 
Lightweight Aggregate Ltd.,132 which involved allegations of a business 
conspiracy by defendants to drive competitors, including plaintiff, out of 
business. Defendants raised an ex turpi causa defense because plaintiff 
had some level of voluntary participation in defendants' scheme by 
seeking to become the sole supplier to defendants' combine of light-
weight aggregate for the production of concrete. The court discussed 
several cases, but made no definitive pronouncements, concluding: 
"Whatever the state of the law [regarding ex turpi causa] may be at the 
present time," plaintiff must lose because there was no causal relation-
ship between the illegal acts of defendants and plaintiff's injury.133 
The language in Canada Cement was, perhaps, a vague hint that the 
Canadian Supreme Court was not receptive to the ex turpi causa defense 
in tort cases. A clearer signal came in the 1992 case, Norberg v. 
"Wynrib, 134 in which a male physician prescribed a painkiller to an 
addicted female patient in exchange for sexual favors. The patient sued 
the doctor for damages on several theories, including assault and battery, 
negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty. The physician raised an ex 
129. E.g., Lewis v. Sayers, 13 D.L.R.3d 543, 550 (Ont. Dist. Ct) (defense implicitly 
abolished by legislation eliminating contributory negligence and replacing it with a 
comparison of plaintiff's "fault" as well as ''negligence"); Funk v. Clapp, 35 B.C.L.R.2d 
222, 233 (C.A. 1986) (same). 
130. Indeed, one author noted that "[t]he Canadian experience with the defence of 
ex turpi causa non oritur actio has not been happy." l G.H.L. FRIDMAN, THE LAW OF 
TORTS IN CANADA 352 (1989) 
131. E.g., Betts v. Sanderson Estate, 53 D.L.R.4th 675, 682 (1988) (Can.). 
132. 145 C.L.R.3d 385 (Can. 1983). 
133. Id. at 404. The court did not discuss what level of causation (direct or 
proximate) was needed to activate the defense. · · 
134. 92 D.L.R. 4th 449 (Can. 1992). 
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turpi causa defense, noting that plaintiff had entered a plea of guilty·to 
the criminal offense of "double doctoring" ( obtaining narcotic prescrip-
tion drugs from a doctor without disclosing particulars of prescriptions 
from other doctors in violation of the Narcotic Control Act). Again, no 
definitive pronouncement was issued regarding the ex turpi causa 
defense. However, Judge LaForest concluded that the defense should 
not succeed because there was "no causative link" between the injury 
and plaintiff's crime. Even if plaintiff had been relying on defendant 
alone for her drugs, she would have suffered the same harm.135 Also, 
Judge Sopinka concluded that the key to the ex turpi causa defense was 
the public policy of preventing the administration of justice from being 
tainted.136 Because society's views of what is fair-minded or right-
thinking regarding the claims of law-breakers has changed over the 
years, Sopinka was convinced that "the administration of justice will 
suffer no disrepute in the eyes of the public by reason of this court's 
lending its assistance to the [plaintiff] in this case."137 
The death knell for the ex turpi causa defense in most Canadian tort 
cases was finally sounded by the Canadian Supreme Court in its 1993 
decision in Hill v. Hebert. 138 Defendant owned a "souped-up muscle 
car." He and plaintiff had been drinking. The car stalled on a rough 
gravel road with a sharp drop-off on one side. Defendant concluded that 
the only way to start the car was a "rolling start," because he could not 
find the keys that had shaken out of the ignition. Despite plaintiff's 
arguably intoxicated state, defendant, at plaintiff's request, allowed 
plaintiff to drive when they started the car rolling. Plaintiff lost control 
of the car, causing serious injuries to himself. Plaintiff sued defendant 
in negligence. Defendant raised the ex turpi causa defense. 
The trial court apportioned liability at seventy-five percent for 
defendant and twenty-five percent for plaintiff, allowing partial recovery. 
The court of appeal reversed, holding that the ex turpi causa defense 
barred any recovery whatsoever.139 The Canadian Supreme Court 
135. Id. at 469. 
136. Id. at 483. · 
137. Id. 
138. [1993) 2 S.C.R. 159. 
139. 53 B.C.L.R.2d 201 (C.A. 1991). Writing for the majority, Judge Gibbs held 
that ex turpi causa is not limited to cases of joint criminal enterprise, but is available 
any time a plaintiff's claim is so tainted with criminality or immorality that public policy 
prevents the courts from aiding plaintiff. Id. at 210-11. Dissenting, Judge Southin 
followed the opinion of Judge Windeyer in Smith, holding that ex turpi causa has no 
place in tort law, but reaching precisely the same result as if it did by holding that 
defendant owed no duty to plaintiff. Id. at 215-16. · 
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restored the trial court's judgment in favor of plaintiff.140 
In an extended opinion, Judge Cory rejected the basic rationales that 
have been proffered in support of the ex turpi causa defense in tort 
cases. He concluded that the defense undermined the policies that 
eliminated contributory negligence as an absolute defense, and that "the 
defence of ex turpi causa should not be applied in tort cases."141 
Judge McLachlin, with· whom Judges Iacobucci, LaForest, and 
L'Heureux-Dube concurred, also harshly criticized the ex turpi causa 
defense in tort cases, reserving its application for an extremely narrow 
set of factual situations.142 These limited situations will be explored 
later in this Article.143 
After Hill, there is very little room for the ex turpi causa defense in 
tort cases in Canada. 
D. New Zealand 
New Zealand's jurisprudence contains relatively few cases involving 
ex turpi causa in the tort area, but recent decisions have shown an 
implicit hostility to the defense. 144 
In Fletcher v. National Mutual Life Nominees, Ltd.,145 essentially an 
accountants' liability case, litigation arose out of the collapse of a group 
of companies known as the AIC Group. AIC Securities was a money 
140. [1993] 2 S.C.R. at 225. · However, the majority did alter the allocation of fault 
from 75%,-25% to 50%-50%. In a dissent, Judge Sopinka explained that he would have 
denied recovery on ex turpi causa grounds, using a public policy approach. Id. at 192 
("The true basis for denying recovery in such circumstances is the court's reluctance to 
lend its assistance to persons involved in serious criminal activity when to do so would 
reflect adversely on the administration of justice."). However, Judge Sopinka also 
expressed support for the "no duty" approach of Smith. Id. at 193. Judge Gonthier 
generally agreed with Sopinka. Id. at 195. 
141. Id. at 223. 
142. Id. at 172-79. 
143. See infra notes 356-64 and accompanying text. 
144. Earlier cases exhibited the same hostility. See Green v. Costello, 1961 
N.Z.L.R. 1010 (Sup. Ct.) (mere fact that the plaintiff is a wrongdoer because he struck 
the first blow in a fight is not a general defense to tort action); LeBagge v. Buses Ltd., 
1958 N.Z.L.R. 630 (Sup. Ct.) (plaintiffs violation of regulatory statute by driving his 
truck seven straight days without a break of at least 24 hours held to not necessarily 
affect amount ofrecovery in suit under Death by Accidents Compensation Act); Canning 
v. The King, 1924 N.Z.L.R. 118 (decedent driver's violation of statutory regulation 
requiring stopping at railroad crossing treated as contributory negligence rather than as 
illegal act). 
145. [1990] l N.Z.L.R. 97 (High Ct.). 
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market operator required by New Zealand law to operate under a trustee. 
National Mutual Life was the trustee and hired Deloitte Haskins & Sells 
as auditor for AIC. Following collapse of the group of companies, 
depositors sued National Mutual Life and recovered NZ$6. 7 5 million for 
negligence and breach of trust. National Mutual Life filed a third party 
claim for negligence against Deloitte. The primary issue litigated in the 
case was whether Deloitte owed a duty of care to third party National 
Mutual Life. However, the High Court in Auckland also addressed 
Deloitte's ex turpi causa defense. Essentially, Deloitte argued that 
National Mutual Life's own negligence and, more importantly, breach 
of :fiduciary duty, barred its recovery from Deloitte. Judge Henry gave 
short shrift to the defense: 
The maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio, certainly when separated from any 
historical basis it may have provided for the defence of contributory negligence, 
has no application to the present .factual situation. There is a school of thought 
which places its proper field of application as being in the law of contract. 
Whether or not that be so, there is no illegality or moral turpitude in the 
conduct of National Mutual Life Nominees which would give such a defence 
to Deloitte. Public policy could not possibly require that this action should be 
dismissed because of lack of diligence in carrying out the duties of a trust-
ee.146 
Fletcher thus involved a brief discussion of a public policy approach. 
The "public conscience" theory was applied in R v. Collis147 to reach 
an interesting result. Police searched Collis's property and found 
cannabis and NZ$103,000 in cash. Collis initially denied ownership of 
the money and at trial sought to provide an innocent explanation for his 
possession of it. After he was convicted, he claimed that the money was 
his after all, earned through illegal drug dealing. He sought return of the 
money. He was then charged with selling cannabis, but the charge was 
dismissed on a technicality. The. trial court _held that the money 
belonged to Collis, and ordered that it be paid to reduce .a tax liability 
he owed. The Crown argued that because the money had been illegally 
obtained, it should have been paid into the government's Consolidated 
Fund given that courts should not help wrongdoers benefit from their 
criminal activity. 
A spirited dissent by Judge Wylie supported the Crown's position, 
based on the "conscience test" approach to the ex turpi causa de-
fense.148 However, Judges Casey and Hardie Boys disagreed . and 
ordered the money returned to Collis. An important part of their holding 
146. Id. at 108 (citations omitted). 
147. [1990] 2 N.Z.L.R. 287 (C.A.). 
148. Id. at 300-07. 
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appeared to be simply that' Parliament had by statute ordered forfeiture 
of drug money in certain circumstances, and this particular case was not 
covered by· the statute; therefore, to refuse to order return of the funds 
to Collis would be tantamount to ordering a forfeiture not authorized by 
Parliament. 149 
Both judges also discussed the "conscience test," emphasizing a 
limitation ursgn it as explained by Lord Justice Kerr in Euro-Diam Ltd. 
v. Bathurst. 150 Kerr gave a lengthy synopsis of the public conscience 
test as he understood it, 151stating in part that where granting relief to 
149. Id. at 293. 
150. [1987] 2 All E.R. 113 (Q.B.). 
151. Kerr stated: 
(1) The ex turpi causa defence ultimately rests on a principle of public 
policy that the courts will not assist a plaintiff who has been guilty of illegal 
( or immoral) conduct of which the courts should take notice. It applies if, in 
all the circumstances, it would be an affront to the public conscience to grant 
the plaintiff the relief which he seeks because the court would thereby appear 
to assist or encourage the plaintiff in his illegal conduct or to encourage others 
in similar acts: see para 2(iii) below. 
· The problem is not only to apply this principle, but also to respect its limits, 
in relation to the facts of particular cases in light of the authorities. 
(2) The authorities show that in a number of situations the ex turpi causa 
defence will prima facie succeed. The main ones are as follows. 
(i) Where the plaintiff seeks to, or is forced .to, found his claim on an illegal 
contract .or to plead its illegality in order to support his claim: ... For that 
purpose it makes no difference whether the illegality is raised in the plaintiffs 
claim or by way of reply to a ground of defense ... 
(ii) Where the grant of relief to the plaintiff would enable him to benefit 
from his criminal conduct. .. 
(iii) Where, even though neither (i) nor (ii) is applicable to the plaintiffs 
claim, the situation is nevertheless residually covered by the general principle 
summarized in (i) above. . . . , 
(3) However, the ex turpi causa defence must be approached pragmatically 
and with caution, depending on the circumstances. . . . This applies in 
particular to cases which at first sight appear to fall within para (2)(i) or (ii) 
above. 
Thus: (i) Situations covered by para 2(i) above must be distinguished from 
others where the plaintiffs claim is not founded on any illegal act, but where 
some reprehensible conduct on his part is disclosed in the course of the 
proceedings, whether by the plaintiff himself or otherwise .... But where both 
parties are equally privy to the illegality the plaintiffs claim will fail, whether 
raised in contract or tort, for potiorest condicio defendantis [the position of the 
defendant is the stronger] .... And an action on a contract the terms of which 
are falsely recorded in documents intended to conceal the true agreement 
between the parties may be defeated by the ex· turpi causa defence .... 
(ii) In situations covered by para 2(i) and (ii) above the ex turpi causa 
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plaintiff would enable him to benefit from his criminal conduct the 
defense will still fail "if his claim is for the delivery up of his goods, or 
for damages for their wrongful conversion, and if he is able to assert a 
proprietary or possessory title to them, even if this is derived from an 
illegal contract."152 Justice Casey stressed that he preferred a very 
narrow application of the "conscience test."153 Justice Hardie Boys 
concluded that Kerr's limitation on the defense "allays in large measure 
the misgivings I _have had about the subjectiveness of a 'conscience 
test' ."154 · 
Thus, ex turpi causa has a relatively small presence in New Zealand 
jurisprudence. 155 
E. The United States 
The doctrine of ex turpi causa has a long and checkered history in 
American tort law, although, as noted earlier, it has virtually disappeared 
in recent years. 
Two strains of American tort cases apply the ex turpi causa doctrine. 
The first is a public policy strain keyed to the notion that courts should 
not lend assistance to those whose injuries are related to their own illegal 
actions.156 These. cases stress the moral component of the law. 
Indeed, a tone. of strong moral outrage :permeates many of the cases 
recognizing the ex turpi causa defense.15 The second strain relates to 
defence will also fail if the plaintiffs claim is for the delivery up of his goods, 
or for damages for their wrongful conversion, and if he is able to assert a 
proprietary or possessor title to them even if this is derived from an illegal 
contract. 
Id. at 28-29. 
152. Collis, [1990] 2 N.Z.L.R. at 293 (Casey, J.). 
153. Id. 
154. Id. at 299. 
155. But see Tamworth Indus. Ltd. v. Attorney-General, [1991] 3 N.Z.L.R. 616 
(following R v. Collis in refusing to use ex turpi causa to bar return to plaintiff of 
unexplained cash seized by police). 
156. This is, of course, an important part of the rationale for refusing to enforce 
illegal contracts. It also accounts for a second line of cases wherein U.S. courts, unlike 
their New Zealand counterparts just discussed, refuse to allow plaintiffs to profit from 
their wrongdoing in cases where plaintiffs seek to recover money or other property 
seized by police. E.g., Carr v. Hoy, 2 N.Y.2d 185 (1957) (plaintiff who pleaded guilty 
to outraging public decency following scheme that charged persons $10 each for 
privilege of attending a farm outing and there photographing female models, some of 
whom posed nude, could not recover ticket moneys seized by sheriff). 
157. For example, in Lencioni v. Long, 361 P.2d 455 (Mont. 1961), plaintiff 
bartender was sprayed in the eye with tear gas as he looked through an uncovered 
peephole to tum away drunken patrons from a house of prostitution. Recovery from 
plaintiffs employer was denied on ex turpi causa grounds, the court complaining that 
"the salient facts are rampant with a reeking libidinous atmosphere that should never 
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the causal link between the plaintiff's illegal acts and the injuries 
sustained. 
1. Proximate Causation 
The causation approach will be discussed first. The principle case 
with respect to this approach is Bosworth v. Swansey, 158 which pro-
nounced what is known as the "Massachusetts rule." The plaintiff in 
Bosworth was injured because of a defect in a road for which defendant 
was responsible. The injury occurred on a Sunday, however, as plaintiff 
traveled in violation of a Massachusetts statute prohibiting Sunday travel 
for secular purposes. The court denied recovery on grounds of the ex 
turpi causa defense. Because the injury occurred as plaintiff traveled 
illegally, plaintiff was barred from recovery. In a "but for" sense, the 
plaintiff's illegal action caused his own injury. However, in no manner 
could one argue that proximate causation was present. 159 Nonetheless, 
Bosworth and similar cases were strongly defended on grounds that the 
plaintiff's own actions were the "immediate, active cause of the damage" 
sustained. 160 
The Massachusetts rule was quite popular in the mid-to-late 1800s. 
Plaintiffs were denied recovery not only because they illicitly traveled 
on Sundays, but also because they violated traffic regulations,161 other 
permeate a claim of alleged negligence." Id .• 
158. 63 Mass. (10 Met.) 363 (1845); see also Lyons v. Desotelle, 124 Mass. 387 
(1878) (holding that unlawful traveling on Sunday necessarily contributes to an accident 
and therefore bars recovery); Hinckley v. Inhabitants of Penobscot, 42 Me. 89 (1856) 
(same). 
159. Eventually, most courts rejected the Bosworth result for two reasons: (1) lack 
of proximate cause, and (2) insufficient gravity of the criminal offense to justify denial 
of recovery. 
160. Davis, supra note 12, at 513. Davis's reasoning seems curious today. He 
essentially concluded that among all the conditions that lead to an injury, the active one 
occurring most immediately preceding the accident is the cause of the accident. For 
example, according to Davis, if defendant builds a defective bridge and carelessly 
maintains it, this creates a mere passive condition. The actual cause of the accident is 
plaintiff's riding across the bridge on his way from home to work in violation of a 
Sunday traveling ordinance, regardless of the fact that the same accident would have 
occurred on Monday morning (when plaintiff was traveling the same route completely 
legally) if it had not occurred on Sunday. Id. at 509. · 
161. E.g., Heland v. City of Lowell, 85 Mass. (3 Allen) 407 (1862) (plaintiff 
exceeding speed limit barred from recovery because of illegal nature of act); Tuttle v. 
Lawrence, 119 Mass. 276 (1876) (same). 
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safety. regulations, 162 or public morals, 163 even if those violations 
were not causally related to their injuries. Through this rule and related 
strategies, 164 courts in Massachusetts and other jurisdictions created a 
milieu extremely hostile to personal injury litigation. 
Bosworth's overly broad view of causation was eventually rejected, 
however, because it erroneously assumed "that a mere concurrence of the 
illegal act with the accident in point of time is to be treated as aa 
concurring cause of the injury, which it is not, but rather a condition or 
incident merely."165 Virtually all American jurisdictions had rejected 
the Massachusetts rule by the early 1900s, substituting a requirement that 
the illegality not just coincide with the timing of the injuries but 
proximately cause the injuries.166 Proximate causation was viewed as 
162. E.g., Read v. Boston & Albany R.R. Co., 4 N.E. 227 (Mass. 1885) (plaintiff 
locomotive engineer barred from recovering for injuries caused by defective track 
because he was running an unauthorized Sunday train). 
163. E.g., Curtis v. Murphy, 22 N.W. 825 (Wis. 1885) (plaintiff not allowed to 
recover from hotel whose clerk stole plaintiff's money because plaintiff checked into 
hotel with prostitute). 
164. For a time, Massachusetts courts also threw out similar cases by labeling 
plaintiffs as trespassers disentitled to the law's protection. E.g., Widronak v. Lord, 168 
N.E. 799 (Mass. 1929) (passenger in car being driven the wrong way down a one-way 
street Was an outlaw and trespasser not owed any duty by negligent defendant); Hanson 
v. Culton, 169 N.E. 272 (Mass. 1929) (plaintiff from Rhode Island who had not 
registered his car in Massachusetts was a trespasser who could not recover from 
negligent defendant who caused auto accident). See generally Irving S. Altshuler, Note, 
Automobiles--Use and Operation in Violation of Statute-Effect on Civil Rights, 10
B.U. L. REV. 211 (1930). . 
165. Broschart v. Tuttle, 21 A. 925, 928 (Conn. 1890) (allowing recovery by a 
speeding horseman whose violatjon of the speed limit did not cause the accident 
complained of). 
166. E.g., Currelli v. Jackson, 58 A. 162 (Conn. 1904) (failure of employee to 
obtain town clerk's written permission to use dynamite did not bar suit against employer 
for injuries sustained due to employer's alleged negligence in requiring employee to use 
frozen dynamite); Gilman v. Central Vermont Ry., 107 A. 122 (Vt. 1919) (fact that 
plaintiff was driving umegistered vehicle did not bar recovery from railroad for 
negligence because violations of criminal statutes "do not preclude a recovery unless 
there is a proximate, causal connection between the violation of the statute and the injury 
complained of." Id. at 124); Hoadley v. International Paper Co., 47 A. 169 (Vt. 1899) 
(fact that plaintiff was working on Sunday in violation of statute did not prohibit 
recovery from negligent employer where that fact was not proximate cause of injury); 
Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Messina, 72 So. 779 (Miss. 1916) (fact that plaintiff was illegally 
riding without paying fare by permission of the engineer did not bar negligence action 
against railroad where such free transportation was an incidental condition of, and not 
a contributing cause to, plaintiff's injury); Johnson v. Boston & M.R.R., 143 A. 516 
(N.H. 1928) (fact that plaintiff operated car without license did not bar negligence 
recovery unless it was causally related to injury); Sutton v. Town of Wauwatosa, 29 Wis. 
21 (1871) (plaintiff driving cattle to market on Sunday in violation of statute allowed to 
recover from maintainer of defective bridge); Baker v. City of Portland, 4 A. 274 (Me. 
1870) (plaintiff who violated speeding ordinance not barred from recovery where speed 
at time of accident did not proximately cause accident); Baldwin v. Barney, 12 R.I. 392 
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Invocation of the ex turpi causa defense in tort cases is rare in 
America today, but the occasional modern American case giving 
credence to the defense tends to stress proximate cause as a prerequisite 
to the defense.168 
(1879) (illegal Sunday traveler allowed to recover from reckless driver); Connolly v. 
Knickerbocker Ice Co., 21 N.E. 101 (N.Y. 1889) (infant plaintiff riding unlawfully on 
trolley platform allowed to recover); Platz v. City of Cohoes, 89 N.Y. 220 (1882) 
(illegal Sunday traveler allowed to recover); Cohen v. Manuel, 39 A. 1030 (Me. 1898) 
(unlicensed peddler of goods not barred_ from recovering from innkeeper for loss of 
goods while he stayed at inn); Kansas City v. Orr, 61 P. 397 (Kan. 1900) (fact that 
decedent was working on Sunday in violation of statute did not bar wrongful death 
action because violation was not proximate cause of the injury). 
Most courts also rejected fairly early on the Massachusetts trespass theory alluded to 
earlier, supra note 164. See generally Sears v. Bernardo, 115 A. 647 (R.I. 1922) 
(disregard of one-way sign is evidence of negligence but does not render violator an 
outlaw); Moore v. Hart, 188 S.W. 861, 863 (Ky. 1916) (Massachusetts "outlaw" rule is 
a "cruel and almost savage doctrine" and deprives violator "of all consideration dictated 
by the plainest principles of humanity"); Rapee v. Beacon Hotel Corp., 56 N.E.2d 548 
(N.Y. 1944) (plaintiff who fell down elevator shaft in hotel while registered under a false 
name as a married person with woman who was only his fiancee held a trespasser, but 
not an outlaw disentitled to recover). 
167. See generally Magdalen G. H. Flexner, Comment, Torts: Negligence: Illegal 
or Improper Purpose as Affecting Status, 31 CORNELL L.Q. 89 (1945). 
168. E.g., Janusis v. Long, 188 N.E. 228 (Mass. 1933) (alien illegally in country not 
barred for that reason from recovering in negligence from defendant for injuries arising 
out of auto accident); Meador v. Hotel Grover, 9 So. 2d 782 (Miss. 1942) (fact that 
plaintiff's decedent was killed by defendant hotel's negligent operation of elevator while 
visiting hotel with prostitute did not bar recovery because injury was not suffered as 
proximate result of committing illegal act); Curry v. Vesely, 348 P.2d 490 (N.M. 1960) 
(plaintiff, who apparently had abandoned earlier decision to participate in gang fight but 
was injured in a car wreck on his· way to check on his brother's safety, was allowed to 
sue driver of the other car who had participated in the rumble); Havis v. Iacovetto, 250 
P.2d 128 (Colo. 1952) (passenger for hire allowed to sue negligent driver even though 
accident occurred as plaintiff returned from illegal .gambling expedition to Utah because 
gambling was not a contributing cause to the accident); Johnson v. Thompson, 143 
S.E.2d 51 (Ga. Ct. App. 1965) (fact that plaintiff patron of drive-in movie theater was 
injured as he walked to snack bar to pick up an illegal bingo prize did not bar recovery 
absent causal relation between illegal act and injuries sustained); Manning v. Noa, 76 
N.W.2d 75 (Mich. 1956) (plaintiff injured when leaving church after playing illegal 
bingo game not barred from recovery because injury was not the proximate result of her 
committing an illegal act); Bagre v. Daggett Chocolate Co., 13 A.2d 757 (Conn. 1940) 
(plaintiff who broke off tooth when biting into a piece of candy made by defendant not 
barred from recovery by fact that he won the candy in an illicit bingo game because 
there was no causal relation between the illegality and the injury); Martinez v. Rein, 146 
So. 787 (La. Ct. App. 1933) (plaintiff's violation of city ordinance by placing scale on 
sidewalk-where it was struck by car in accident caused by defendant's negligence-did 
not bar recovery because violation was not a contributing cause of accident). 
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2. Public Policy 
The second major strain of American tort cases applying the ex turpi 
causa doctrine is primarily confined to the jurisdiction of Virginia. 
Although similar decisions are occasionally found in other jurisdictions, 
Virginia has produced most of the recent court decisions applying a 
broad public policy approach to ex turpi causa, reflecting a strong 
commitment to the principal that a court should not aid a plaintiff who 
has acted illicitly. Thus, a wrongful death action was rejected because 
the decedent had committed suicide;169 a wife who contracted venereal 
disease from her husband was denied recovery because the transmission 
happened during an illicit act of intercourse occurring before they were 
married;170 and a ·wrongful death action against a negligent abortionist 
was barred because decedent knew the abortion was illegal.171 
Virginia courts stress that a plaintiff's illegal act constitutes not merely 
contributory negligence or assumption of risk, but totally bars recovery. 
The reason-explained in the case of Zysk v. Zysk involving the 
transmission of venereal disease--is simply that "courts will not assist 
the participant in an illegal act who seeks to profit from the act's 
commission. " 172 
3. Modern American Rule 
Although occasional American cases outside Virginia still apply ex 
turpi causa to dismiss tort claims, the doctrine is seldom invoked today. 
Prosser and Keeton accurately note that: 
[W]ith few exceptions, the courts have long discarded the doctrine that any 
violator of a statute is an outlaw with no rights against anyone, and have 
recognized that, except in so far as the violator must resort to an illegal contract 
or an illegal status as the basis of the defendant's duty to him, one who violates 
a criminal statute is not deprived of all protection against the torts of others. 
Thus the Sunday driver or the unlicensed operator of an unlicensed car, 
although he is a criminal, can recover for his injuries if in other respects he is 
exercising proper care. 
169. Hill v. Nicodemus, 755 F. Supp. 692 (W.D. Va. 1991), ajf'd, 919 F.2d 987 
(4th Cir. 1992). 
170. Zysk v. Zysk, 404 S.E.2d 72 (Va. 1990). 
171. Miller v. Bennett, 56 S.E.2d 217 (Va. 1949). 
172. Zysk, 404 S.E.2d at 722; see also Suddarth v. Slane, 539 F. Supp. 612 (W.D. 
Va. 1982) (state trooper fired after adultery charge held not protected by civil rights law, 
42 U.S.C. § 1983, because of his participation in the immoral act). 
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The accepted rule now is that a breach of statute by the plaintiff is to stand 
on the same footing as a violation by the defendant.' 
Thus, in America the general rule is that a plaintiff's violation of a 
criminal statute may constitute contributory negligence174 or assump-
tion of risk, but it generally does not completely bar a plaintiff's 
recovery on ex turpi causa grounds. Except for the occasional Virginia 
case applying a public policy approach, or the occasional New York case 
applying a public policy view coupled with the more traditional 
proximate cause requirement, 175 few U.S. tort claims today are barred 
by the ex turpi causa defense. 
This is consistent with the R?statement (Second) of Torts, which 
provides: "One is not barred from recovery for an interference with his 
legally protected interests merely because at the time of the interference 
he was committing a tort or a crime .... "176 
173. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 36, 
at 232 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON] (citations omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
174. It may even constitute contributory negligence per se if the statute violated was 
enacted for the protection of others, including defendant. E.g., Watts v. Montgomery 
Traction Co., 57 So. 471, 472 (Ala. 1912). 
175. E.g., Barker v. Kallash, 468 N.E.2d 39 (N.Y. 1984), discussed infra notes 232-
38 and accompanying text. 
176. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 889 (1977). The Restatement divides the 
potential scenarios for application of the rule into several categories: 
First is the case of intentional harms by third persons. The Restatement provides this 
illustration: "A strikes B, who, unknown to A, has criminal possession of narcotics with 
intent to sell them. A is subject to liability to B." 
Second is the case of negligent harms by third persons. The Restatement provides this 
illustration: "A negligently collides with and harms B, who is carrying contraband goods. 
A is subject to liability to B." 
Third is the case of intentional harm to the person by a conspirator. The Restatement 
hypothesizes an example of one robber shooting another in a dispute over the spoils of 
a robbery. The shooting victim would have a cause of action for the physical injury, but 
no claim for the other's refusal to divide the spoils. 
Fourth is the case of taking land or chattels from the illegal possession of another. 
Generally speaking, it is not a defense for A who stole a bike from B, that B had stolen 
it from its true owner. However, the Restatement suggests that a court may, as a matter 
of public policy, refrain from aiding B in such a claim until an attempt is made to 
contact the true owner and afford her an opportunity to intervene. The Restatement 
gives this illustration: "A has illegal possession of drugs that can be kept only for 
medicinal purposes. B seizes A's drugs. B is subject to liability to A." This result 
would be different if the chattel involved were not capable of legal use. 
Fifth is the case of liability of a bailee to a bailor for goods illegally bailed. In such 
cases, bailment for an illegal purpose does not necessarily bar recovery by the bailor 
against the bailee for negligent harm to the bailed goods. However, if the return of the 
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Little notice was taken of the gradual disappearance of the ex turpi 
causa defense in American tort cases, because it did not affect the 
outcome of most cases. As the defense disappeared, the doctrines of 
contributory negligence and assumption of risk still served as complete 
defenses to recovery. Therefore, in most cases, abandonment of the 
defense neither aided plaintiffs nor harmed defendants. · 
However, contributory negligence has been gradually replaced by 
comparative negligence in the vast majority .of American jurisdic-
tions.177 Today, a plaintiff's recovery may be reduced, but generally 
is not barred, by a plaintiff's simple carelessness, product misuse, or 
even knowing assumption of risk. Today, plaintiffs in personal injury 
cases are often recovering some or most of their damages in cases where 
their wrongdoing would have constituted a complete bar to recovery 
under previous interpretations of the ex turpi causa doctrine. Now that 
proportionate liability has replaced the total defenses that previously 
existed due to contributory negligence and assumption of risk, the 
gradual disappearance of the ex turpi causa defense in the United States 
takes on a new significance. It is surprising that the doctrine's revival 
in other western common-law jurisdictions has not been noted by 
American advocates and judges. 
IV. A CRITIQUE OF COMMON-LAW JURISDICTION APPROACHES TO 
THE EX TURPI CAUSA DEFENSE 
An initial step in determining whether the United States should revive 
the ex turpi causa defense in tort cases involves an analysis of the 
theoretical approaches to application of the defense that have . been 
developed over time. A valid doctrine should have a strong theoretical 
underpinning and an articulated rationale that allows for clarity and 
consistency of application. Have the courts in other nations that have 
revived ex turpi causa formulated these necessary elements? This part 
will attempt to answer this query. 
chattel would aid in the commission of a crime ("as when a retail dealer who has 
received narcotics refuses to return them to the wholesaler ... who intends to use them 
for illicit purposes"), a court will deny recovery. 
Sixth is the case of the trespassing plaintiff. Here the Restatement borrows the duty 
concept of cases like Smith v. Jenkins, see supra notes 86-98 and accompanying text, 
stating that "a malicious mischief maker who is hurt by a defective condition of the 
premises that he is seeking to harm is denied recovery because the owner of the 
premises owes no duty of care. with respect to him." Id. 
177. See infra notes 336-38 and accompanying text. 
88 
[VOL. 32: 53, 1995] Litigation "Crisis" 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
The earlier survey of selected common-law jurisdictions demonstrates 
that there are four primary approaches to application of the ex turpi 
causa defense in tort actions. 1 . 
First, there is the legislative intent doctrine explicated in Australia's 
Henwood case.179 · 
Second, Australia also produced the duty rule centered on the notion 
that co-venturers in crime owe each other no duty, in part because it 
would be impossible for the court to establish a standard of care in such 
cases. This -rule arises from Smith, as refined in Jackson. 180 , 
Third is the public .policy approach embodied in Australia's Godbolt 
case, in Canada's Tallow case, in England's "conscience test," and in 
Virginia's Zysk case. 181 
Fourth is America's causation approach, which transformed the 
Massachusetts rule's concurrent condition requirement into a proximate 
causation requirement.182 
A. The Legislative Intent Test 
As noted earlier, two members of the Henwood court concluded that 
depriving decedent (who had stuck his head out a window of the tram 
in order to vomit) of recovery because he had violated a safety rule was 
"[p]robably the last thing intended by the framers .... "183 
This quotation highlights one of the most intractable problems with the 
legislative intent approach. Almost inevitably, in passing criminal 
legislation the legislature will not have considered the impact the law 
should have upon a private cause of action brought by one of its 
violators. This will be true whether the law involved is a minor safety 
regulation as in Henwood, or a major felony statute, as in McCummings. 
Indeed, the problem is amplified by the fact that, as in Henwood, the 
178. In establishing this categorization, it is not to be supposed that there is no 
overlap or interaction among the theories. The earlier description of these approaches 
clearly demonstrates that these categorizations often highlight a difference of emphasis 
only. 
179. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text. 
180. See supra notes 86-99 and accompanying text. 
181. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text (Godbolt), notes 122-24 and 
accompanying text (Tallow), notes 109-20 and accompanying text ("conscience test"), 
and notes 170-72 and accompanying text (Zysk). 
182. See supra notes 158-68 and accompanying text. 
183. Henwood v. Municipal Tramways Trust, 60 C.L.R. 438 (1938) (Austl.). 
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factual circumstances which result in invocation of the ex turpi causa 
doctrine often tend toward the bizarre and unforeseen. 
Inevitably, the legislative intent approach leaves courts groping in the 
dark, attempting to derive a _ conclusion as to legislative intent with 
absolutely no solid evidence upon which to base that conclusion. It is 
one thing for courts to do their best to exercise policy judgments when 
such is required. It is less satisfactory for courts to exercise policy 
judgments under the guise of applying a legislative intent that cannot be 
satisfactorily determined.184 Naturally, the vagaries of statutory 
interpretation under such circumstances have led to inconsistent 
conclusions as to the meaning of specific statutes. 185 Ex turpi causa 
is a court-developed doctrine; its application is not satisfactorily 
determined by resort to imaginary legislative intent. 186 
Additionally, many cases do not involve violations of statutes, but 
simple violations of morals contrary to public policy as construed by the 
courts. Legislative intent cannot possibly be of assistance in such cases. 
In short, the legislative intent approach is appropriate only in the 
exceedingly rare case where legislative intent clearly establishes that the 
legislature in passing a statute meant not only to regulate or criminalize 
conduct but also to deprive violators of their right to recover for injuries 
inflicted by others. In the remaining cases, the legislative intent 
approach is ineffectual if not disingenuous. 
The main opinion in Tallow, written by Judge Clement, appropriately 
rejected the legislative intent approach of Henwood as "put[ting] an 
entirely different footing under the rule"187 by shifting the focus from 
public policy analysis regarding the antisocial character of the plaintiff's 
184. This criticism has also been lodged regarding invocation of the illegality 
defense in contract law. John Shand, Unblinkering the Unruly Horse: Public Policy in 
the Law of Contract, 30 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 144, 149 (1972) ("The reality of the situation 
is that the legislator has probably never applied his mind to the problem of whether the 
contract or right should be enforceable."). 
185. Compare Monk v. Monk, 32 B.C.L.R.2d 240 (1989) (Family Compensation 
Act provisions do not render inappropriate the application of ex turpi causa defense 
arising from acts of deceased) with Funk v. Clapp, 35 B.C.L.R.2d 222 (C.A. 1986) (ex 
turpi causa defense should not use illegal acts of deceased to bar recovery to his family 
under Family Compensation Act). 
186. Judges Dixon and McTieman framed the key issue in a manner that restricts 
the ex turpi causa defense: "It appears to us that in- every case the question must be 
whether it is part of the purpose of the law against which the plaintiff has offended to 
disentitle a person doing the prohibited act from complaining of the other party's neglect 
or default, without which his own act would not have resulted in injury." Henwood, 60 
C.L.R. at 460. Because the legislature will almost never have considered the matter, 
courts will be unable to conclude that disabling the plaintiff from recovery was part of 
the legislative purpose. However, the presumption could just as easily have been framed 
oppositely, in a pro-defendant posture. 
187. Tallow v. Tailfeathers, 44 D.L.R.3d 55, 64 (Alta. 1973). 
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behavior to the technical matter of statutory interpretation. This ignores 
the importance of turpitude that is the sine qua non of the doctrine. 
Judge Clement further noted that "[t]o parse a section of the Criminal 
Code dealing with, say, theft or criminal negligence or driving while 
intoxicated, to determine whether it adds to or subtracts from the civil 
rights of a wrongdoer would be an unusual occupation."188 It would 
also be a dangerous occupation. Such speculation can serve only to 
undermine the certainty of the law.189 
B. The Duty Approach 
1. Part One: Existence of Duty 
As noted earlier, in Smith, an Australian court refused to allow one 
criminal co-venturer to recover from another for injuries negligently 
inflicted during the course of their criminal escapade, denying that the 
latter could owe a duty to the former under such circumstances. This 
approach was refined in Jackson, where the court reasoned that a duty 
is not owed because it would be impossible in the context of 
safecrackers blowing up a safe or bank robbers executing a getaway for 
the court to establish a standard of care. 
Several drawbacks to the duty approach are apparent. First, it may be 
observed that although the Smith duty test gives some guidance in cases 
where defendant is charged with negligence, it is not helpful in cases 
where plaintiffs are pursuing other theories. Second, as Professor 
Weinrib asks, "If the focus of -the defence is the act of illegality on the 
part of the plaintiff, of what relevance can it be that the defendant rather 
than a third party is an accomplice in the illegality or indeed that there 
is any accomplice at a11?"190 Third, the courts have not clarified what 
188. Id. at 65. 
189. Ezra R Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARV. L. REV. 317,320 
(1914) ("[T]his sort of speculation as to unexpressed legislative intent is a dangerous 
business permissible only within narrow limits; and the tendency to overindulge it is 
responsible for much of the confusion in the law."). 
190. Ernest J. Weinrib, Illegality as a Tort Defence, 26 U. TORONTO L.J. 28, 34 
(1976). Professor Ford agrees, arguing that the principle of "legal inseverability" for 
purposes of responsibility for the acts of several persons joined together in commission 
of a wrong adverted to by Judge Kitto in Smith, "is a principle for the purposes of 
criminal, not civil responsibility. It is surely inappropriate to argue matters of civil 
liability on the basis of a rule designed for other purposes." Ford, supra note 95, at 39. 
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level of cooperation constitutes the sort of joint criminal activity that will 
lead to application of the doctrine. Must plaintiff's level of involvement 
be identical to defendant's for there to be no duty owed? What if 
plaintiff is not as involved as defendant in the crime, but her actions 
could be viewed as aiding and abetting? What if her actions do not 
constitute aiding and abetting, but nonetheless exhibit some involvement 
in the criminal act? No court applying the duty test has answered these 
questions.191 
Fourth, while the duty approach plausibly applies where defendant is 
a co-conspirator in crime,· it obviously has no application in other 
scenarios where the ex turpi causa defense is raised. 192 Apparently, 
it would not even be available to defendants in cases such as 
McCummings. In fact, the test produces two anomalies: (a) it allows 
defendant to profit from his own wrong in order to prevent plaintiff from 
profiting from hers, and (b) it puts innocent third parties at greater risk 
of liability than wrongdoing criminals. Regarding the first anomaly, a 
Canadian judge has noted: 
[C]onfining the barring of recovery to cases where the plaintiff and the 
defendant were engaged in a joint criminal act produces a paradoxical result. 
Assume that the plaintiff is injured by the defendant's negligence while the 
plaintiff is carrying out a criminal enterprise. If the defendant is also engaged 
in the criminal enterprise, the defendant will escape liability. But if the 
defendant is not involved in the criminal enterprise at all, he will be liable. The 
net result of a principle intended to prevent a plaintiff from profiting from his 
own wrong would be to permit a defendant to profit from his own wrong.193 
This passage also highlights the second· anomaly-that the ex turpi 
causa defense is available to criminals in situations where it would not 
protect innocent third parties. For example, the accident in Smith 
occurred when the car, driven by plaintiff's cohort in crime, went off the 
road and hit a tree. But assume. instead that the accident had been 
partially caused by the careless driver of another vehicle. Under the 
duty approach enunciated in Smith, the co-conspirator defendant has an 
ex turpi causa defense that is not available to the non-criminal driver of 
the other car. Because he was not jointly engaged in a criminal venture 
with plaintiff, the driver of .the other car is deprived of an absolute 
191. See generally Bruce MacDougall, Ex Turpi Causa: Should A Defence Arise 
from a Base Cause?, 55 SASK. L. REV. 1, 25 (1991). 
192. Indeed, some courts have explicitly limited the defense to cases of joint 
criminal activity. E.g., Teece v. Honeybourn, 54 D.L.R.3d 549 (B.C. 1975). 
193. Betts v. Sandersons Estate, 31 B.C.L.R.2d 1, 6 (1988) (Lambert, J.) (emphasis 
added). 
92 
[VOL. 32: 53, 1995] Litigation "Crisis" 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
defense.194 "Justice hardly seems to be served by a rule which penal-
izes a defendant for his innocence but not for his guilt.;'195 
Similarly, justice is not served by a. rule which seems to provide at 
least a vague incentive for defendant to involve herself in plaintiff's 
illegal activity so as to create the conditions for application of the ex 
turpi causa defense. 196 
Furthermore, the duty approach confuses what should be two distinct 
concepts-the plaintiff's duty not to violate the law 197 and the 
defendant's duty of care (in a negligence case) or duty not to injure (in 
an intentional tort case ).198 
Additionally, despite protestations to the contrary by the very courts 
rendering the decisions, the denial of a duty renders the plaintiff; in 
194. Judge Kitto supplied this illustration: 
If, to take a strong example, the respondent in the present case had been an 
escaped convict travelling in the car in order to elude lawful pursuit but the 
appellant had been driving him in all innocence, the appellant would, I should 
think, have owed the respondent the same duty of care as he would have owed 
an ordinary passenger. 
Smith v. Jenkins, 119 C.L.R. 397, 403 (1969) (Austl.). 
195. W.J. Ford, Tort and Illegality: The Ex Turpi CausaDefence in Negligence Law 
(Part Two), 11 MELB. U. L. REV. 164, 176 (1977). 
196. See JOHN G. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 278 (7th ed. 1987): Fleming 
explains: 
There is really no reason in logic or policy for a different result where the 
plaintiff is involved in a joint illegal enterprise with the defendant: the 
plaintiff does not appear more culpable than if he had acted alone, and offering 
immunity to the defendant would be apt to encourage rather than deter the 
enterprise. 
Id.; see also MacDougall, supra note 191, at 28. MacDougall states: 
Id. 
lf the law is willing to make the plaintiff an outlaw vis-a-vis a co-participant 
in illegality, then why not vis-a-vis anyone else? If, on the other hand, the 
innocent defendant is not allowed to take advantage of the deferice, then 
should it not be refused to a "guilty" defendant? It is not a purpose of the law 
to encourage others to participate in wrongful acts in order to allow them to 
escape civil liability. 
197. Professor MacDougall asks: "Why should it matter that they were involved 
jointly? If the court wishes to express its disapproval of the plaintiff's activity then only 
her activity should be of relevance to the court." MacDougall, supra note 191, at 28. 
198. GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, JOINT TORTS AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 334 
(1951). Williams notes: 
Id. 
The duty not to smuggle is logically distinct from the duty to warn invitees of 
traps, just as the duty not to operate a car without a licence is distinct from the 
duty not to drive a car negligently; breach of the one should not be a defence 
to an action for breach of the other. 
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effect, caput lupinum in violation of so many basic principles of tort 
law.199 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the duty test is so malleable in 
the hands of judges that it tends to be extremely result-oriented in 
application. After all, even proponents of the duty theory recognize that 
''there is no a priori reason in law why a duty cannot subsist between 
criminals or wrongdoers."200 Adding a new layer of considerations in 
determining whether a duty exists "provides no new insight into the 
fundamental question of when the courts should be entitled to deny 
recovery in tort to a plaintiff on the ground of the plaintiff's immoral or 
illegal conduct,"201 · and further complicates an already uncertain area 
of the law. As Prosser has stated: 
These are shifting sands, and no fit foundation. There is a-duty if the court 
says there is a duty; the law ... is what we make it. Duty is only a word with 
. which we state our conclusion that there is or is not to be liability; it necessarily 
begs the essential question. 202 
Although Prosser was discussing American law, the "duty" concept is 
no clearer in Australia or England where this test is popular. 203 
Indeed, English author P.S. Atiyah finds the same difficulties with the 
concept, deeming the "duty" question "an unnecessary abstraction which 
adds nothing to the substance of the law ... [being] simply coextensive 
with the boundaries of liability once negligence in fact and damage in 
fact have been shown."204 
This malleability has been manifest in ex turpi causa cases. Professor 
MacDougall argues that this "result orientitis" of the duty approach is 
nearly unavoidable because courts will be much more reluctant to 
impose the harsh conclusion that no duty exists in cases where plaintiff's 
personal injuries are severe than in cases where plaintiff's personal 
injuries are minor.205 The difficulty with this approach, of course, is 
that neither plaintiff nor defendant know before the accident giving rise 
199. MacDougall, supra note 191, at 4. 
200. Hall v. Hebert, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 159, 180 (Can.) {McLachlin, J.). 
201. Id. at 181. 
202. William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 15 (1953). 
203. The most recent major case decided in England regarding scope of duty is an 
accountants' liability case, Caparo v. Dickman, [1990] 2 W.L.R. 358 (H.L.). 
Unfortunately, courts in other· common-law nations are having a devil of a time 
determining exactly what Caparo meant, leading to substantial confusion. See Robyn 
Martin, Professional Liability - What Price Caparo Now?, 9 PROF. NEGL. 119 (1993). 
204. PATRICK S. ATIYAH, ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION, AND THE LAW 47 (1970). 
205. MacDougall, supra note 191, at 18 ("It is, I think, correct that the doctrine 
ought not to be applied if manifest injustice would result--that must always be true of 
principles developed within the common law.") (quoting Judge Taylor in Mack v. Enns, 
30 B.C.L.R. 337, 346 (1981)). 
94 
[VOL. 32: 53, 1995] Litigation "Crisis" 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
to suit how severe the injuries will be or, consequently, whether the 
courts will find a duty to exist.206 Such an unprincipled and unpredict-
able approach is clearly deficient. 
2. Part Two: Determining Standard of Care 
The Smith rule was refined, of course, by Jackson, but the latter's 
approach-which provides that no duty exists in situations where one co-
venturer in crime injures another because it is supposedly impossible for 
the courts to establish a standard_ of care-also has its flaws. Assume 
that Driver D and Passenger P are jointly engaged in transporting illegal 
drugs. Both desire that D will drive carefully so as not to attract undue 
police attention. Under Jackson, D owes a duty to P and will be liable 
for an accident unless, the moment before the agreement, a police siren 
was flipped on and a chase began. The distinction is a thin one. 
As noted above, Smith purportedly rejected application of the ex turpi 
causa defense, focusing solely on the duty issue.207 However, as also 
noted above, this was merely a semantic ruse-the case was indistin-
guishable in reasoning, rationale, and result from others applying the ex 
turpi causa defense. On the one hand, unlike Smith, the Jackson 
approach arguably moves the duty theory away from the ex turpi causa 
defense in that the degree of moral turpitude of the parties is irrelevant. 
The only issue is whether a duty of care can be established. Most courts 
and commentators ( and accurately so) view the Jackson approach as just 
another approach to the ex turpi causa defense,208 but to the extent that 
it purports not to be, it loses all theoretical focus.209 
Notwithstanding the reasoning of Jackson and its progeny, it is, in 
fact, possible to establish a standard of care for the setting of a dynamite 
charge by one of two safecrackers. That standard of care would be very 
similar to that owed by one construction worker to another. It is also 
possible to set a standard of care for the driver of a getaway car in a 
bank robbery. That standard of care would be very similar to that owed 
206. MacDougall, supra note 191, at 18-20. 
207. See supra notes 86-99 and accompanying text. 
208. E.g., Pitts v. Hunt, [1990] 3 W.L.R. 542, 552 (Beldam, L.J.), 558 (Balcombe, 
L.J.), 566 (Dillon, L.J.) (Eng.). 
209. See Hall v. Hebert, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 159, 183-86 (Can.) (McLachlin, J.) 
(explaining why, to the minimal extent ex turpi causa should play a role in tort 
litigation, it should be as a defense, not as an element of plaintiffs cause of action). 
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by the driver of a car rushing to a hospital in a medical emergency. It 
is possible to set a standard of care for the driver of an automobile, even 
when he and the passenger have been drinking together all day. It is 
certainly possible to establish a duty of care in a case regarding the 
performance of a driver, even though, as in Jackson, the driver has no 
license. 
Although McCummings was not a joint-wrongdoer case, it demon-
strates that a standard of care can be determined in such a situation. The 
shooting officer was constrained by both a U.S. Supreme Court decision 
making it a constitutional violation to shoot an unarmed fleeing suspect 
who poses no danger to the officer or to the public,210 and by New 
York police guidelines providing that guns should only be used as 
defensive weapons and cannot be used to stop an escaping felon "unless 
there is probable cause to believe a felon will use deadly force."211 
In short, Jackson is dead wrong in concluding that no standard of care 
can be established in such cases. The judges are simply saying that in 
certain cases they do not wish to establish a standard of care.212 This 
will be the case in situations where the parties are jointly involved in 
crimes or other acts of moral turpitude-which is precisely the element 
that the Jackson court purports to exclude from its analysis. 
Because of two deficiencies the Jackson decision results in an 
intolerable lack of guidance. First, the decision does not make it clear 
whether the courts cannot establish a duty of care (which is never true) 
or are simply choosing not to establish a duty of care. Second, if the 
latter is the case, the decision gives precious little guidance as to what 
types of conduct will cause the court to choose not to establish a duty. 
To the extent that the duty approach requires courts to establish 
guidelines in order to determine when they will and when they will not 
choose to establish standards of care, the duty approach simply collapses 
and is replaced by the public policy approach discussed in the next part. 
For it is only those public policy factors which can provide the needed 
guidelines. 
210. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9 (1985). 
211. See Richard Cohen, A Mugging of Taxpayers, PLAIN DEALER (CLEVELAND), 
Dec. 5, 1993, at D3. There was very substantial evidence supporting the jury's finding 
that neither of these criteria were met in the McCummings case. Id. 
212. See Williams, supra note 111, at 750-51. 
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C. The Public Policy Approach 
At least four different common-law countries have developed a public 
policy approach to application of the ex turpi causa defense. Each has 
its limitations. 
1. Australia: Godbolt 
To the extent that Godbolt is viewed as turning on public policy 
considerations, two major problems come immediately to mind. First, 
there are objections to the specific public policy advanced in this case 
( encouragement of crime) and others (insult to the integrity of the 
judicial system, punishment of wrongdoers, etc.). Godbolt's view that 
crime would be encouraged by allowance of recovery is facially 
incredible. No person embarks on a criminal venture hoping that he or 
she will be injured in the course of that venture and thereby enabled to 
recover from a co-conspirator in a subsequent civil action.213 
Second, there is a valid objection generally to the use of public policy 
as the basis for deciding whether to apply the ex turpi causa defense. 
In the hands of a result-oriented judge, unlimited numbers of public 
policy arguments can be conjured up to justify application or rejection 
of the illegality defense. In the Godbolt case itself, Judge Manning's 
opinion, though concurring in the result, pointed out some of the perils 
of a public policy approach. Judge Manning cited Lord Atkin in Fender 
v. St. John-Mildmay,214 for the notion that "from time to time judges 
of the highest reputation have uttered warning notes as to the danger of 
permitting judicial tribunals to roam unchecked in the field of public 
policy,"21 and quoted Judge Cave's statement in In re Mirams,216 
that ''.judges are more to be trusted as interpreters of the law than as 
expounders of what is called public policy." 17 
213. For a more detailed discussion of this deterrence rationale, see infra part 
V.A.2. 
214. 1938 App. Cas. I, IO (appeal taken from Eng.). 
215. Godbolt v. Fittock, 1963 N.S.W. St. R. at 617, 630 (Austl.). 
216. [1891] I Q.B. 594. 
217. Id. at 595. In conclusion, Judge Manning cautioned: 
The application of the rules of public policy to circumstances such as this 
provide almost as much difficulty as controlling the ''unruly horse" which the 
policy itself has been said to resemble. Accordingly I do not feel that it is 
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On the other hand, to the extent that Godbolt is viewed as turning on 
the directness of a connection between a criminal enterprise and an 
injury, regardless of causation, it is subject to criticism on two counts. 
It runs completely contrary to modem trends in tort law in that (a) it 
absolutely defeats plaintiff's claim rather than allowing for some 
apportionment under a comparative fault doctrine,218 and (b) provides 
an inadequate tool (to substitute for causation) for use in delimiting the 
scope of the ex turpi causa defense's application.219 
2. England: Pitts 
English cases often apply the "public conscience" test. How does one 
determine which sorts of illegality give rise to an affront to the public 
conscience by indirectly assisting or encouraging the plaintiff in his 
criminal activity? The facts in Pitts were not fertile soil for application 
of the public conscience test.220 But even had they been, the public 
conscience test221 is clearly a variant of the public policy approach of 
necessary or desirable to attempt to lay down any rule of general application. 
1963 N.S.W. St. R. at 630. 
218. There is no doubt that western jurisprudence strongly favors on fairness 
grounds the proportional liability of a comparative negligence or comparative 
responsibility system over a harsh all-or-nothing contributory negligence defense. Harry 
Kalven, Jr., Comments on Maki v. Frelk-Comparative v. Contributory Negligence: 
Should the Court or Legislature Decide?, 21 VAND. L. REV. 897, 899 n.14 (1968) 
(noting "apparent[] worldwide consensus" in favor of comparative negligence). 
219. Weinrib, supra note 190, at 36-38. 
220. See Pitts v. Hunt, [1990) 1 Q.B. 24 (Dillon, L.J.). Plaintiff Pitts was not, after 
all, asking the court to assist him directly or indirectly to commit a crime or to keep the 
proceeds of one. Williams, supra note 11 1,-at 7 51. 
221. The "public conscience" test is also one of two primary approaches used by 
English courts when ex turpi causa is raised as a defense in contract cases. See, e.g., 
Euro-diam Ltd. v. Bathurst, [1990) 1 Q.B. 1; Geismar v. Sun Alliance and London Ins., 
[1978) 1 Q.B. 383 (no recovery under property insurance policy for property stolen from 
insured who had illegally imported the property without paying proper duty); Beresford 
v. Royal Ins. Co. Ltd., [1938) App. Cas. 586 (appeal taken from Eng.) (no recovery 
under life insurance policy by personal representative of insured who had committed 
suicide). The other approach refuses recovery on ex turpi causa grounds where it is 
necessary for plaintiff to prove or plead an illegal contract in order to recover. See 
Bowmakers Ltd. v. Barnet Instruments Ltd. [1945) 1 K.B. 65. See generally Tan, supra 
note 45, at 523. Naturally, this rule would also bar recovery in tort cases. Saunders v. 
Edwards, [1987) 1 W.L.R. 1116, 1132 (C.A.) (Nicholls, L.J.). 
In one recent case, the Court of Appeals found for plaintiff using the public conscience 
test, and the House of Lords affirmed on grounds that plaintiff did not need to assert the 
contract in order to state her claim. See Paul Magrath, Law Report: Illegality No Bar 
to Property Claim, INDEPENDENT, July 6, 1993, at 13 (reporting on Tinsley v. Milligan, 
in which one of two joint beneficial owners of a house who had agreed to put the 
property in the name of the other so as to facilitate fraudulent claim to housing benefits 
by former was allowed to impress trust upon property for half its value). 
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Godbolt,222 and suffers many of the same infirmities discussed above, 
including vagueness.223 
For example, Lord Justice Beldam barred recovery in Pitts because 
"[t]he public conscience is ever increasingly being focused not only on 
those who commit the offence [ of driving while intoxicated] but, in the 
words of recent publicity, those who ask the driver to drink and 
drive,"224 but adamantly refused to draw any sort of line to give 
guidance as to what sorts of offenses would be serious enough to arouse 
the public conscience to bar recovery and those which would not.225 
Absent such guidance, public policy is worse than an unruly horse; it is 
an imaginary one. 
3. Canada: Tallow 
The public policy approach, subject to the criticisms mentioned above, 
has its own particular problems, as constructed in Tallow. The court 
described the division of legislative power in Canada placing criminal 
law within the federal sphere and then noted the distinction between 
offenses malum in se ("evil in itself') and those malum prohibitum 
("wrong because it is prohibited").226 Judge Clement then equated 
federal offenses with mala in se and provincial offenses with mala 
prohibita, concluding that the former involved sufficient turpitude to 
justify invocation of the ex turpi causa defense, while the latter did 
not.227 Plaintiff's recovery was barred because of plaintiff's participa-
tion with defendant driver in theft and unlawful use of the car. 
This rather neat solution has been criticized228 (a) as ignoring the 
fact that the equation of morality and criminality has been expressly 
222. The public policy approach has also been characterized as turning on the 
proximity (not causal connection) of the illegality to the matters of which plaintiff is 
complaining. Pitts, 1 Q.B. at 51. 
223. For example, Lord Justice Dillon stated in Pitts that he found the public 
conscience test "very difficult to apply, since the public conscience may well be affected 
by factors of an emotional nature." Id. at 56. 
224. Id. at 46. 
225. Id. 
226. Tallow v. Tailfeathers, 44 D.L.R.3d 55, 65 (Alta. 1973). 
227. Id. 
228. See Weinrib, supra note 190, at 32-33. 
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disclaimed in Canadian constitutional law,229 and (b) because many 
federal criminal offenses in Canada are of a strictly regulatory na-
ture. 230 Acts do not become malum in se simply because a federal 
legislature has seen fit to outlaw them. Thus, like their Australian and 
English brethren, judges in Canada clearly have not found a satisfactory 
basis• upon which to distinguish those illegal and immoral acts which 
should motivate a court to deny tort recovery by invocation of ex turpi 
causa from those which should not. 
4. United States: Zysk 
Like common law courts elsewhere, the Virginia courts, the primary 
proponents of the public policy approach to ex turpi causa in the United 
States, have not clarified the boundaries of their rationale. The 
victimless crime of fornication between two consenting adults apparently 
is a sufficiently immoral act to require the courts to withhold reme-
dy.231 The crime of speeding, which endangers third parties much 
more significantly, presumably is not so immoral. But where is the line 
being drawn, and ·why? Is it between felonies and misdemeanors? 
Between crimes malum prohibitum and those malum in se? ' Between 
acts that are merely immoral and acts that have been criminalized? 
Virginia does not explicate. 
This problem has been highlighted in New York. New York, perhaps 
more than any American jurisdiction other than Virginia, has produced 
a fair number of recent decisions applying the ex turpi causa defense in 
tort cases.232 In Barker v. Kallash,233 for example, a fifteen-year-old 
plaintiff was barred from negligence recovery because his injury 
occurred while he was making an illegal pipe bomb which exploded. 
229. See Proprietary Articles Trade Ass'n v. Attorney Gen. Can., 1931 App. Cas. 
310, 324 (Lord Atkin) ("Morality and criminality are far from co-extensive; nor is the 
sphere of criminality necessarily part of a more extensive field covered by morali-
ty .... "). 
230. For example, Weinrib asks: "Can it be seriously asserted, for instance, that the 
act of mixing sulphur dioxide into sausages in the proportion of forty-six one-hundredths 
of a part of sulphur dioxide to two thousand parts of meat is intrinsically wrong and 
against conscience even in the absence of injury?" Weinrib, supra note 190, at 33. 
231. Zysk v. Zysk, 387 S.E.2d 466 (Va. 1990). 
232. E.g., Braunstein v. Jason Tarantella, Inc., 450 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1982) (barring 
producers of pornographic movie from bringing negligence action against distributors 
because plaintiffs would have to rely on their own illegal act to establish their claim); 
Hines v. Sullivan, 431 N.Y.S.2d 868 (Fam. Ct. 1980) (denying plaintiff father's attempt 
to obtain an order of filiation to enable him to seek custody of child because child was 
conceived through act of illegal intercourse between 16-year-old plaintiff and 14-year-old 
mother). 
233. 468 N.E.2d 39 (N.Y. 1984). 
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The case was particularly weak anyway because plaintiff was suing an 
eight-year-old who had allegedly sold to third parties the firecrackers 
used as the source of gunpowder for the bomb. The court invoked the 
ex turpi causa defense, holding that plaintiff should not profit from his 
own wrong.234 
Interestingly, Judge Jasen's concurring opinion stressed that violation 
of a criminal statute should preclude a plaintiff's suit only when (1) 
plaintiff's own criminal conduct was a contributing proximate cause, and 
(2) ''that conduct can fairly be considered so egregious an offense that 
permitting recovery would be inimical to the public interest."235 Thus, 
the New York approach seems to conflate the majority proximate cause 
test with Virginia's public policy approach. 
The key question in the public policy approach is this: How 
"egregious" must the plaintiff's conduct be to disqualify plaintiff from 
recovery? Like Virginia, New York has trouble drawing satisfactory 
lines. In Barker, plaintiff argued that he was only fifteen years old and 
that this was just a case of several youngsters playing with fireworks 
shortly before the Fourth of July.236 Thus, plaintiff argued, his 
conduct was not so egregious that it should bar recovery. The court 
ruled that making a bomb was serious business that should not- be 
minimized.237 In attempting to establish a general rule, the court drew 
a distinction between statutes that merely regulate a certain activity and 
statutes that prohibit that activity: Violation of the former would not bar
plaintiff's recovery; violation of the latter would.238 
Using this standard as a guideline poses several problems. First, this 
standard suffers from many of the deficiencies cited earlier regarding the 
legislative intent standard of the Henwood case in Australia.239 Most 
importantly the legislature rarely makes known its intent to permit or 
deny civil recovery when it enacts criminal legislation. Second, it is not 
always clear when the legislature intends merely to regulate an activity 
234. Id. at 41 (citing Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889) and Carr v. Hoy, 
139 N.E.2d 531 (N.Y. 1957)). 
235. Id. at 44. . 
236. 'Id. at 42. Plaintiff also argued that barring his recovery under these 
circumstances was inconsistent with the legislature's earlier abolition of contributory 
negligence as a total bar to recovery. Id. at 43. The dissenting opinion agreed. Id. at 
48-49 (Simons, J., dissenting). 
237. Id. at 40-41. 
238. Id. at 41. 
239. See supra notes 183-89 and accompanying text. 
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or to prohibit it. Legislatures often attempt to "regulate out of exis-
tence" activities that they find odious.240 Third, this standard is 
irrelevant for those cases in which ex turpi causa is raised as a defense 
where plaintiff's conduct is allegedly immoral, but is not necessarily in 
violation of any particular statute. There are many such categories of 
cases. The strongest moralistic tones arise from cases involving illicit 
sexual intercourse which may or may not violate specific criminal 
enactments, such as Hegarty v. Shine.241 
Added together, these factors essentially mean that in most cases the 
judges will decide on an ad hoc, subjective basis whether they think the 
particular conduct in a case is sufficiently egregious to merit application 
of the ex turpi causa defense. As the dissenting judge noted in Barker: 
"A plaintiff's right to maintain an action ... should not rest on a 
Judge's subjective view of whether the conduct is serious or egregious: 
Judges will differ in making such an evaluation. Indeed the Judges of 
this court disagreed on the 'seriousness' of the plaintiff's conduct 
•••• "
242 Such a state of affairs has led to seriously inconsistent 
judgments in New York243 and elsewhere.244 . 
Thus, each permutation of the public policy approach has its 
limitations. Each one illustrates what an "unruly horse" the doctrine of 
public policy truly is. The arbitrariness in application of the principle 
must be a concern. As Ronald Dworkin has noted: 
A principle like "No man may profit from his own wrong" ... states a reason 
that argues in one direction, but does not necessitate a particular decision . . . . 
There may be principles or policies arguing in the other direction--a policy 
securing title, for example, or a principle limiting punishment to what the 
legislature has stipulated. 245 
. 
240. See Sen. Daniel P. Moynihan, Guns Don't Kill People. Bullets Do., N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 12, 1993, at EIS (suggesting that ammunition be subjected to a tax so high 
as to effectively tax it out of existence). 
241. 14 Cox Crim. Cas. 145 (Ir. C.A 1878) (denying recovery for transmission of 
a loathsome disease because plaintiff female had committed "immoral acts"). 
242. 468 N.E.2d at 47 (Simons, J., dissenting). 
243. Consider, for example, Alice D. v. William M., 450 N.Y.S.2d 350 (Civ. Ct. 
1982), where plaintiff violated a New York statute prohibiting (not regulating) adultery, 
yet was allowed to recover from defendant co-adulterer the costs of her abortion. 
Though the statute contained a clear prohibition, the court held that it was rarely 
enforced and to give it effect in this case would create an injustice. Id. at 355. 
244. See John Irvine, Annotation to Mongovius v. Marchand, 44 C.C.L.T. 18, 20 
(B.C. 1988). Irvine explains: 
Id. 
It seems that the ex turpi case is running a somewhat maverick course 
through the law of torts at present, with the unhappy result that like cases may 
yield unlike results, depending on whether this defence is pleaded and if so, 
whether it recommends itself to the Judge. Its scope is unnervingly vague. 
245. Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 26 (1967). 
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Perhaps more importantly, none of the approaches satisfactorily 
answers what has been called the ''well-nigh insoluble question as to 
which offences would attract the defence and which would not."246 No 
court has developed a satisfactory method of combining public policy 
factors to develop any sort of clear guideline for deciding which types 
of wrongdoing can or cannot be subject to the ex turpi causa doc-
trine, 247 as a reading of the aforementioned cases clearly illustrates. 
When a judge pronounces that a worker's violation of a safety regulation 
designed for his own protection must receive the same treatment as a 
violation of a felony provision of the criminal code,248 things are 
seriously amiss. 
No court has determined how to draw the line between the situations 
of Bernard McCummings and Rodney King. Every U.S. citizen, 
seemingly, is outraged at the courts for allowing Bernard McCumm:ings 
to recover from the New York Transit Authority. On the other hand, 
most U.S. citizens would be outraged if Rodney King were not allowed 
to recover from the Los Angeles Police Department.249 Nothing in ex 
turpi causa jurisprudence gives helpful guidance to distinguish between 
these two cases. That the latter was videotaped seems the most likely 
explanation for the difference in public reaction. 
This deficiency is terribly significant because the public policy 
approach, in essence, still functionally addresses the question of which 
plaintiffs are guilty of conduct so odious that they should be denied any 
246. Debattista, supra note 105, at 16; see also Tom Hervey, Note, Caveat 
Criminalis, 97 LAW Q. REV. 537, 540 (1981). Hervey asks: 
Id. 
But where will the line be drawn? Surely not between statutory crimes and 
common law crimes or arrestable and non-arrestable offences. Should the 
Criminal Injuries Board classification of "crime of violence" be adopted, with 
or without an extension to attempts to avoid apprehension for other offences? 
Should the difficult distinction between ma/a in se and mala prohibita be 
called into play? Or should we merely trust the courts to know the right kind 
of crime when they see it?. 
247. MacDougall, supra note 191, at 21. 
248. Progress & Properties Ltd. v. Craft, 135 C.L.R. 651, 659 (1976) (Austl.) 
(Barwick, C.J., dissenting). 
249. The McCummings defendants asked the U.S. Supreme Court to make an 
exception to the rule that it is unconstitutional to shoot unarmed fleeing suspects. That 
exception would allow use of deadly force against one who had committed an act of 
"serious physical violence." See Justice Gets a Good Mugging, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5, 
1993, at M4. By denying certiorari, the Court declined to draw such a distinction. 
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redress in court for injuries that would otherwise be compensable. If 
they are not termed caput lupinum, such plaintiffs are nonetheless treated 
as such. A very clear and strongly defensible standard should be 
available to draw such lines, yet none exists. To the extent that the 
legislature has not chosen to deprive a criminal wrongdoer of civil 
remedies (and, as we have seen, legislatures almost never actively 
choose to do so), courts should not be eager to substitute their own 
judicial activism. 
D. Proximate Cause 
On a theoretical plane, the proximate cause approach has its own 
deficiencies. Even assuming the existence of proximate causation, how 
do we draw the line between which illicit acts will be viewed as 
necessary to invoke the defense and which will simply constitute 
comparative fault? The proximate cause test itself provides no answer 
and does not attempt to. It relies, as we saw in Barker, upon one of the 
variations of the public policy test, all of which are inadequate to the 
task. 
Furthermore, the very usage of the term "proximate cause" reminds us 
of the parallels between treating plaintiff's illegal acts as comparative 
negligence or assumption of risk (which in modem law will not 
generally completely bar recovery) and treating those acts as giving rise 
to the ex turpi causa defense (which will totally bar recovery).250 The 
test provides no justification for undermining the policies of comparative 
fault. 
Furthermore, the proximate causation approach lacks clarity in 
application.251 In Smith, Judge Windeyer criticized the approach.252 
Judge Windeyer stated: 
[T]his formulation by which the critical question is whether the unlawful act has 
a causal connexion with the harm suffered and ''proximately contributed" to it 
is not to my mind satisfactory. The question gets bogged down in phrases 
about causal relations, ''proximate cause", "causa causans", "causa sine qua 
non", "novus actus". (It is perhaps worth interpolating that the word "causa" 
has here a meaning which, obviously, is quite different from "causa" in the 
phrase "turpis causa".)253 
250. See generally Weinrib, supra note 190, at 36. 
251. See generally Ford, supra note 95, at 42-44. 
252. 119 C.L.R. 397, 420 (1969) (Austl.). 
253. Id.;_see also FRIDMAN, supra note 130, at 288 ("It would seem that the utility 
of any doctrine of causation, however formulated for the purpose of resolving this 
problem, is very much in doubt."). 
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The accuracy of Windeyer's criticism is borne out by a survey of the 
case results, which yields inconsistent decisions on similar fact 
pattems.254 · 
A useful doctrine must be based on a clearly justified theoretical 
foundation and must be embodied in a set of clear rules capable of 
producing consistent results. But the discussion in this part clearly 
demonstrates that there. is no satisfactory approach yet developed to 
applying the doctrine of ex turpi causa in tort cases. The defense has 
been allowed for more than 100 years, yet the law in the area remains 
intractably murky.255 The fact that no satisfactory philosophical 
rationale or practical elements for application of the defense yet exist 
strongly mitigates in favor of the view that this defense niust be used 
sparingly, if at all. 
V. GENERAL EVALUATION OF THE EX TuRPI CAUSA DEFENSE 
· As noted in the preceding part, each specific approach to applying the 
ex turpi causa defense to tort cases that has been developed by the 
courts is seriously flawed. Those containing broader applications of the 
defense seem to have more problems than those with more constricted 
applications, but all are problematic at best. 
This part steps back from the specific flaws of the various theoretical 
approaches to applying the doctrine in order to examine its fundamental 
rationale on a more general plane. First, this part will examine the 
various rationales supporting the doctrine in order to determine whether 
they are truly advanced when the. ex turpi causa defense is applied to 
254. MacDougall, supra note 191, at 29. 
255. See STEPHEN M. D. TODD, THE LAW OF TORTS IN NEW ZEALAND 845 (1991) 
(ex turpi causa is a defense "ofuncertain scope"); KLAR, supra note 10, at 333 ("[W]hy 
ex turpi causa is applied [in Canada] is not generally agreed upon ... [so] the question 
of how and when it is to be applied suffers from the same confusion."); HEUSTON & 
BUCKLEY, supra note 10, at 325 (ex turpi causa is an "obscure, yet intriguing" defense 
in England); C.D. BAKER, TORT 568 (4th ed. 1986) ("This is a rather obscure comer of 
the law."); Neville H. Crago, The Defence of Illegality in Negligence Actions, 4 MELB. 
U. L. REV. 534, 534 (1964) (the role of the ex turpi causa defense "has long perplexed 
courts both in Commonwealth countries and in the United States of America"); 
MacDougall, supra note 191, at 37 (''There. can be said to be no uniform, coherent 
learning developed by the courts on ex turpi causa."); Williams, supra note 111, at 749 
("[T]he case law enshrines a wide variety of approaches, as well as some contradiction 
and confusion .... "). · 
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tort cases. Second, this part will examine various disadvantages and 
drawbacks created when the defense is applied to tort cases 
A. Rationale for the Ex Turpi Causa Defense 
The courts have pronounced four major rationales supporting their 
invocation of the ex turpi causa defense in tort cases. First, denial of 
recovery prevents plaintiffs from profiting from their own wrongs. 
Second, denying recovery deters crime. Third, the civil law is a proper 
avenue for punishing crime. Fourth, the illegality defense preserves 
judicial integrity. These rationales will be evaluated in turn. 
1. Denial of Recovery Prevents Plaintiffs From Profiting from Their 
Own Wrongs 
The law often ,allows people to profit, quite legally, from their 
wrongs.256 Nonetheless, it is clear that the courts are not, and should 
not be, eager to allow plaintiffs to profit from. criminal wrongdoing. 
Thus, for example, the law does not allow A to murder B for purposes 
of speeding up an inheritance A is to gain under the provisions of B's 
will257 or a recovery A is to gain as beneficiary of B's life insurance 
policy.258 "Son-of-Sam" laws are another example of this innate 
impulse.259 
256. As Dworkin points out: 
We say that our law respects the principle that no man may profit from his 
own wrong, but we do not mean that the law never permits a man to profit 
from wrongs he commits. In fact, people often profit, perfectly legally, from 
their legal wrongs. The most notorious case is adverse possession-if I 
trespass on your land long enough, som(). day I will gain a right to cross your 
land whenever I please. There are many less dramatic examples. If a man 
leaves one job, breaking a contract, to take a much higher paying job, he may 
have to pay damages to his first employer, but he is usually entitled to keep 
his new salary. If a man jumps bail and crosses state lines to make a brilliant 
investment in another state, he may be sent back to jail, but he will keep his 
profits. 
Dworkin, supra note 245, at 25-26. 
257. E.g., Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889) (deciding that a plaintiff who 
speeded up inheritance by murdering grandfather was not entitled to take under will); 
Lundy v. Lundy, 24 S.C.R. 650 (1894) (Can.) (similar). 
258. E.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Wenckus, 244 A.2d 424 (Me. 1968) 
(holdinigthat a wife who murdered her husband was not entitled to recover as primary 
beneficiary of life insurance contract). See generally William M. McGovern, Jr., 
Homicide and Succession to Property, 68 MICH. L. REV. 65 (1969). 
259. See, e.g., Garrett Epps, Wising Up: "Son of Sam" Laws and the Speech and 
Press Clauses, 70 N.C. L. REV. 493, 522 (1992) (''The impulse behind these [Son of 
Sam] laws-the desire of the community that hateful criminals not profit from selling 
their stories-is a very real one."); Jon A. Soderberg, Comment, Son of Sam Laws: A 
Victim of the First Amendment?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 629, 630 (1992) ("[P]ublic 
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This principle is correct and does, in fact, give rise to certain proper 
applications of the ex turpi causa tort defense. First, tort damage 
recoveries should not include lost wages or other income derived from 
illegal activities. For example, if a person who makes a living as an 
arsonist is injured in a car wreck, whether or not on the way to the site 
of a contemplated arson, and claims as damages the income he lost by 
being hospitalized and therefore unable to set fires for profit, recovery 
of such wages should be denied. Similarly, Bernard McCummings 
should not be allowed to recover for lost income derived from mugging. 
To allow such recoveries would allow plaintiffs to profit from wrongdo-
ing. The courts are in general agreement on this point. 260 
Second, consider Gamble v. Randolph.261 Plaintiff was in an auto 
accident while operating his car in violation of New York's ''no fault" 
law which required each motorist to have personal injury insurance. 
Because plaintiff was not an "insured motorist" under the law, he 
claimed that he should have been allowed.to sue defendant for·his non-
serious injuries--a remedy not available to an insured motorist. The 
court properly dismissed plaintiff's suit, thereby preventing plaintiff from 
putting himself in a better position than those who complied with the 
law.262 
Third, ex turpi causa could properly prevent plaintiffs who act 
illegally from recovering punitive damages. For example, in the famous 
dismay over notorious criminals commercially exploiting their criminal behavior by 
selling their crime stories has prompted Congress and many state legislatures to enact 
so-called 'Son of Sam' laws."). 
Note that while the Supreme Court struck down the only version of a "Son of Sam" 
law it has evaluated, in Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime 
Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991), it did so on First Amendment grounds while holding 
that the state does have an ''undisputed compelling interest" in preventing criminals from 
profiting from their crimes. Id. at 510. Thus, the Supreme Court implicitly made a 
point this Article seeks to emphasize----there are many situations where other values will 
require courts to overcome their reluctance to allow "wrongdoers" to "profit." 
260. E.g., McNichols v. J. R. Simplot Co., 262 P.2d 1012 (Idaho 1953) (refusing 
recovery of damages for profits lost by plaintiff caused by defendant's nuisance where 
plaintiffs business was illegal); Desmet v. Sublett, 225 P.2d 141 (N.M. 1950) (awarding 
plaintiff possession of truck in replevin action but not damages for time he was deprived 
of its possession because he was planning on profiting from unlicensed hauling); Harper 
v. Grasser, 150 P.·1175 (Wash. 1915) (holding that defendant had superior right to fish 
under license, but was not entitled to damages on counterclaim because he planned to 
fish using illegal drag seine). 
261. 398 N.Y.S.2d 109 (Civ. Ct. 1977). 
262. Id. at 110. 
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"spring-gun" case of Katko v. Briney,263 plaintiff, while trespassing in 
an abandoned house, was injured by a booby-trap left there by defen-
dant. When plaintiff opened the door, his action pulled a string which 
discharged a shotgun pointed at the door. The court allowed recovery 
of compensatory damages. and also allowed the jury to tack on $10,000 
in punitive damages. The punitive damages were a form of "profit" to 
plaintiff, and allowing their recovery improperly rewarded plaintiff.264 
Beyond these limited exceptions, however, the ex turpi causa defense 
does not properly serve the enunciated principle.265 For example, the 
compensatory damages awarded plaintiff in Katko were proper. In most 
of the ex turpi causa cases discussed earlier in this Article, plaintiffs 
were not ·attempting. to profit from their illegal activity. They were 
merely attempting to obtain compensation for injuries they sustained 
because of the tortious actions of defendants. If this distinction (between 
compensating a plaintiff for injuries on the one hand, and rewarding a 
plaintiff's illegality on the other) is recognized and observed, rarely will 
invocation of the ex turpi causa defense truly advance the pronounced 
public policy of refusing to allow plaintiffs to profit from their own 
wrongs.266 
Many jurisdictions recognize this important distinction in the contract 
law setting. Thus, plaintiffs who attempt to realize a profit by enforcing 
an illegal contract will almost always fail while, if they are able to recast 
their claim as one for restitution as a means of avoiding a loss, they will 
263. 183 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa 1971) 
264. If it is felt that punitive damages are necessary in such cases to punish and 
deter the defendant, some provision should be made for paying them into the public 
treasury rather than to plaintiff There is precedent for such action. See, e.g., ILL. .ANN. 
STAT. ch. 735, act 5, § 2-1207 (Smith-Hurd 1992) (granting judge discretion to allocate 
a portion of a punitive damage award to state Department of Rehabilitation). 
265. As Judge Lambert noted in Betts v. Sanderson Estate: 
If it were applied strictly in the law of tort it would prevent an award of 
punitive or aggravated damages, but would extend no further. An award of 
purely compensatory damages cannot be considered to be permitting a 
wrongdoer to profit from his or her crime. So an extension of the principle 
into the purely compensatory aspects of the law of tort represents not just an 
extended application of the principle, but a modification of the principle itself. 
That modification has only a very tenuous hold on the law of tort, if it has any 
place there at all. 
Betts v. Sanderson Estate, 31 B.C.L.R.2d l, 8 (1988). 
266. See Dale Gibson, Comment, Torts-I/legality of Plaintiff's Conduct as a 
Defence, 47 CANADIAN B. REV. 89, 96 (1969) ("The ex turpi causa defence is 
appropriate ... only where the plaintiff is trying to profit by his illegality, not where he 
is simply claiming compensation for a wrong done to him while engaged in illegal 
conduct."). 
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often succeed.267 Similarly, if an illegal contract is fully executed, a 
plaintiff may sometimes recover from defendant moneys received by 
defendant if plaintiff can plead the cause without resort to the con-
tract. 268 
Tort law should also recognize this distinction, especially because 
most such cases involve physical injuries in which the plaintiff is simply 
trying to be made whole in his or her physical person.269 Consider, for 
example, the plaintiff in Zysk. She was merely attempting to recover 
compensation for. a grievous physical injury done to her-infliction of 
a sexually transmitted disease. No "profit" in any reasonable sense of 
that word was involved. Only the court's recondite reasoning could lead 
to the same result_ as the infamous and oft-condemned decision in 
Hegarty.270 
We naturally have less sympathy for the "millionaire mugger," 
Bernard McCummings. But the $4.3 million verdict he received, though 
a lot of money, is not out of line with other verdicts aimed at compen-
267. See, e.g., JAEGER & WILLISTON, supra note 29, at 46-47 ("[E]ven an equal 
participant in the illegality, if public policy demands it, is often allowed relief by way 
of restitution or rescission, though not on the contract." (citation omitted)); John W. 
Wade, Benefits Obtained Under Illegal Transactions-Reasons For and Against 
Allowing Restitution, 25 TEX. L. REV. 31, 33 (1946) (noting that "courts have sometimes 
allowed recovery" in restitution for benefits obtained under illegal contracts); George A. 
Strong, The Enforceability of Illegal Contracts, 12 HASTINGS L.J. 347, 375 (1961) 
("Specific restoration or payment of the reasonable value of consideration given are not 
regarded as enforcement. ... "). 
Such cases are part of a body of several exceptions that have developed to the general 
rule at common law which ignores the distinction between attempting to enforce an 
illegal contract and merely seeking restitutional recovery. See Narragansett Indian Tribe 
v. Ribo, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 48 (D.R.I. 1988) (stating general rule). This general rule has 
been heavily criticized. See John D. McCamus, Restitutionary Recovery of Benefits 
Conferred Under Contracts in Conflict with Statutory Policrthe New Golden Rule, 
25 OSG00DE HALL L.J. 787, 796 (1987). McCamus states: 
Id. 
[E]ven where policy considerations suggest that unperformed aspects of the 
[illega!J agreement should be held unenforceable and/or that it is appropriate 
to deprive the parties of any of the profits they may have secured from the 
agreement, it may still be sound policy to allow recovery of the value of 
benefits conferred thus far in a restitutionary claim where refusal to do so 
would yield unnecessarily harsh or otherwise inappropriate results in the 
circumstances of the particular case. 
268. E.g., McMullen v. Huffman, 174 U.S. 639,655 (1899). 
269. Weinrib, supra note 190, at 41. 
270. 14 Cox Crim. Cas. 145 (Ir. C.A. 1878) (denying recovery for transmission of 
venereal disease to woman who engaged in illicit sexual intercourse). 
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sating persons who were similarly injured by the wrongful acts of 
others.271 
Consider also the situation where the lawsuit is brought by the 
wrongdoer's survivors. If the wrongdoer was killed by the negligence, 
for example, of a co-conspirator or a third party, one cannot say that 
allowing recovery by his or her survivors profits the wrongdoer in any 
way.212 
In short, where a plaintiff truly will not profit from wrongdoing if 
granted recovery by a court, there is no logical reason for a court to 
withhold recovery on the ground of illegality. In such a context, the 
court's refusal to aid a wrongdoer "sounds more like an epithet than a 
reason. "273 
2. Denial of Recovery Deters Crime 
It is unrealistic to believe that allowing recovery to a civil plaintiff in 
the illegality context would encourage crime or that denial of recovery 
would discourage it, yet this is a commonly cited rationale for invocation 
of the ex turpi causa defense. For example, American cases have denied 
recovery to women who were butchered .in negligently performed illicit 
abortions on grounds that permitting recovery would encourage married 
271. For example, in the same issue of the National Law Journal that contained 
criticism of the McCummings verdict, two comparable verdicts handed down by New 
York City juries were reported: a $6.3 million verdict for two New York City Transit 
Authority workers who suffered lung damage from fumes issued by cleaning fluid they 
were using, and a $4.5 million verdict for a man who suffered epileptic seizures after 
a piece of plaster and brick fell on his head while he was sitting on a toilet in his 
apartment. See Margaret C. Fisk, Verdict/Settlement Watch, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 20, 1993, 
at 7. 
Critics of the McCummings judgment can take some satisfaction in the fact that a 14-
year-old girl who claims that McCummings is her father is seeking $1,000,000 in child 
support from him, and another lawyer who once represented him is seeking $700,000. 
Anthony Scaduto, Award Stands in Subway Mugging, NEWSDAY, Nov. 30, 1993, at 16. 
272. This point has been made regarding the illegality defense in the area of 
contract law. Shand, supra note 184, at 160 ("In what way could it be said that the 
deceased [who had committed suicide] would derive benefit from his crime if the right 
[ of his beneficiaries to recover under an insurance pplicy] was upheld?"). 
Fortunately, some courts adopting the ex turpi causa defense in tort cases recognize 
this distinction and refuse to apply it in this setting. For example, one court explained: 
The defence of ex turpi causa would also fail in the present case because the 
act has been committed by the deceased, and not by [his widow] the plaintiff. 
The doctrine is intended to prevent a wrongdoer from benefitting from his own 
illegal or immoral act. In the present case, it is not the deceased or his estate 
which could benefit from the action brought pursuant to the Family Compensa-
tion Act, but rather his widow and children. They have committed no immoral 
or illegal act. . . . 
Funk v. Clapp, 35 B.C.L.R2d 222, 232 (1988) (Seaton, J.A.). 
273. Primeau v. Granfield, 180 F. 847, 852 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910). 
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women to have aborti01;1.s for the profit that might accrue from malprac-
tice recoveries274 and would encourage unmarried women to become 
seductresses.275 
Such reasoning seems as unrealistic276 as it is cruel. Do. women 
truly choose to go to bed with men thinking: "I hope I'll become 
pregnant so that I can have a back-alley abortion and recover big bucks 
if the abortionist butchers me?" Do individuals really decide to rob 
banks in the hope that they will be injured in a high speed chase so that 
they can recover damages from the insurance company of the getaway 
driver?277 Did Bernard McCummings mug a poor old man in the New 
York subway system hoping that he would have his spinal cord severed 
by a transit authority cop's bullet and thereby become a "mugger 
millionaire"? Such thinking borders on the delusional. 
Just as allowing recovery in such cases does not encourage crime, 
denying recovery in such cases does not realistically discourage crime. 
For example, no criminal refrains from stealing a car due to the fear that 
if while riding in it he is injured in a collision he will be unable to 
recover a monetary judgment from a co-conspirator or negligent third 
party. As Judge Starke noted in Jenkins v. Smith,278 criminals, "like 
honest citizens, when undertaking a journey in an automobile, confident-
ly expect that they will arrive at their destination safe and sound."279 
It has even been suggested that application of the ex turpi causa 
defense might encourage crime by eliminating the restraining influence 
274. E.g., Sayadoffv. Warda, 125 Cal. App. 2d 626,631,271 P.2d 140, 143 (1954). 
275. E.g., Barton v. Bee Line, Inc., 265 N.Y.S. 284, 285 (1933). In an equally 
ridiculous line of reasoning applied in a contract case, a court held that a plaintiff, as 
executor, could not recover money the testator lost at cards due to defendants'· fraudulent 
acts. The executor argued that he should be allowed to recover on behalf of the innocent 
heirs, even though the testator himself, if still alive; would not be allowed to recover. 
The court concluded that it could see "no authority for the distinction, and that it would 
be an encouragement to gaming if a man might kill himself, and thereby give his 
executor a remedy." Babcock v. Thomson, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 446, 449 (1826). 
276. · Hervey, supra note 246, at 539 ("[T]he idea that a potential criminal would be 
deterred from his crime by the prospect of difficulty in a future civil action seems wildly 
unrealistic."). 
277. John G. Fleming, Notes of Cases: Insurance for the Criminal, 34 MOD. L. 
REV. 176, 178 (1971) ("[I]t is really bizarre to credit liability insurance with the 
psychological potential for stimulating crime or other intentional injury."). 
278. [1969] V.R. 267, rev'd, 119 C.L.R. 397 (1969) (Austl.). 
279. Id. at 275. 
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that potential civil liability might have for the reckless criminal.280 
This argument is not particularly convincing. However, it does lead us 
toward the critical questions. 
In the case of joint wrongdoers, where the injury arises directly out 
of the criminal wrongdoing, the key question is which approach would 
better deter criminal activity: (a) barring plaintiff's recovery, thereby 
encouraging plaintiff to obey the law, or (b) allowing plaintiff's 
recovery, thereby encouraging defendant to obey the law? This, 
unfortunately, will turn out to be a very fact-specific determination 
hampering our ability to draw general conclusions. Consider the 
following scenarios, but keep in mind that by the time the ex turpi causa 
defense is applied, the criminal law with its attendant punishments has 
already failed as a deterrent,281 so there is little reason to believe that 
ex turpi causa will succeed. 
The personal and economic pressures that would lead a woman to seek 
an illegal back-alley abortion in the face of legal, religious, and societal 
condemnation would probably not be significantly affected by a policy 
barring recovery from a negligent performer of such abortions. 
Logically, a performer of such abortions often has a profit motive and 
would more likely be deterred by a threat of liability than a pregnant 
woman would be by the threat that damages would be withheld. 
Consider·the transmission of herpes case. What factors motivate two 
romantically involved but unmarried persons to have sexual intercourse? 
It is unlikely that, as they lie in the backseat of the '57 Chevy, monetary 
factors are at the top of their list of considerations regarding what to do 
next. It is unlikely that either the presence or absence of the ex turpi 
causa doctrine has much influence, especially because the parties are 
unlikely to know about it. If they do not know about it, it cannot affect 
their. judgment. If they do know about it, the transmittee certainly 
cannot be induced to engage in the illicit intercourse by a doctrine 
allowing recovery, because recovery is limited to compensatory damages. 
The transmitter, on the other hand, if he or she has some· reason to know 
280. Crago, supra note 255, at 548. 
281. Given that the evidence indicates that neither the death penalty nor mandatory 
life sentences appears to deter crime, it seems fanciful to believe that denial of an after-
the-fact civil remedy will do so. See, e.g., David J. Gottlieb, The Death Penalty in the 
Legislature: Some Thoughts About Money, Myth, and Morality, 37 KAN. L. REV. 443, 
455 ( 1989) ("In sum, the empirical evidence supports the view that the death penalty was 
not a marginal deterrent even when executions took place with some frequency, and it 
is certainly not a marginal deterrent as presently employed."); Edward Felsenthal, Life 
Terms Aren't Viewed as Big Deterrent, WALL Sr. J., Nov. 11, 1993, at B2 (reporting 
that evidence indicates that mandatory life sentences for habitual criminals are not 
reducing the crime rate, and quoting Peter Arnella, U.C.L.A. law professor, who says 
"[t]he deterrent value of the criminal law has always been grossly exaggerated"). 
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of the infection but has carelessly failed to confirm the situation,282 is 
facing a significant economic loss which might deter careless or 
intentional disease-spreading conduct. 
Most cases that we can imagine make it clear that (a) the absence of 
the ex turpi causa defense does not encourage plaintiffs to break the law 
because the most plaintiffs can expect, if allowed to recover, is mere 
compensation for injuries sustained,283 and (b) in certain situations the 
_threat of liability to defendants created by the absence of an· ex turpi 
causa defense might encourage defendants to obey the law. Admittedly, 
this borders on rank speculation. 284 
Consider the case where only plaintiff violated the law. The Henwood 
case is a good example. If the threat of serious bodily injury to plaintiff 
that arose from sticking his head out a tram window in order to vomit 
was not sufficient to induce him to comply with the tram rules, it is 
unlikely that the existence of an ex turpi causa defense ( of which 
plaintiff is likely unaware) would induce him to do so. The tram 
company, on the other hand, often makes studied comparisons of risks 
of liability versus investment in safety devices, warning signs, etc. If 
preventing such accidents is our main goal ( and in this case it seems to 
282. Of course; if in a given case the plaintiff claims negligence and the defendant 
made no conscious decision regarding a course of action (for example, plaintiff claims 
to have been infected by defendant with herpes, alleging not that defendant had any 
inkling that he had herpes but only that given his high number of sexual partners· in 
recent years he was negligent in not having himself tested), it is unlikely that an ex turpi 
causa doctrine could have any impact one way or the other. . 
283. It is arguable, or at least conceivable, that allowing an ex turpi causa defense 
will encourage criminal or reckless activity by the defendant. As Kevin Williams has 
argued: "It is even possible that a driver might be positively encouraged [to break the 
law] if he understood that as against his complicit passenger he would, somewhat 
paradoxically, be relieved entirely of responsibility for the civil law consequence of his 
reckless driving." Williams, supra note 111, at 751. 
284. Because so many cases involve traffic accidents arising out of joint criminal 
ventures, the fabulous movie "Thelma and Louise" comes to mind Assume that instead 
of being happily committed to accelerating into the Grand Canyon at movie's end, 
Thelma was heard loudly protesting. That would effectively eliminate any volenti 
defense, but because of the extended nature of the criminal venture, an ex turpi causa 
defense, as applied in many common-law jurisdictions, would still shield Louise's estate 
from any lawsuit by Thelma's estate. Would availability of the ex turpi causa defense 
make it more likely or less likely that Louise would drive into the Grand Canyon over 
Thelma's vehement protests? It seems that it would be less likely, indicating that 
recognition of the ex turpi causa defense in this joint criminal context would encourage, 
not discourage, crime and negligence. The speculative nature of this conclusion is 
obvious, however. 
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be a main goal both of the safety ordinance and of the applicable tort 
law), it seems that rejecting the ex turpi causa defense and allowing 
recovery is the path most likely to succeed.285 This is especially so 
because given the relative positions of plaintiff and defendant, defendant 
is often more likely to have knowledge of the rule and therefore is more 
likely to be affected by it. 
Consider the Bosworth Sunday traveler case. Assuming that it is safe 
to do so, plaintiff travels over defendant's negligently maintained bridge 
heading from home to work on a Sunday in violation of a statute 
requiring that any Sunday travel be to or from church. If plaintiff does 
not fall through the bridge on Sunday, he or she will likely do so on 
Monday. Therefore, the existence of an ex turpi causa defense ( even if 
plaintiff knows about it) is not likely to have any deterrent impact. 
Defendant is more likely to know of the state of the law and therefore 
be deterred by the absence of an ex turpi causa defense, although the 
deterrent impact is likely to be minimal because there are six chances 
out of seven that the defense will not be available. 
What about the speeding plaintiff case? Plaintiff is exceeding the 
speed limit when she smacks into defendant who just ran a red light. 
Plaintiff might be induced to pay more careful attention to the speed 
limit if she knows of the existence of an ex turpi causa defense. 
Defendant might be induced to pay more careful attention to stop signs 
if he knows that by carelessly causing an accident he will be liable, at 
least partially, to all persons he hits, not just those who were not 
exceeding the speed limit.. To the extent that either party is simply not 
thinking, suffering the type of momentary mental lapses that are 
inevitable in human behavior, the existence or nonexistence of an ex 
turpi causa defense would seem to have no impact in terms of encourag-
ing legal and/or careful behavior. 
All in all, the questions surrounding the deterrent impact of the ex 
turpi causa defense in tort cases cannot be answered with certainty. The 
issue is sufficiently clouded that no reasonable claim that ex turpi causa 
will deter criminal action by plaintiffs can be credibly made. Nor can 
a strong claim be made that elimination of ex turpi causa will deter 
criminal or even negligent action by defendants. Indeed, given the 
description of the law given above, it is easy to agree with Professor 
MacDougall that "[t]he application of ex turpi causa is currently so 
unpredictable that it can have little deterrent effect on a person who is 
285. Generally speaking, it is more feasible to use the law to affect the economic 
decisions of corporate defendants such as the tram company than it is to attempt to 
encourage more careful { or more lawful) behavior by consumers, drivers, or employees. 
See generally Prentice & Roszkowski, supra note 6, at 274-300. 
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willing to gamble on an illegal enterprise."286 Therefore, this major 
justification for the existence of an ex turpi causa defense fails. It has 
even less validity in the body of tort law than in the body of contract 
law, where it has already been greatly criticized.287 Therefore, atten-
tion must tum away from the deterrence function to other considerations 
shaping tort law (such as the compensation function) which should 
accordingly be given more weight.288 
3. Tort Law Should Be Used to Punish Crime 
Certainly tort law should not be at loggerheads with criminal law. 
Therefore, the ex turpi causa defense is properly applied where it 
prevents neutralization of criminal sanctions. 
For example, in Mettes v. Quinn,289 the court properly refused to 
allow plaintiff to sue her former attorney while claiming, in essence, that 
defendant's negligent advice had allowed a fraud perpetrated by plaintiff 
to be discovered, depriving her of the benefit of the fraud.290 To have 
allowed recovery would have completely offset the criminal sanctions 
attached to the fraud. 
In a famous English case, Colburn v. Patmore,291 plaintiff publisher, 
who had been convicted and fined for publishing a criminal libel, sued 
the editor who had published the material without plaintiff's knowledge. 
Plaintiff sought to force the editor to pay plaintiff the amount of the 
criminal fine plaintiff had been forced to pay because of the editor's 
acts. However, to allow recovery in such a case would stultify the effect 
of the criminal law, and recovery was· properly denied. 
A more recent case making the same ·point is Braunstein v. Jason 
Tarantella, Inc., 292 in which producers of an obscene film, "Fulfilling 
Young Cups," sued distributors of the film, inter alia, for negligence in 
286. MacDougall, supra note 191, at 37. 
287. Shand, supra note 184, at 154 ("[Deterrence of criminal activity] is the 
function of the criminal law ... [but] it is no part of the law of contract, any more than 
of the law of tort."); Harold C. Havinghurst, Book Review, 61 YALE L.J. 1138, 1145 
(1952) (suggesting that refusal to enforce illegal contracts rarely has a substantial impact 
in deterring illegal conduct). 
288. See discussion infra notes 326-31 and accompanying text. 
289. 411 N.E.2d 549 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980). 
290. Id. at 551. 
291. 149 Eng. Rep. 999 (Ex. 1834). 
292. 450 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1982). 
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choosing to show the film in a New York county which subjected the 
producers to criminal prosecution, and for fraud in misrepresenting the 
number of places where such a film could be legally shown. The court 
properly denied recovery, because a judgment of damages "would, in 
essence, permit the producer to recover the fine it paid. upon its 
conviction,"293 again offsetting the duly imposed criminal sanction. 
Unfortunately, the ex turpi causa defense in tort cases is more often 
used not to preserve valid criminal sanctions, but to add civil punish-
ments to those criminal sanctions provided by the legislature. This 
"double punishment" improperly places valid civil tort policy consider-
ations in a subservient position to criminal law policies that are only 
tangentially relevant. Professor Weinrib has argued that: 
[T]he refusal to allow a civil remedy entails the enshrining of the criminal law 
policies as dominant and indeed exclusive. This in itself may not be desirable. 
In the situation presented in Tallow v. Tailfeathers, for instance, the activity 
involved ... is regulated by a vast nexus of legal arrangements. The task is 
shared by [Canadian] federal criminal law, provincial penal legislation, 
administrative prerequisites such as licensing, tort law, the contract of 
insurance, and legislative modifications that extend the scope of insurance as 
a device for distributing losses. This panoply of legal mechanisms serves an 
appropriately wide variety of social aims. It is designed to prevent the evil of 
physical injury, to visit a sanction on a perpetrator or potential perpetrator of 
the evil, and to mitigate the effects of the evil when it materializes by 
compensating the victim. By denying recovery in the Tallow situation a court 
gives a wide berth to the policies of prevention and punishment at the expense 
of stultifying the policy of compensation.294 
Another major objection is that using denial of civil recovery as a 
sanction against wrongdoing plaintiffs amounts to a form of double 
jeopardy by adding a punishment for the offense that was not contem-
plated by the legislature. This additional sanction is imposed without the 
procedural safeguards attendant to the process of criminal sentenc-
ing.29s 
The additional sanction has the further disadvantageous feature of 
being unduly fortuitous, not falling on all wrongdoers equally. For 
293. Id. at 866. 
294. Weinrib, supra note 190, at 43-44. 
295. One of these important safeguards relates to burden of pr!)of. In America, 
naturally, the burden of proof in criminal cases is generally the "beyond a reasonable 
doubt" standard, whereas in civil cases it is the lower "preponderance of the evidence" 
standard. In Betts v. Sanderson Estate, 53 D.L.R.4th 675 (1988) (Can.), Judge Lambert 
observed that a key factual issue in the case--who was driving the car at the time of the 
accident- could never have been established beyond a reasonable doubt because one 
of the main participants in the incident was killed and the other suffered amnesia. Yet, 
were ex turpi causa applied, plaintiff ( on her counterclaim) might be punished by denial 
of her civil recovery on the basis of speculative evidence that could never have led to 
criminal punishment. Id. at 685-86. 
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example, in Tallow, a case involving a wrecked car and a group of joy-
riding boys, one wrongdoer was killed. Others suffered various injuries 
of differing severity. All committed the same offense, were guilty of the 
same moral turpitude, and- would have been subjected to the same range 
of criminal penalties, but because recovery in civil suit was denied on 
ex turpi causa grounds, they sustained vastly differing penalties.296 
Those injured the most severely were punished the most by being barred 
from compensation via a civil suit. 
Severity is another consideration. The "double punishment" criticism 
has long been made against the illegality defense in the realm of contract 
law.297 The objection is much stronger in the area of tort law where 
the loss that the court refuses to compensate is likely to involve severe 
personal injury rather than mere economic dislocation. · The criminal 
penalty for an offense might be a few months of imprisonment, or 
perhaps just a small monetary fine. This might be the maximum penalty 
imposed by the legislature. But life in a wheelchair, completely 
uncompensated by monetary damages from the negligent driver, could 
be an additional, completely disproportionate sentence added by a court 
applying the ex turpi causa defense.298 The plaintiff in Pitts, for 
example, was effectively fined £40,000 for the offense of aiding and 
abetting his friend's reckless driving of a motorcycle.299 Bernard 
McCummings, if recovery was denied on ex turpi causa grounds, would 
suffer a functional $4.3 million civil fine (and life in a wheelchair) in. 
addition to the thirty-two months in jail that he served as a consequence 
of his unarmed mugging of another. Upon what principled basis is this 
harsh additional sanction imposed.?300 
296. Weinrib, supra note 190, at 45. 
297. E.g., St. John Shipping Corp. v. Joseph Rank, Ltd., (1957] 1 Q.B. 267, 292 
(Devlin, J.). The court stated: 
The Act of 1932 imposes a penalty which is itself designed to deprive the 
offender of the benefits of his crime. It would be a serious thing if the 
operation could be performed twice-once by the criminal law and then again 
by the civil. It would be curious, too, if in a case in which the magistrates had 
thought fit to impose only a nominal fine, their decision could, in effect, be 
overridden in a civil action. 
Id. 
298. Weinrib, supra note 190, at 45. 
299. For a similar offense, the plaintiff in Ashton v. Turner, (1981] 1 Q.B. 137, was 
effectively fined L 70,000 in addition to the criminal punishment already imposed. 
300. F.A. TRINDADE & PETER CANE, THE LAW OF TORTS IN AUSTRALIA 487 (1985) 
("[W]hile deterrence of breach by means ... of a fine may be desirable, the unpredict-
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The punishment obviously bears no necessary relation to the degree 
of plaintiff's moral turpitude in the particular case, which may be 
slight.301 Worse still, in the cases of joint wrongdoing the defendant 
is equally at fault, yet is rewarded by the law with immunity from 
liability for his or her negligence (or perhaps intentional tort).302 
Furthermore, if a person is killed in an accident while engaged in a 
criminal enterprise, and the ex turpi causa defense is used to deny 
recovery to his or her heirs, this defense casts a burden on the survivors 
which amounts to vicarious liability for criminal acts.303 This is 
completely contrary to most of our basic notions of criminal responsibili-
ty.304 
There is obviously a long history of interrelationship of criminal and 
tort law. 305 The two bodies of law have common roots and did not 
diverge until fairly late in the game. 306 And while there is certainly an 
important role for the concepts of punishment and deterrence in tort law, 
the modem trend is to deemphasize tort law's criminal and punitive 
function in deference to its civil and compensatory purposes. 307 As 
noted earlier, the punitive function of tort law should not be made 
paramount at the expense of the compensatory function. Any broad use 
of the ex turpi causa defense commits this sin.308 
able and usually much more serioµs sanction of the denial of a civil remedy may seem 
an unnecessary and unduly harsh penalty."). 
301. See St. John Shipping Corp., 1 Q.B. at 288-89 ("It may be questionable also 
whether public policy is well served by driving from the seat of judgment everyone who 
has been guilty of a minor transgression."). 
302. As noted above, similar criticisms have been made in the area of contract law, 
where the defendant is often allowed to keep the fruits of an illegal contract at plaintiffs 
expense, even though defendant was equally at fault. It has been noted that judicial 
refusal to assist either party to an illegal contract, in light of the ''remarkable growth of 
regulation in the modem era" has led to "absurd results" that confer "windfall benefits" 
on lucky defendants "for which no sensible justification can be offered." McCamus, 
supra note 267, at 788-89; see also Wade, supra note 267, at 36. 
Fortunately, some courts have acted on this criticism. E.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 192 
Cal. App. 3d 551, 237 Cal. Rptr. 644 (1987) (deciding that the rule that illegal contracts 
will not be enforced should not be applied where the transaction has been completed, no 
moral turpitude was involved, and to apply the illegality rule would permit defendant to 
be unjustly enriched). 
303. Some courts have recognized this distinction and have acted to preserve the 
rights of widows and orphans accordingly. E.g., Bigcharles v. Merkel, [1973] 1 W.W.R. 
324 (B.C.). 
304. Crago, supra note 255, at 547-48. 
305. See generally Gary, supra note 12, at 1622 ("[T]he protection of society 
through the punishment and deterrence of antisocial behavior is an accepted function of 
the tort law."). 
306. See generally WEX S. MALONE, ESSAYS ON TORTS 1-10 (I 986); GEORGE C. 
CHRISTIE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 1-7 (1983). 
307. Gary, supra note 12, at 1621. 
308. See discussion of the compensatory function of tort law infra part V.B.1.a. 
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The criminal justice system is, one hopes, a well-conceived approach 
to the problems of deterrence and criminal sanction. That system 
supposedly metes out punishment in proportion to moral dereliction by 
the defendant and the societal interest to be protected. To allow the ex 
turpi causa defense to add punishments willy-nilly, unconnected to either 
plaintiff's moral failings309 or to society's vital interests, would 
undermine rather than advance the interests of the criminal justice 
system,310 and cause other dislocations as well.311 
4. The Illegality Defense Preserves Judicial Integrity 
The final major argument lodged in favor of broad application of the 
ex turpi causa defense in tort cases is that the integrity of the judicial 
process is defiled if the courts must entertain testimony by criminals and 
perhaps grant judgments to them. 312 
No doubt courts should not be accomplices to criminals, assisting them 
in their criminal designs. As noted above, courts should not enable 
criminals to profit from their crimes. Such actions would truly sully the 
courts' reputation. However, this defiling of a court's image does not 
arise if the court does not allow a plaintiff to profit from crime, but only 
compensates him or her for injuries wrongfully sustained at the hands of 
others. Assuming a suit by one criminal conspirator against another for 
negligent injuries sustained in the course of a getaway, one may ask: Is 
the court's image as. a bastion of justice more damaged by awarding 
plaintiff damages truly caused by defendant's acts than by awarding 
defendant (who is guilty of the same· criminal conduct and additional 
309. Weinrib calls this an "indiscriminate lashing out at the offender." Weinrib, 
supra note 190, at 46. 
310. Even in contract cases, "[a] court may conclude that the [criminal] sanction 
explicitly provided by the legislature is adequate to further the statute's underlying 
policy, without the additional sanction of unenforceability." FARNSWORTH, supra note 
17, at 348 (citing Town Planning & Eng'r Assocs. v. Amesbury Specialty Co., 342 
N.E.2d 706, 711 (Mass. 1976) (Kaplan, J.) ("Our cases warn against the sentimental 
fallacy of piling on sanctions unthinkingly once an illegality is found.")). 
311. For example, if discouraging crime were given as much prominence in other 
areas of the law as it is in tort law by the ex turpi causa defense, we might hold all 
property liability policies void because, it has been argued, insurance against loss from 
theft promotes these crimes because it weakens the incentive of insureds to take adequate 
security measures. See generally M.P. Furmston, The Analysis of Illegal Contracts, 16 
TORONTO L.J. 267, 272 (1965). 
312. Crago, supra note 255, at 551. 
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negligent conduct) immunity from the injuries caused by the latter's 
misdeeds? There is no reason to think so.313 
Some courts invoke the ex turpi causa defense stressing the impropri-
ety of a court's entertaining evidence about criminal misdeeds. The 
integrity of the judicial system is scarcely breached when a court is 
forced to hear such testimony. In America this occurs all the time, often 
on the television evening news or perhaps a court channel on cable TY. 
No judge sits on the bench very long before running into a Bernard 
McCummings. As Judge Owen noted in Smith: 
[l]t has been suggested, as a reason for the denial of a remedy in some 
exceptional cases to a participant in crime, that the courts might properly refuse 
to entertain an action, where evidence would be required of a kind which would 
endanger the dignity of judicial proceedings and tend to bring the courts into 
public disrepute. But courts are required constantly to hear evidence of 
criminal conduct no matter how vile and degrading it may be. The reception 
of evidence of that kind need not be regarded as an affront to the dignity of the 
court. . . . I do not think that the essential reason for a rule by which the courts 
refuse to recognize a right of action in some cases of criminality is a shrinking 
by the court from the seamy facts of life or a scrupulous regard for its dignity 
or reputation.314 
Courts often have to hear vile and degrading evidence regarding a 
defendant :S, misconduct. They will, on occasion, hear evidence 
regarding vile and degrading conduct by the plaintiff that bore no direct 
relationship to the plaintiff's injuries or to the wrong committed. In 
neither of these situations will the court feel bound to exclude the 
evidence because of its. shocking nature. Therefore, it cannot be too 
great a shock to a court's system to hear similar evidence regarding a 
plaintiff's misconduct that may bear on the plaintiff's tort-caused 
injuries.315 The court simply must keep in mind that the fundamental 
313. TRINDADE & CANE, supra note 300, at 212 ("[I]t does no credit to the law that 
an intentional tortfeasor is able to rely upon the illegal nature of the transaction with the 
victim to escape liability for his own intentional and tortious conduct."). 
314. Smith v. Jenkins, 119 C.L.R. 397, 431-32 (1970) (Austl.). 
315. This same argument has been persuasively made in the context of court 
reluctance to enforce illegal contracts: 
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Any turpitude involved in a suit arising from an illegal contract is no worse 
than that disclosed in the sordid cases which the criminal courts entertain daily 
without feelings of wounded dignity or pollution and without covering their 
eyes in holy horror at the display of human iniquity. Civil courts, too-even 
those sitting as "courts of conscience" in equity-do not reject a plaintiff 
whose suit requires a demonstration of the defendant's fraudulent, immoral or 
unlawful acts; but on the contrary they weigh such acts with great care in 
determining the appropriate relief, and without speaking of contamination or 
public scandal. . . . The truth is that in its usual statement this argument has 
an unrealistic, other-world flavor, as if it came from the medieval monks who 
isolated themselves from the world, rather than from judges accustomed to 
dealing with the daily affairs of men good and bad. 
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question being asked is whether the loss sustained by plaintiff should, 
under all the circumstances, be shifted to defendant.316 Judicial 
fastidiousness is no reason to deny compensation if the other prerequi-
sites to legal recovery are present.317 
No doubt, if they had their druthers, attorneys would always represent 
only the purest of the pure and judges would hand out damage awards 
only to church-going mothers of four, injured on their way to an evening 
class in Bible study. But we must realize that the legal profession has 
had some of its finest moments in representing the dregs of society. 
Clarence Darrow, famed "Attorney for the Damned," whose clients were 
often far from saints, shines brightly as a model for aspiring attor-
neys.318 And,. one could easily argue, our Supreme Court's decisions 
that most embody the advancement of western civilization have involved 
protecting the rights of the Clarence Earl Gideons,319 Dollree 
Mapps,320 Danny Escobedos,321 and Ernesto Mirandas322 of the 
world.323 
Wade, supra note 267, at 43-44. 
316. Thayer, supra note 189, at 340. 
317. Shand, supra note 184, at 152 ("Our system of justice is not a beautiful garden 
ornament but is ( or should be) a piece of machinery for social engineering which may 
occasionally require its operators to put on overalls and get their hands dirty."). 
318. See ARTHUR WEINBERG & LILA WEINBERG, CLARENCE DARROW: .A 
SENTIMENTAL REBEL 10 (1980) (quoting letter from William Kunstler stating that 
Darrow "established the ideal of the fighting brave lawyer who will go to the limits of 
his endurance, skill and courage for a client"); KEVIN TIERNEY, DARROW: A BIOGRAPHY 
439 (1979) ("[Darrow] carved his own niche in history, a voice for the inarticulate, the 
oppressed, the poor .... [H]is robust independence left an example for later generations 
to admire."). 
319. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (protecting an accused's right to 
counsel). 
320. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (protecting an accused's right to protection 
from unreasonable searches and seizures). 
321. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (protecting an accused's privilege 
against self-incrimination). 
322. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (creating the now infamous "Miranda 
Rights"). 
323. See ARCHIBALD Cox, THE WARREN COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION AS 
AN INSTRUMENT OF REFORM 88 (1968) ("If Winston Churchill was right in saying that 
'the quality of a nation's civilization can be largely measured by the methods it uses in 
the enforcement of its criminal law,' then the activism of the Warren Court has enabled 
our civilization to give a vastly better account of itself."); Walter V. Schaefer, 
Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV; 1, 26 (1956) ("The quality 
of a nation's civilization can be largely measured by the methods it uses in the 
enforcement of its criminal law."). 
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Simply put, the moral characteristics of the parties before a court have 
little or no relevance to that court's capacity to do justice or injus-
tice.324 And awarding compensation to a wrongdoing victim of 
another's torts does not signal judicial approval of the wrongdoing any 
more than does a court's decision to overturn a criminal conviction on 
technical statutory or constitutional grounds. It merely signals that in 
our system of justice there are often other values to be served.325 
B. Reasons for Virtually Eliminating the Ex Turpi Causa Defense in 
Tort Cases. 
The previous part's discussion shows that there is no persuasive reason 
for courts to recognize a broad-based ex turpi causa defense in tort 
cases. Such a defense does not prevent plaintiffs from profiting from 
their wrongs; it prevents them from being compensated for wrongs done 
to them. Nor can it be shown that the defense deters crime, serves as a 
proper complement to the criminal law, or preserves judicial integrity. 
As noted in the earlier discussion, however, there is a very limited role 
for the ex turpi causa defense in tort litigation. The purpose of this part 
is two-fold. First, it explains the primary positive arguments for the 
virtual elimination of the ex turpi causa defense in tort cases. Second, 
it explains and justifies the argument for a real, but very limited, role in 
tort law for the ex turpi causa defense. 
324. See Shand, supra note 184, at 152. Shand states: 
Id. 
It is not the function of the judge to be shocked, far less to seek out public 
outrage where none may exist or where it may be prejudiced or ill-informed. 
Indeed, it is in those very situations which are [the] most shocking that public 
policy may demand positive intervention and where a denial of relief may 
simply perpetuate the undesirable manifestations of an illegal contract. 
325. In the McCummings case, those other values include a public desire to restrain 
police officers from the use of undue force. Police brutality is still a majot problem in 
this nation, as the Rodney King videotape graphically demonstrates. See Leslie Gevirtz, 
Police Brutality Costs Millions of Dollars, Shatters Lives, REUTERS, Oct. 31, 1991, 
available in LEXIS, Nexus Library, News File. 
The Supreme Court spelled out the constitutional values also at stake when it ruled in 
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. l (1985), that a Tennessee statute authorizing the use of 
deadly force against an unarmed, nondangerous fleeing felony suspect was unconstitu-
tional. The Court explained: ''The suspect's fundamental interest in his own life need not 
be elaborated upon. The use of deadly force also frustrates the interest of the individual, 
and of society, in judicial determination of guilt and punishment." Id. at 9. 
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1. Positive Arguments Supporting the Near Elimination of the Ex 
Turpi Causa Defense in Tort Cases 
As noted above, the major arguments raised over the years in support 
of a broad ex turpi causa defense in tort cases have little validity. 
Furthermore, invocation of this defense severely undermines two 
important aspects of tort law-the compensation function and the 
fairness value. 
a. The Compensation Function of Tort Law 
Perhaps the most important objective of the common law of torts is 
the compensation of injured plaintiffs.326 As Professor Wright noted 
many years ago: 
Arising out of the various and ever-increasing clashes of the activities of 
persons living in a common society, carrying on business in competition with 
fellow members of that society, owning property which may in any of a 
thousand ways affect the persons or property of others-in short, doing all the 
things that constitute modem living-there must of necessity be losses, or 
injuries of many kinds sustained as a result of the activities of others. The 
purpose of the law of torts is to adjust these losses, and to afford compensation 
for injuries sustained as the result of the conduct of another. 327 
Any invocation of the ex turpi causa defense in tort cases occurring 
outside the very limited circumstances outlined later in this part 
significantly undermines this compensation goal. Application of the ex 
turpi causa defense almost always suoordinates compensation, perhaps 
the fundamental purpose of tort law, 328 to goals of lessei: importance 
such as criminal deterrence, support for criminal law, and the image of 
the judicial system.329 
326. See ALLEN M. LINDEN, CANADIAN TORT LAW 3 (4th ed. 1988) ("First and 
foremost, tort law is a compensator."); ROBERT E. KEETON, VENTURING To Do JUSTICE 
147 (1969) (''The primary objective of Anglo-American tort law is fair and just 
compensation for losses."). 
327. Cecil A. Wright, Introduction to the Law of Torts, 8 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 238, 238 
(1944) (emphasis added). 
328. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 173, at 5-6 ("[Tort law] is directed toward the 
compensation of individuals . . . for losses which they have suffered within the scope 
of their legally recognized interests generally .... "). 
329. In his dissenting opinion in Barker v. Kallash, 468 N.E.2d 39 (N.Y. 1984), 
Judge Simons criticized application of the ex turpi causa defense as 
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Indeed, the compensatory function of tort law is virtually ignored in 
all the judicial pronouncements regarding the defense. Courts using the 
"public policy'' approach to ex turpi causa, for example, virtually never 
mention the public policies supporting compensation of persons injured 
by the torts of others. Worse still, courts allowing the ex turpi causa 
defense are more likely to leave injured plaintiffs uncompensated and 
thus with no choice but to resort to welfare or the dole for support. 330 
This is an aspect of public policy not sufficiently considered in such 
cases.331 
b. The Fairness Concept 
Given that an essential component of tort law is compensation, 
doctrines which totally block compensation based on transgressions 
(negligent and/or illegal) by plaintiffs work against the compensation 
goal and, just as importantly, are unfair. Perhaps the most irresistible 
trend in tort law in recent years has been to sweep away such doctrines. 
Thus, both courts· and legislatures have fashioned schemes that apportion 
liability based on fault. 
Contributory Negligence. Consider the contributory negligence 
doctrine, which, like ex turpi causa, reflects the courts' essential 
reluctance to assist persons who themselves areat fault. 332 Of course, 
a return to the old "admonitory" theory of tort liability, the idea that a 
defendant was liable to the plaintiff because of his blameworthiness or fault. 
The rationale of that theory, in its pristine form, was that because the conduct 
of the defendant may have fallen short of criminal activity the injured party 
should be given satisfaction, and the wrongdoer ''punished", by a civil remedy 
of damages in tort. Because this admonitory or punitive function was 
-paramount, a plaintiff who was also guilty of blameworthy conduct was 
similarly punished by being denied relief. Both parties being at fault, the 
courts refused to measure their wrong and let the losses lay where they fell. 
The rigors of such a rule soon became apparent and the law moved towards 
a compensatory theory of tort law which led to the principle of comparative 
liability set forth as early as the turn of the century in statutes such as the first 
Federal Employees Liability Act, followed by the Jones Act, the Merchant 
Marine Act and eventually the comparative negligence statutes enacted in 
several States . . .. 
Id. at 48 (Simons, J., dissenting). 
330. See Jackson v. Harrison, 138 C.L.R. 438, 464-65 (1978) (Austl.) (Murphy, J.). 
331. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 111, at 751 ("[W]here defendants (or their 
insurers) are able to pay some compensation, the public interest is not advanced by 
excusing them and leaving the plaintiff reliant on social security or charitable support."); 
Cecil A. Wright, Editorial Note to Danluk v. Birkner, [1946] 3 D.L.R. 172, 173 
("Participation in crime should not compel an injured man to seek redress from public 
funds rather than from a wrongdoer."). 
332. See Francis H. Bohlen, Contributory Negligence, 21 HARV. L. REV. 233,258 
(1908) ("[Contributory negligence] debars from recovery, even from an admittedly 
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the contributory negligence doctrine originally prevented any recovery 
by a plaintiff whose negligence contributed in any significant fashion to 
his or her own injuries. The.unfairness of the doctrine was well known. 
As Prosser noted: 
The hardship of the doctrine of contributory negligence upon the plaintiff is 
readily apparent. It places upon one party the entire burden of a loss for which 
two are, by hypothesis, responsible. The negligence of the defendant has 
played no less a part in causing the damage; the plaintiff's deviation from the 
community standard of conduct may even be relatively slight, and the 
defendant's quite extreme. The injured person is in all probability, for the very 
reason of his injury, the less able of the two to bear the financial burden of his 
loss, and the answer of the law to all this is that the defendant goes scot free 
of all liability, and the plaintiff bears it all. Nor is it any answer to say that the 
contributory negligence rule promotes caution by making the plaintiff 
responsible for his own safety. It is quite .as reasonable to say that it 
encourages negligence, by giving the defendant reason to hope that he will 
escape the consequences. 3 
The contributory negligence doctrine was so harsh in application that 
judges were constrained to create exceptions to its operation,334 and 
juries often disregarded it in practice. 335 An "increasing social aware-
ness of [the] harsh 'all or nothing' consequences"336 of contributory 
negligence caused most western common-law jurisdictions· to adopt some 
form of comparative negligence or comparative fault so that a minor 
indiscretion by plaintiff no longer requires plaintiff to bear an entire loss 
negligent defendant, one whose own social misconduct has been a concurring proximate 
cause of his harm."). 
333. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 173, at 468-69. 
334. Among those judicially created modifications to the contributory negligence 
defense were rules that plaintiff was not barred from recovery by his or her own 
negligence if: (a) defendant had the "last clear chance" to avoid the accident, (b) 
defendant was guilty of wanton and willful misconduct, (c) defendant was subject to 
strict liability under the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.-H.L. 330 (1868), and (d) 
defendant had violated a statute clearly designed to protect plaintiff. See generally 
Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879, 882-84 (W. Va. 1979) (explaining 
the various judicial modifications to the theory of contributory negligence). 
335. See Donald Wittman, The Price of Negligence Under Differing Liability Rules, 
29 J.L. & ECON. 151, 162 (1986). 
336. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 735, 575 P.2d 1162, 1167, 144 
Cal. Rptr. 380, 385 (1978); see also Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879, 
882 (W. Va. 1979) ("[O]ur system of jurisprudence, while based on concepts of justice 
and fair play, contains an anomaly in which the slightest negligence of a plaintiff 
precludes any recovery and thereby excuses the defendant from the consequences of all 
of his negligence, however great it may be."). 
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caused largely by defendant.337 Thus, comparative negligence or 
comparative fault principles clearly improve the fairness of the tort 
system.338 
Assumption of Risk. Assumption of risk, known in other common-law 
nations as volenti non fit injuria,339 was formerly a total bar to a 
plaintiff's recovery. This was unfair because it absolved a careless ( or 
intentionally wrongdoing) defendant of any liability whatsoever even 
though defendant may have contributed substantially to plaintiff's injury. 
Such immunity for defendant was inconsistent with the basic policies of 
risk distribution underlying tort law.340 
Because of the harshness and unfairness of the original volenti 
doctrine, the trend in most western jurisdictions today is to compare 
plaintiff misconduct in the form of assumption of risk with defendant's 
fault, resulting in only a proportionate reduction in plaintiff's recov-
ery.341 Like comparative fault, and unlike ex turpi causa, the assump-
tion of risk defense's provision for proportionate allocation of loss 
produces a fairer result than an absolute bar to recovery. 
Contribution. Contribution among tortfeasors is also an area of the 
law that illustrates the continuing evolution toward fairer policies 
embodied in proportionate allocation of loss. Originally, courts refused 
337. These provisions talce several fonns, of course. Several jurisdictions have 
adopted "pure" comparative negligence. Most allow plaintiff to achieve a partial 
recovery so long as plaintiff's fault is either (a) less than, or (b) not greater than 
defendant's. See generally William A. Vainisi, Merging Comparative Fault with Strict 
Liability Actions in North Dakota: In Search of a New Day, 61 N.D. L. REV. 7 app. at 
27-29 (1985) (defining the varying degrees of comparative negligence and illustrating 
the states which use each form, as well as the corresponding case law and statutory 
authority); John H. Leskera, Comment, Change from "Pure" Comparative Negligence 
to "Modified'.' Comparative Negligence -Will It Alleviate the Insurance Crisis?, 32 
ST. LoUIS U. L.J;· 753 app. at 773-76 (1988) (illustrating which states apply pure 
comparative negligence, modified comparative negligence, and contributory negligence 
as a complete defense, and citing the relevant primary authority in those states). 
338. See Jordan H. Leibman & Anne S. Kelly, Accountants' Liability to Third 
Parties for Negligent Misrepresentation: The Search for a New Limiting Principle, 30 
AM. Bus. L.J. 345, 387 (1992) ("A comparative fault regime would appear to meet tort 
law's fairness and deterrence objectives more effectively than one in which contributory 
negligence is a complete defense."). 
339. Literally, "one is not legally injured ifhe has consented to the act complained 
of or was willing that it should occur." BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 1349 (3d ed. 
1969). 
340. Victor E. Schwartz, Strict Liability and Comparative Negligence, 42 TENN. L. 
REV. 171, 176 (1974) (addressing the products liability area). 
341. See, e.g., Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 732, 575 P.2d 1162, 
1167, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380,385 (1978); Coney v. J. L.G. Indus., 454_N.E.2d 197,200 (Ill. 
1983). See generally Robert L. Walsh, Note, Assumption of Risk Merges with 
Comparative Negligence, 31 LoY. L. REV. 401 (1985) (discussing several American 
cases taking this point of view). 
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to grant contribution to a tortfeasor on the same grounds that they 
invoked the ex turpi causa defense.342 Most particularly, courts 
reasoned that by denying contribution. they were preventing a wrongdoer 
from profiting from his wrongs and they were protecting the judiciary's 
honor by refusing to lend their aid to a wrongdoer. 343 Indeed, some 
authorities trace the origins of the common law's no-contribution rule to 
the Highwayman :S, Case, which is also a foundation case for the 
illegality defense.344 
This reasoning is terribly outmoded.345 With the exception of 
occasional nooks and crannies, a regime allowing contribution has 
342. Daniel Waltz, Note, Total Equitable Indemnity Under Comparative 
Negligence: Anomaly or Necessity?, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1057, 1061 (1986) (explaining that 
the rule against contribution among joint tortfeasors "echoed the Latin maxim ex turpi 
causa non oritur actio"). 
343. See Robert A. Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. 
PA. L. REV. 130, 132 (1932) ("[T]he rule refusing contribution between joint tortfeasors 
is rooted in this same unwillingness of courts to aid persons whose conduct has not 
measured up to legal standards [ as was demonstrated in the famous ex turpi causa case 
arising out of a charivari, Gilmore v. Fuller, 65 N.E. 84 (Ill. 1902))."); see also Skinner 
v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 374 N.E.2d 437, 442 (Ill. 1977), modified, 
374 N.E.2d 444 (Ill.), cert. denied sub nom., Hinckley Plastic, Inc v. Reed-Prentice Div. 
Package Mach. Co., 436 U.S. 946 (1978) (rejecting this rationale as no longer 
persuasive). 
344. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text. After noting that the court 
fined the solicitors and beheaded both plaintiff and defendant, Prosser commented on the 
Highwayman's Case: "In short, contribution was not allowed." WILLIAM L. PROSSER, 
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 1112 n.23 (1941). See generally, Guy M. Hodges, 
Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 26 TEX. L. REV. 150 (1947). 
However, most authorities trace the common law's old no-contribution rule to 
Merryweather v. Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799). See, e.g., Theodore W. Reath, 
Contribution Between Persons Jointly Charged for Negligenc'7-Merryweather v. 
Nixan, 12 HARV. L. REV. 176, 176 (1898) (noting that Merryweather is usually cited as 
the leading case for the proposition that "[a]s between conscious, willful, malicious, or 
intentional joint wrongdoers, or tort-feasors who are in pari delicto, neither the law or 
equity will intervene to adjust the damage by enforcing contribution"); Note, Contribu-
tion and Indemnity Among Joint Wrongdoers, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 94, 94 (1932) 
("Merryweather v. Nixan is generally accepted as the origin · of the doctrine that 
contribution will not be enforced among joint wrongdoers .... "). 
Merryweather itself has been criticized as a misapplication of the principle of ex turpi 
causa non oritur actio, further emphasizing the intertwining of the outmoded no-
contribution rule with the ex turpi causa defense. See J. Fischer Williams, The Rule in 
Merryweather v. Nixan, 17 LAW Q. REV. 293,301 (1901). 
345. See generally Francis H. Bohlen, Contribution and Indemnity Between 
Tortfeasors, 21 CORNELL L. REV. 552, 559 (1957) (rejecting notion that wrongdoers 
must always be denied a judicial forum). 
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replaced the old no-contribution regime in most western nations.346 
The reason for this evolution in the law has been clear: "The lack of 
contribution is quintessentially unfair."347 This was recognized by the 
Supreme Court which has concluded that equitable considerations require 
that damage liability be assessed according to proportional fault 
whenever possible.348 Granting contribution does not allow wrongdo-
ers to profit, but simply allows them to mitigate a loss,349 a lesson that 
should be applied when the ex turpi causa defense is raised in tort cases. 
The ex turpi causa defense is inconsistent with the trend toward 
proportional liability, and tends to emasculate its fairness goal. 350 In 
346. See Richard W. Wright, Allocating Liability Among Multiple Responsible 
Causes: A Principled Defense of Joint and Several Liability for Actual Harm and Risk 
Exposure, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1141, 1183 (1988) ("In England and almost all other 
countries, joint and several liability with contribution has long been the rule."). 
347. Jonathan M. Jacobson, Contribution Among Antitrust Defendants: A Necessary 
Solution to a Recurring Problem, 32 U. FLA. L. REV. 217, 238 (1980); see also John H. 
Langmore & Robert A. Prentice, Contribution Under Section 12 of the Securities Act 
of 1933: The Existence and Merits of Such a Right, 40 EMORY L.J. 1015, 1062 (1991) 
("[T]here can be no justice in a wrongdoer escaping liability for the wrong caused by 
his or her fault."); M. Patricia Adamski, Contribution and Settlement in Multiparty 
Actions Under Rule l0b-5, 66 IOWA L. REV. 533, 541 (1981) ("[F]undamental fairness 
requires that the financial loss caused by joint wrongdoers be apportioned among 
them."); Martin Turck, Contribution Between Tortfeasors in American and German 
Law-A Comparative Study, 41 TuL. L. REV. 1, 10 (1966) ("Justice involves the 
principle of equality, which is violated if, when several parties are involved in the same 
fault, one alone bears the total loss."); Leflar, supra note 343, at 141 (stating that refusal 
to grant contribution creates "obvious injustice"). 
348. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 411 (1975) 
("[W]orldwide experience has taught that that goal [ of just and equitable allocation of 
damages] can be more nearly realized by a standard that allocates liability for damages 
according to comparative fault whenever possible."). As Reliable Transfer indicates, 
the Supreme Court has, for similar fairness reasons, often advanced regimes of 
comparative fault and contribution. E.g., Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 
417 U.S. 106, 111 (1974) (adopting contribution in admiralty cases on grounds that "a 
'more equal distribution of justice' can best be achieved by ameliorating the common-
law rule against contribution"). 
Although many courts are reluctant to allow contribution to intentional wrongdoers, 
there is no reason not to do so if they are seeking recovery from others who are equally 
at fault. Langmore & Prentice, supra note 347, at 1068 ("[I]t is fair to allow intentional 
wrongdoers to seek contribution from other intentional wrongdoers because their claim 
for compensation arises not from the wrong done to the plaintiff, but from the righting 
of that wrong."). 
349. B. Franklin MacPherson, Comment, Contribution and the Distribution of Loss 
Among Tortfeasors, 25 AM. U. L. REV. 203, 213 (1975) ("The right to contribution is 
not created by the tort,· but by satisfaction of the judgment, which repairs the harm done 
by the tort. Hence, the contribution action is based not on a wrong, but upon its 
compensation---an act which cannot be said to soil the hands of the perfonner."). 
350. See, e.g., Gibson, supra note 266, at 91 (ex turpi causa defense inconsistent 
with trend away from contributory negligence and consent defenses); Thayer, supra 
note 189, at 341-42 (reinforcement of absolute effect of contributory negligence 
defense's "discrimination against the plaintiff [by ex turpi causa] would come oddly at 
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the joint wrongdoer context, like the common-law no-contribution rule, 
it leaves the total loss upon just one of two wrongdoers. 351 
In short, there has been a generally irresistible tide in western comm.on 
and statutory law away from the harsh regimes of contributory negli-
gence, volenti, and no-contribution. 352 Just like the ex turpi causa 
defense, all three doctrines were originally based upon the courts' 
reluctance to assist wrongdoers. All three doctrines have been greatly 
restricted or even eliminated in order to enhance the equity and justice 
of western law. 
To revive ex turpi causa as an absolute defense is, in the words of 
Professor Weinrib, "retrograde."353 It allows judges to reach harsh 
results that are inconsistent with both the modem comparative fault and 
assumption of risk defenses, thereby undermining the purposes of the 
more modem approaches,354 many of which are based on legislative 
enactment. Indeed, "[O]ne is left with the feeling that contributory 
negligence apportionment provides a far safer tool for doing substantial 
justice on a case-to-case basis, and produces results more likely to appeal 
to 'fair-minded and right thinking people' than this stark and retributive 
defence of illegality." 55 
2. The Limited Role of Ex Turpi Causa 
Earlier discussions noted a few very limited situations in which t];ie 
defense of ex turpi causa is properly applied in tort cases. Essentially, 
there are three such situations. First, ex turpi causa should serve as a 
a time when the defense itself is crumbling at many points under attacks both legislative 
and judicial"); Note, The Plaintiff's Breach of Statutory Duty as a Bar in an Action of 
Tort, 39 HARV. L. REV. 1088, 1090 (1926) (ex turpi causa 's "continued advocacy seems 
particularly unfortunate at a time when the rigor of the defence of contributory 
negligence is being gradually relaxed"). 
351. Williams, supra note 11 l, at 752 (ex turpi causa allows defendants "to turn 
the flank of contributory negligence and side-step the statutory prohibition against 
volentt'). 
352. See Jordan H. Liebman, Comparative Contribution and Intentional Torts: A 
Remaining Roadblock to Damages Apportionment, 30 AM. Bus. L.J. 677, 677 (1993) 
("The trend to apportion damages among parties in tort litigation has proceeded 
inexorably, yet cautiously, in the United States."). 
353. Weinrib, supra note 190, at 37. 
354. MacDougall, supra note 191, at 38, 41. 
355. John Levine, Annotation, in Mongovius v. Marchand, 44 C.C.L.T. 18 (B.C. 
1988), quoted in Pierre Legrand Jr., La dynamique de l'impunite: autour de la defense 
d'ex turpi causa en common law des de/its civils, 36 McGILL L.J. 609, 629 (1991). 
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defense if the legislature has made it clear that a law it has enacted is to 
disable violators from civil recovery.356 Second, plaintiffs should not 
profit from their wrongdoing by (a) recovering as damages lost wages 
or earnings from illegal enterprises, (b) recovering punitive damages 
over and above compensatory damages,357 or (c) somehow placing 
themselves in a position superior to that of law abiders.358 Third, 
plaintiffs should not be allowed to receive compensation in tort for 
criminal fines or other punishments the law has imposed upon them,359 
or to recover money or property properly seized by the law enforcement 
authorities,360 thereby stultifying the criminal law. 361 
The rationale for this very limited role for the ex turpi causa defense 
in tort law has been best explained by Judge McLachlin in his thoughtful 
opinion in Hall v. Herbert. Although he expressed some sympathy for 
the view expressed by Judge Cory that the defense should be totally 
eliminated, he stated: 
My own view is that courts should be allowed to bar recovery in tort on the 
ground of the plaintiff's immoral or illegal conduct only in very limited 
circumstances. The basis of this power, as I see it, lies in the duty of the courts 
to preserve the integrity of the legal system, and is exercisable only where this 
concern is in issue. This concern is in issue where a damage award in a civil 
suit would, in effect, allow a person to profit from illegal or wrongful conduct, 
or would permit an evasion or rebate of a penalty prescribed by the criminal 
law. The idea common to these instances is that the law refuses to give by its 
right hand what it takes away by its left hand.362 
356. See supra part IV.A (explaining that this will be a very rare occurrence). 
357. Even this rule arguably punishes plaintiff in some cases. Denial of punitive 
damages, it has been pointed out, may leave plaintiff undercompensated given that one-
third of the compensatory damages will likely go to plaintiffs lawyer. Fleming, supra 
note 277, at 179 n.21. . 
358. See supra notes 263-64 and accompanying text. 
359. See supra notes 261-62 and accompanying text; see also Blain v. The Doctor's 
Co., 222 Cal. App. 3d 1065, 272 Cal. Rptr. 250 (1990) (denying recovery to a doctor 
who lied at deposition in civil case to his ultimate detriment from insurance defense 
counsel who allegedly advised him to do so); Feld & Sons v. Pechner, 458 A.2d 545 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (denying recovery to plaintiffs convicted of federal perjury and 
other crimes from counsel who allegedly urged them to commit the offenses); Kirkland 
v. Mannis, 639 P.2d 671 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) (denying recovery to plaintiff perjurer from 
attorney who allegedly cooperated in the perjurious tale). 
360. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text (discussing a New Zealand case 
that erroneously allowed such a recovery). 
361. In a roughly analogous situation, some courts have held that savings and loan. 
officials accused of wrongdoing should not be allowed to raise in their defense the 
contributory negligence of government regulators in failing to detect and report the 
wrongdoing. See, e.g., In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 818 F. Supp. 840-41 (E.D. Pa. 1993). 
(holding that an auditor defendant was not allowed to raise FDIC's careless regulation, 
as part of a comparative negligence defense). 
362. Hall v. Herbert, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 159, 169 (emphasis added). After surveying 
a number of cases, Judge McLachlin also concluded that the best explanation for their 
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This is certainly not a new idea in the law. Many years ago an 
American court noted that "[t]he law is not properly chargeable with the 
absurdity of implying an obligation to do that which it forbids."363 
Similarly, the law is not properly chargeable with the absurdity of 
allowing a plaintiff to profit from acts which it forbids or allowing a 
plaintiff to avoid a punishment which the law prescribes. 
After examining several examples consistent with the rules described 
above, Judge McLachlin submitted that the "fundamental rationale for 
the defence of ex turpi causa ... [is] based on the need to maintain 
internal consistency in the law, in the interest of promoting the integrity 
of the justice system."364 
Thus, the instincts of the courts applying the public policy approach 
have been correct all along. Civil tort plaintiffs should not actually 
profit from wrongdoing. The criminal law should not be neutralized. 
Unfortunately, the courts have painted with too broad a brush. In all of 
its various manifestations-duty rule, public policy approach, proximate 
cause rule, etc.--the ex turpi causa defense has generally been applied 
much too broadly. If the doctrine is to do ·more good than harm in the 
tort context, it must be strictly limited (indeed, nearly eliminated) as 
discussed in this part. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Holmes once said that law is "the witness and external deposit of our 
moral life. Its history is the history· of the moral development of the 
holdings was not simply a desire to prevent plaintiffs from profiting from their 
wrongdoing: 
A more satisfactory explanation for these cases, I would venture, is that to 
allow recovery in these cases would be to allow recovery for what is illegal. 
It would put the courts in the position of saying that the same conduct is both 
legal, in the sense of being capable of rectification by the court, and illegal. 
It would, in short, introduce an inconsistency in the law. It is particularly 
important in this context that we bear in mind that the law must aspire to be 
a unified institution, the parts of which--contract, tort, the criminal law-must 
be in essential harmony. For the courts to punish conduct with the one hand 
while rewarding it with the other, would be to "create an intolerable fissure in 
the law's conceptually seamless web." We thus see that the concern, put at 
its most fundamental, is with the integrity of the legal system. 
Id. at 176 (quoting Weinrib, supra note 190, at 42). 
363. Edison Blee. Co. v. City of Pasadena, 178 F. 425,431 (9th Cir. 1910). 
364. Hall, 2 S.C.R. at 178 (emphasis added). 
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race."365 Tort law, particularly, has a strong moral component.366 
Nothing should be done to undermine Holmes's description or to lend 
the judicial system's support to advance wrongdoing. However, "[m]oral 
indignation must not be mistaken for public policy."367 For that 
reason, the answer to the question posed in the title of this Article is 
"no." The obscure equitable doctrine ex turpi causa non oritur actio 
should not be used in a misguided attempt to blunt the litigation crisis 
in the United States or in other western common-law nations. 
Though contract law and tort law each have a strong moral compo-
nent, moral standards are just one of several public policy considerations 
that go into shaping both bodies of law.368 The law-and tort law 
especially-does not distribute compensation based on who is a good 
person and who is not.369 The ex turpi causa defense blurs the lines 
between our gut hesitation to aid a wrongdoer and the more important 
public policies underlying tort law, allowing the former to exert undue 
influence.370 The doctrine leads the courts to focus improperly upon 
365. 0. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,459 (1897); see 
also A.L. GoODHART, ENGLISH LAW AND THE MORAL LAW 37 (1953) (noting that 
"morality has played a particularly important part in the development of the common 
law"). 
366. See SIMON F. LEE, LAW AND MORALS 18 (1986) ("Behind the technical law 
of tort ... are competing moral principles .... "); Ernest J. Weinrib, Thinking About 
Tort Law, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 717, 717 (1992) (explaining the "moral ground" needed 
to link a plaintiff and defendant in order to create liability). Professor Weinrib correctly 
observes that tort law has an intrinsic moral component that renders simple economic 
analysis of tort law inadequate. See Ernest J. Weinrib, The Special Morality of Tort 
Law, 34 McGILL L.J. 403, 404 (1989). _ 
367. Jenkins v. Smith, [1969] V.R. 267, 276 (Starke, J.). Holmes himself also said 
that "[m]oral predilections must not be allowed to influence our minds in settling legal 
distinctions." 0. w. HOLMES, JR. THE CO1™ON LAW 148 (1881). 
368. See Shand, supra note 184, at 147 ("[T]he moralistic concept ofcontract law, 
as opposed to utilitarian or pragmatic justifications for enforcing bargains, is open to 
dispute."). 
369. F.C. Cronkite, Effect of the Violation of a Statute by the Plaintiff in a Tort 
Action, 7 CAN. B. REV. 67, 83 (1929) ("When a defendant comes into court and argues 
that he should not make good the damage he has caused, and gives as his sole reason 
that the plaintiff is also a bad man, he is making the oldest retort of the human mind 
when charged with evil."). 
370. CHRISTOPHER F. MOONEY, S.J., PUBLIC VIRTUE at xi (1986) ("Morality and 
public policy may be related .. . But the two are also clearly distinct, since not every 
ethical value promotes the common good."). 
An obvious example of the distinction between moral obligation and legal obligation 
lies in the "Good Samaritan" doctrine, holding that there is no legal obligation to 
emulate the hero of the famous Biblical parable. Luke 10:30-37. See also Robert A. 
Prentice, Expanding the Duty to Rescue, 19 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 15 (1985) (arguing, 
primarily on public policy grounds, for a limitation on the Good Samaritan doctrine). See 
generally FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS 1 (2d ed. 1986) ("A sharp 
distinction was recognized between the obligations of the common law and those of 
ethics or humanitarianism."). 
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the punctilios of the plaintiff rather than the public policy factors that 
should underlie a reasoned assignment of legal responsibility.371 
The problem is particularly acute in cases where the plaintiff's 
illegality involves a simple breach of a regulatory statute,372 and cases 
in which there is no illegality at all, but simply a breach of moral 
standards.373 Cases where ex turpi causa allows an immoral defendant 
to escape an otherwise applicable legal duty are also especially 
troublesome. 
Even in the contract area where the illegality doctrine was born and 
developed, it has vexed the judiciary,374 and its application has been 
the subject of frequent criticism by legal commentators both in the 
United States and abroad.375 Indeed, New Zealand has gone so far as 
In criminal law also, the emphasis on morality can inappropriately overwhelm other 
public policy factors. In drafting the Model Penal Code, the American Law Institute 
noted this fact, stating: "We deem it inappropriate for the government to attempt to 
control behavior that has no substantial significance except to the morality of the actor. 
Such matters are best left to religious, educational and other social influences." MODEL 
PENAL CODE§ 207.1 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955). 
371. Weinrib, supra note 190, at 37 ("Thus in Godbolt the fact that the litigants 
happened to be engaged in the theft of cattle when the defendant negligently drove his 
truck off the road and injured the plaintiff seems more pertinent to an assessment of the 
plaintiffs character than to the ascription of responsibility to the defendant for his 
careless act."). 
372. In a contract case, such a consideration led Lord Devlin to note that the 
illegality defense "cares not at all for the element of deliberation or the gravity of the 
infraction, and does not adjust the penalty to the profits unjustifiably earned." St. John 
Shipping Corp. v. Joseph Rank, Ltd., [1957] 1 Q.B. 267, 281. The same criticism may 
be made of most approaches to the illegality defense in tort cases. It seems particularly 
important that the injured plaintiff not be rendered a wolfs head (or, perhaps, a Zoe 
Baird) for a minor, technical violation of regulatory standards. 
373. Hubert W. Smith, Antecedent Grounds of Liability in the Practice of Surgery, 
14 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 233, 271 (1942) ("Why should a breach of morals destroy a 
legal right of action when it will not confer one?"). 
374. Andrew Beck, Illegality and the Courts' Discretion: The New Zealand Illegal 
Contracts Act in Action, 13 N.Z. U. L. REV. 389, 389 (1989) ("Illegal contracts have 
always provided something of a headache to the judiciary .... "); R.A. Buckley, 
Illegality in Contract and Conceptual Reasoning, 12 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 280, 281 
(1983) ("[T]his branch of the law [has produced] an unusually high proportion of cases 
in which the judicial reasoning seems both questionable and difficult to follow."); 
Strong, supra note 267, at 347 ("The illegality of contracts constitutes a vast, confusing 
and rather mysterious area of the law."). 
375. See generally Brian Coote, Another Look at Bowmakers v. Barnet 
Instruments, 35 MOD. L. REV. 38, 38 (1972) ("The common law on illegal contracts is 
Draconian ... in all conscience .... "); Shand, supra note 184, at 167 ("The frequently 
expressed dissatisfaction of the judges with the consequences of applying the present 
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to replace the common-law doctrine with a new statutory scheme.376 
If courts have developed a wariness about the illegality defense even in 
contract cases,377 how much greater must the problems be when it is 
transplanted to the relatively foreign soil of tort law?378 
Whether the context be tort law, contract law, or criminal law, judges 
must not be overly fastidious, fearing that they will muss their robes if 
they must hear unsavory evidence or consider the claims of unwhole-
some individuals. Justice, not an elevated sense of judicial propriety, 
must be the guiding star. 
None of the cases discussed in part II of this Article379--not even 
that of Bernard McCummings----should be dismissed on ex turpi causa 
grounds. Use of the ex turpi causa defense beyond the limited 
parameters outlined in this Article serves no good purpose; rather, it 
undermines the compensatory and fairness features of our tort law 
system. 
Notwithstanding all the foregoing discussion, the McCummings 
verdict, mentioned in the introductory quotations, still grates at a visceral 
level. This grating may not go away when it is remembered that of all 
the scenarios discussed in part II as possibly giving rise to an ex turpi 
causa defense, the McCummings case involved, by a wide margin, the 
most serious form of plaintiff misconduct. The answer to this visceral 
irritation is two simple words: Rodney King. Carelessly applied, as it 
often is in other western common-law jurisdictions, the ex turpi causa 
defense would likely have barred any suit brought by Rodney King 
against the Los Angeles Police Department for injuries sustained during 
illegality rules is ample indication of their desire to be freed from them."); ·Hazel Carty, 
Illegal Contracts of Employment, Void or Contractually Unenforceable?, NEW L.J., 
Aug. 20, 1981, at 871; K. Gillance & A.N. Khan, Effect of Illegality in Contract of 
Employment, SOLIC. J., March 27, 1981, at 212, 213. 
376. See generally Brian Coote, Validation Under the Illegal Contracts Act, 15 
N.Z. U. L. REV. 80 (1992). 
377. Royal Bank of Can. v. Grohman, 18 O.R.2d 636, 651-52 (1977) (Krever, J.) 
("[M]odern judicial thinking has developed in a way that has considerably refined the 
knee-jerk reflexive reaction to a plea of illegality."). 
378. As MacDougall explains: 
Ex turpi causa non oritur actio works in contract law because the plaintiff 
has consented to what he or she (presumably) knows is an illegal arrangement. 
The court cannot be used to enforce what the plaintiff expected to derive from 
an illegal arrangement. In tort cases, the situation is different. The plaintiff, 
presumably, is punished by the criminal or other law for the wrong he or she 
has committed and is deprived of all other profits that he or she might have 
expected from the wrongful act. To say that the plaintiff must also bear the 
burden of uncontemplated damages for which he or she is not "at fault" is 
insupportable. 
MacDougall, supra note 191, at 38. 
379. See supra notes 57-74 and accompanying text. 
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the notorious video-taped beating. Rodney King has not lived his life 
as a model citizen, but his alleged criminal acts on the night in question 
(and those occurring before and since) do not disentitle him from the 
protection of the law. Nor should they neutralize the other public policy 
factors that might mitigate in favor of a judgment against the police in 
his case. If what appears on the videotape to have happened actually did 
happen, the jury's $3.8 million verdict in favor of Mr. King was 
certainly justifiable.380 There may be a principled method of distin-
guishing between the Rodney King and Bernard McCummings cases, but 
the ex turpi causa doctrine cannot provide it. 381 Both are excessive-
use-of-force cases and entitlement to recovery should tum on factual 
determinations unaffected by the ex turpi causa defense. 
Legislatures and courts should not revive the ex turpi causa defense 
in tort cases. They should not hastily undermine the compensatory 
function of tort law in order to effectuate some perceived need to reduce 
the amount of existing tort litigation. 
380. King Jury May Be Key to Appeal, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 3, 1994, at 
SA. 
381. Up to this point, I have not directly defended the McCummings verdict. 
However, the verdict is definitely defensible. There was substantial evidence that the 
shooting officer, Officer Rodriguez, who had several earlier incidents of questionable use 
of his firearm, (a) did not see the mugging take place, (b) shot the unarmed 
McCummings as McCummings was running away and posing no threat to Rodriguez or 
others, ( c) did so in clear violation of guidelines imposed by his employer in accordance 
with Supreme Court mandate, and ( d) lied about his actions on the witness stand (his 
testimony was contradicted by _the testimony of McCummings, of the mugging victim, 
of his fellow officers, and by the available physical evidence-unless it is possible for 
a person to run down a flight of stairs after having his spinal cord severed in the mid-
chest area). See generally McCummings v. New York City Transit Auth., 580 N.Y.S.2d 
931 (1992), ajf'd, 613 N.E.2d 559 (N.Y. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 548 (1993). 
The recovery by McCummings from the tortfeasor has the advantage of providing him 
with funds needed to compensate his victim who sued him for damages. William 
Murphy, Mugging Victim Wins Court Order, NEWSDAY, Dec. 24, 1993, at 24. It will 
also pay his attorney's fees from his criminal defense. 
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